THE TURKS IN EUROPE

Qu'est ce que la Turquie?

La Turquie est le pays classique des massacres. . . . Son histoire se résume à ceci: pillages, meurtres, vols, concussions—sur toutes les échelles—révoltes, insurrections, répressions, guerres étrangères, guerres civiles, révolutions, contre-révolutions, séditions, mutineries. . . .

ARSÈNE PERLANT,
Eternelle Turquie.

"To murder a man is a crime; to massacre a nation is a question."

VICTOR HUGO, 1876.

THE TURKS IN EUROPE

A SKETCH-STUDY

BY W. E. D. ALLEN

WITH A PREFACE BY
BRIG.-GEN. H. CONYERS SURTEES, C.M.G., D.S.O.

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DEDICATION

To My Beloved Father—

To you I dedicate this chronicle of men's savageness and meanness. To you, who were so brilliant and so simple; so faultless yourself yet so tolerant of fault in others; so gentle that you could not kill a bird; so kind that men marvelled; so forbearing that they thought you weak; so generous that they thought you fool. You were so quick of comprehension, yet so patient of stupidity in others. You could always forgive, and always understand. Men wondered when you repaid vilest ingratitude with renewed kindness. You who so loved Music and Books and Art, and to roam in the wild places of the earth, and linger in its ancient cities, were for ever imprisoned in an office. You began to work when most boys begin to learn; you spent the best years of your life in drudgery, working often till midnight. You carried for years, while you were dying, the responsibilities and burdens of ten men. You never had a moment's rest, a moment's freedom from care. Your every waking hour was a working hour. You were suffering an illness which, born

of overstrain, brought with it terrible depression. Yet you never complained; to the last you were always charming, always gracious; few even thought you might be ill. To me it does not seem sacrilege to compare you with the Perfect Man.

And with all this you never set yourself above your fellows; a saint, you were yet a man of the world. Bad men as well as good men came to you for comfort and advice. You who had lived in the world, and not merely in its hot-houses, could understand the tragedies of the world. To you the only social pariah was the social "climber"—he who despises those who are below him in Life's ladder, the sycophant, the "time-server."

You could mingle with men of every kind; and all men would listen to you. An accomplished gentleman, your tastes were plain and modest; a philosopher, you remained a believer. Though you knew the world, and had been used ill by men, you believed that there was good in all men, and beauty in all things: you had an Irishman's sense of humour, but no man dared talk scandal in your hearing.

Now you are gone, and a man wise and simple, strong and gentle, is gone from a world which has need of him.

But you have left behind you an example for your sons and for others, of what a man can be.

PREFACE

The study of the Ottoman Empire as it existed up to the time of the outbreak of the great European War affords a wide field for the examination of the subjects of Oriental warfare and rulership, as well as of the general movements of Turkish Society, and the author of this book is to be congratulated on having—by a careful and highly intelligent study of the recognised authorities—produced a work which is worthy to take its place amongst the most reliable of the short histories of the nations.

Especially interesting is his account of the Near Eastern crisis of 1876-78, as is also the description of the origin and rise of the "Committee of Union and Progress."

Having myself been a witness in an official capacity of the events which took place in Constantinople in 1908-9, as well as having been an observer of the preponderating influence there exercised by Germany as represented by that most masterful and astute of diplomatists, Baron Marschal von Bieberstein, I am able to testify to Mr Allen's accuracy, although I am inclined

to think he has, if anything, erred on the side of leniency in the way in which he has treated the entire lack of sympathy with the aspirations of the Turks as evinced by our then diplomatic methods.

Shorn of its former might, we are now witnessing the once great and glorious empire of Suleiman the Magnificent being reduced to the status of an Asiatic Amirate.

"How are the mighty fallen, and the weapons of war perished!"—2 Sam. i. 27.

H. Conyers Surtees,
Brig.-Gen. (retired),
Late Mil. Attaché at Constantinople and Athens.

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CHAPTER I

THE GREAT SULTANS (1288-1566)

I

For five hundred years an army of occupation has held South-Eastern Europe. When a hostile army occupies a country, all the ordinary life comes to a standstill: there is little trade, no social intercourse, probably misery and privation. A few years, even a few months, of enemy occupation has a disastrous effect. Yet for five hundred years the South-East of Europe has suffered this.

When the "Turkish Night" overshadowed the Balkan lands, all trade, all art, all literature, all education, all social progress ceased. The Bulgaria of Tsar Simeon was as progressive as the England of Edward the Confessor; the Serbia of Stephen Dushan was as advanced as the France of St Louis. But to-day the Serbs, the Bulgars, the Greeks, and the Albanians are without a national culture, without political institutions, without coherent traditions, without a history. They are the men of the Fifteenth Century: they understand only the argument of force and the

diplomacy of treachery; they have the mentality of mediæval brigands.

The Austrian domination has had a similar effect, though to a lesser degree, upon the subject races of the Dual Monarchy. The system which allowed men "to carry their heads for one year," scarcely admitted the right to live, certainly not the right to think.

The Turks' arrogant tolerance of subject religions, if not so oppressive, was more debasing than the brutal proselytising of the Spaniards.

The "Turkish Night" is the negation of history.

How was it possible for an obscure tribe of nomad shepherds from the steppes of Central Asia to impose its dominion upon a dozen nations of Europe?

To find an answer to this question it is necessary to examine the political condition of Europe towards the middle of the Thirteenth Century, when the Osmanli entered Armenia. Europe was young and men were struggling in the twilight of understanding. Dimly conceived ideas were beginning to shake the belief of men in the traditions and delusions of twelve hundred years. It was a time when all men fought, but few men thought. The terrors of the first thousand years of the Christian era were passing. The successive barbarian invasions, German, Finnish, Slavic, Mongolian, had spent themselves, and Charlemagne had re-established the Empire of the West. But the fear of invasion from the steppes still overshadowed the life of Eastern Europe, and towards the middle of the Thirteenth Century another great movement was beginning which was to sweep away the

decaying Caliphate, and carry death and destruction across Russia, Hungary, and Poland. Western Europe was a patchwork of artificial states and great hereditary dominions, and men, fighting out the quarrels of the rival barons, had unconsciously begun the struggle for self-determination and self-government. In England the feud between Norman and Saxon was no more than a memory, and the Plantagenets, firmly established on the throne, were disputing their sovereign rights with the barons. The great national struggle between England and France was not yet to begin for half a century. In France, St Louis was neglecting the State for the phantom heroics of the Holy Land; in Italy, the Angevins were spilling blood freely for the worthless crown of Naples; Christian Spain was a prey to baronial wars; the Moorish hegemony was yet unchallenged; Germany, Hungary, the Greek Empire, and Rome were embroiled in futile intrigue and treachery over the Crusades, and year after year wild, undisciplined, enthusiastic hordes passed across Europe to be betrayed and pillaged by Hungarian or Greek or slaughtered by the Seldjuks in the defiles of Asia Minor. Palestine was the grave of all the savage exuberance of a young Europe.

II

About the middle of the Eleventh Century, the disintegration caused by the civil wars, rife in the shreds of the Arab Empire, and the consequent unprotected state of the Eastern provinces of the

Caliphate, had tempted the Turkish tribes inhabiting the regions to the north-east of Khorasan to indulge in numerous raids into the neighbouring territories; a certain Togrhul Bey, whose abilities had raised him above the common ruck of raider chiefs, overthrew the Mahommedan dynasties of Ghazna and Isfahan, and overran Khorasan, Persia, and Armenia, founding in Lesser Asia the first Turkish Seldjuk dynasty. The simple nomads soon adopted the religion and manners of the conquered, intermarried with Arabs and Persians, and attained to a certain level of culture. But on the one hand they had to bear the brunt of the Crusading wars, and, on the other, the shock of fresh barbarian inroads.

And towards the middle of the Thirteenth Century the Seldjuk amirates were tottering before the renewed and vigorous attacks of the Tatars. The Tatar menace was at its height; the sons of Chingiz were founding khanates for themselves in the ruins of Russia; in 1292, Batu had devastated Hungary as far as Trieste. The yearly inroads of these "Tatares vagabonds, qui pillent, qui fuient, et qui reparaissent pour fuir encore," were making of Asia Minor a shambles and a desert. About this time a small Turki shepherd tribe, fugitive from the Tatars, left its pastures in Central Asia, and, wandering through Persia and Armenia, halted for some years in the region of Erzerum. Here after a time they divided; the majority returned to Central Asia, but about 420 families, under Er-Togrhul, their chief, wandered into Asia Minor. There is a well-known tradition of the origin of their prosperity—these Turks came one day upon

a battle, and, ignorant of the identity of both the combatants, took the part of the losing side and succeeded in turning the scale. They discovered that they had succoured Aladdin, the Seldjuk Sultan of Konieh, against a horde of Tatars. As a reward, Er-Togrhul was given the towns of Eski Shehr and Sugut, about sixty miles to the south-east of Brûsa, as a fief of the Seldjuks.

Thus the wandering shepherds laid the foundation of empire. But it was an age when everything was fluid, and it was no uncommon thing for an adventurous warrior or powerful chief to assume independence. The little Turk-Arab principalities which resulted were continually rising and falling according to the ability of the father or the weakness of the son, warring with each other, engaged in unequal struggle with the Tatars, and raiding the lands of the Greek Emperor.

The bulk of Asia Minor was then divided up into innumerable sultanates, amirates, and khanates, all ephemeral enough, which were being raised on the ruins of the Seldjukian Empire. But in the north-west the Greeks still held Brûsa, Nicæa, and Nicomedia. On the coast of the Black Sea there existed the independent "empire" of Trebizond, and in the south-east an independent "Little Armenia" roughly corresponding to Cilicia.

Er-Togrhul died in 1288 and was succeeded by his son Othman or Osman, an energetic and unscrupulous man, the type of the first ten Turkish rulers. From him the tribe took their name of Othmanli, Osmanli, or Ottomans. Osman extended

the narrow boundaries of his possessions by a constant guerilla war against the Byzantine Greeks, and shortly before his death Brûsa fell into Turkish hands (1326). He, however, made no attempt to encroach on the neighbouring Turkish amirates, and though some have ascribed this to religious scruples, and his attack on the Greeks to the desire to spread the Moslem creed in non-Moslem lands, it is more likely that he attacked the Greeks because he found them an easier and a wealthier prey.

The Osmanli were a nation of nomads grafting themselves upon more advanced peoples. Their religion, their cities their agriculture, everything was there ready-made for them. In their history there was no transitional period from nomadic to city life. The way was the easier for them because they stepped into the shoes of the Seldjuk Turks—a people akin to them in speech and habits.

Moreover, their harems were filled with Greek, Armenian, Arab, Persian, Georgian, and Slav women, and although their children inherited the father's traditions, characteristics, and privileges, they received from the mothers something of the intelligence of superior civilisations.

The Osmanli did not settle down on their newly conquered lands, and gradually change from nomads to farmer and town folk—they were from the first lords of a conquered population, a dominant Eastern clan. They did not assimilate their subjects and become indistinguishable from them as the Goths did the Gauls, or the Normans did the English; they remained a caste of military land-owners and maintained their predatory tradi-

tions. All their laws and organisation maintained this system.

Orkhan (1326-59), Othman's son, and his brother Aladdin, the Vizier, formulated a code, calculated to put at the disposal of the Ottoman sultan, a most efficient military force. A body of infantry, well paid and strictly disciplined, was maintained for regular service, and as will be seen later, was often hired out as mercenaries to the neighbouring powers, to the great advantage of the Sultan. A force of cavalry (Spahi) was also formed, not for continuous service, but liable to be called upon when occasion arose. The country districts were divided into fiefs, a modification of the feudal system, with the difference that the fiefs were small and not hereditary. This prevented the great evil of Western Europe —the creation of hereditary baronies, able to challenge the royal authority. Finally, every male Moslem capable of bearing arms, was expected to serve in the event of national emergency. Christians were exempted from military service, but were compelled to pay a tax, which entitled them "to carry their heads for one year."

The most extravagant rewards attended victory; all camp booty, the pillage of cities, and the produce of the country went to the triumphant soldiery, while the captive women filled their harems. In addition, four-fifths of the money accruing from the sale of slaves, which often included not only captives but the whole population of a conquered province, was divided among the soldiers. The remaining fifth was the share of the Sultan. The confiscated lands were dis-

tributed as fiefs to those who had distinguished themselves in battle. The Moslem inhabitants of a conquered territory were alone exempt from these terrors, and they usually went to swell the ranks of the victors. Occasionally, Christians were allowed to abjure their faith in order to save their goods.

Although to proselytise may have been a minor aim of the Turks, it must not be supposed that it was fanaticism which prompted the Ottoman conquests. The main incentive was undoubtedly the predatory instinct, the sheer lust for plunder, the love of getting without earning. At first the Turks were mere opportunists; they fought for plunder or as mercenaries, they attacked the Greeks in preference to the amirates, because the road to Byzantium was the line of least resistance. Murad I. was probably the first Sultan with any idea of forming a powerful military empire. It is said that the battle of the Maritza, where his generals annihilated an army of Hungarians, Serbians, and Bulgarians, convinced him of the feasibility of making extensive conquests in Europe.

III

By 1389 Sultan Orkhan had completed the organisation of his army, and he found himself in command of an armed force, which in discipline and efficiency none of the Balkan powers could hope to match. The Byzantine Empire, which had once extended from the Danube to the Euphrates, had now shrunk to the city of Constantinople, with the Thracian hinterland and the

cities of Adrianople and Demotika, Salonika, the Peninsula of Chalkidice, and the Morea.

The Serbs, descendants of Slav tribes, who had overrun the Balkans in the Sixth Century A.D. were at the height of their prosperity under Stephen Dushan[1] (1336-56). This great warrior and legislator had brought Bosnia, Albania, and Thessaly under his rule, threatened Salonika, and aspired to the throne of Constantinople. But after his death the disruption of Serbia immediately set in. Had this death not put an end to their projects, the Serbs might have anticipated the Turks in the destruction of the Greek Empire, and the whole history of the Near East would have been altered.

The Bulgars, a mixture of Slavs and of a Finno-Mongolian tribe, which had impressed itself on the country in the Seventh Century, had attained their zenith under Tsar Simeon, whose magnificent capital at Preslav, now a squalid village, was the glory of his age. But at the beginning of the Eleventh Century the Greek Emperor Basil, "the Bulgar-slayer," completely subjugated the country; and although a century and a half later they succeeded, under John Asen, in throwing off the Byzantine yoke, the Bulgars never recovered their former position, and at the middle of the Fourteenth Century their king was a vassal of the Serbian Kral.

The Genoese and Venetians, and some lesser Greek and Italian despots, divided the rest of Greece and the Ægean Islands, and the trade rivalry of these two great commercial republics was to prove of no little advantage to the Turks.

[1] The strangler.

Thus Orkhan, with his powerful army, was a peculiar menace to the Balkan countries in this disturbed and divided condition. In little over a hundred years the Osmanli dynasty was to become the most powerful factor in the Near East.

It was the Greeks themselves who gave Orkhan the opportunity to intervene in Europe. In 1343 John Cantacuzene, the guardian of the young emperor, John Palæologus, usurped the Imperial throne, and both sides appealed to Orkhan for support. Cantacuzene finally bought Orkhan, gave him his daughter Theodora in marriage, and with 6000 Turkish troops succeeded in forcing John Palæologus to a compromise, by which they were crowned as co-emperors. The Turkish soldiers returned to Asia, but a dangerous precedent had been created. Six years later 20,000 Ottoman mercenaries were employed in the relief of Salonika from the Serbs, and these again returned to Asia.

But in 1353 the co-emperors quarrelled, and Cantacuzene again purchased the help of Orkhan by the cession of a fortress on the European shore of the Hellespont. Shortly after this an earthquake damaged the neighbouring fortress of Gallipoli, and the Turks, considering this to be the intervention of Allah, occupied and refused to surrender it. Public opinion forced Cantacuzene to declare war on the Turks; he appealed in vain for help to the Bulgars and Serbs, who might then have easily ousted the Turks by concerted action. They refused. Cantacuzene was accused of betraying the Empire to the Turks, was deposed, and took refuge in a monastery. John Palæologus succeeded him, but the 20,000 Turks, whom his

rival had purchased, occupied Demotika and Chorlu, and compelled the Greeks to sign a treaty, recognising the Sultan's possession of Southern Thrace.

In 1359 Orkhan died at the age of seventy-two, having achieved the complete expulsion of the Greeks from Asia, the establishment of the Turks on European soil, and the reduction, almost to vassalage, of the Byzantine Empire.

Murad I., who succeeded his father, was a man of boundless ambitions; ruthless, and cruel, for he blinded his rebel son Saoudji, and compelled the fathers of his son's supporters to put their own children to death in his presence; something of a fanatic, for he was the first of the sultans to persecute his Christian subjects for the sake of religion.

Even after the successes of Orkhan's reign, his dominions in Asia did not equal in extent those of other Turkish amirs. With a population which is estimated not to have exceeded a million, it would have been impossible for him to carry out far-reaching conquests. But it is argued that there was a steady immigration of Central Asian tribes into Asia Minor, and that many of these accepted his suzerainty and served under his banner for the loot which they expected from the European cities. At the battle of Angora, in 1402, one-fourth of the Ottoman army was composed of Tatars.

It was Murad who perfected the organisation of a corps recruited from his Christian subjects, the famous Janissaries—Yeni Cheri, New Troops. This body in Turkey corresponded to the military Orders then in being in Western Europe, although they were of greater fighting value, since they were

directly subordinate to the Sultan, and did not possess an independent organisation. In lieu of tribute in money and kind, the conquered Serbs, Bulgars, and Albanians were compelled to supply a thousand boys a year between the ages of ten and twelve. The healthiest and most intelligent were taken. They were forcibly converted to Mahommedanism, and, after six years of training, were drafted into the Janissary corps, which was kept at a maximum of 12,000. Here they were subjected to the strictest discipline; they were not allowed to marry nor to own property; they belonged to the regiment. The excitements and triumphs of war came as a relief to the severities of barrack life. But so great were the privileges of their corps that, later, membership was much sought after. The loot of cities rewarded victory; ample pensions comforted age or sickness; bravery and intelligence might raise a man to the highest posts in the Empire. The corps soon became the most renowned and the most dreaded body of troops in Europe.

The results of this cynical system of recruitment were disastrous to the vassal nations: they were not only deprived of their most promising sons, but these boys grew up to be the mainstay of Ottoman power, the scourge of their own countries, and the most fanatical followers of the Sultan. They remained a body personally loyal to the Sultan, and in an age when the kings of the West were constantly embroiled with their barons, the Grand Turk stood alone, isolated from his subjects, protected by his devoted and invincible corps. Thus there never grew up any baronage

in Turkey, and the career of the greatest pashas depended always on the whim of the Sultan.

Under the later sultans, however, the discipline of the corps relaxed, its numbers were increased, its rules fell into abeyance, and the sons of Janissaries and Moslems were able to enter its ranks. The Janissaries could make or unmake "the Shadow of God"; they tyrannised the capital, exacted huge subsidies, arrogated exorbitant privileges to themselves. They lost much of their fighting value, as the discipline of Western armies improved, and became an actual danger to the State, for they often forced a policy of war for their own pleasure.

Murad was almost continually engaged in war. By marriage and force he greatly increased his territory in Asia Minor, though he suffered something of a reverse before Angora (1387). It was not until after successive campaigns by Bayazid I. and Mahommed II. that the Turkish amirates were finally subdued, nearly a hundred years later, and the Ottoman power firmly established throughout Asia Minor.

In Europe Murad's armies gained victory after victory. In 1361, Adrianople was taken from the Greeks and henceforward became the capital, while the capture of Philippopolis opened the way for the conquest of Bulgaria. The Greek Emperor John was forced to conclude a still more humiliating peace, by which he bound himself not to assist the Bulgars and Serbs. He appealed to Pope Urban V. and made his submission to the Roman Church. The Pope then endeavoured to stir up a crusade against the enemies of Christendom, but the days

of crusades were over. He succeeded, however, in persuading Louis the Great of Anjou, King of Hungary, to send an army to assist the Serbs and Bulgars; their combined forces were annihilated at Harmanli, on the Maritza, by a night attack of the Turks (1363). But the great Angevin was at that time engrossed in the politics of Italy, the Empire, and Poland, and after the Maritza defeat he did not again interfere in Balkan affairs. The Emperor John was now compelled not only to acknowledge the Sultan's suzerainty, but to send a detachment to fight in the Turkish army.

Murad turned against Bulgaria. The country was disorganised owing to the rival claims of three brothers to the throne. In 1371 the Bulgars and Serbs were defeated at Samakov, and next year the Turks crossed the Vardar, overran Macedonia, and penetrated into Old Serbia, Albania, and Bosnia. The Bulgarian Tsar Sisman obtained a peace by which he was allowed to retain his lands north of the Balkans as a vassal of the Sultan, and his daughter entered Murad's harem. In the succeeding years Monastir, Sofia, and Nish were lost to the Christians, and Serbia was reduced to vassalage.

In 1388 the Bulgarians and Serbs, succoured by the Albanians and Bosnians, rose in a last effort for independence. Murad, now past seventy, was forced to take the field: in a brilliant campaign Sisman was again brought to his knees, and, by the loss of Tirnovo in 1393, the Bulgars were deprived of the last shreds of independence.

Four years before Serbia had been crushed. Prince Lazar came to battle on the plain of Kossovo

(the field of Blackbirds) in Old Serbia. "The plain of Kossovo," wrote a contemporary, "was one mass of steel, horse stood against horse, man against man; the spears form a thick forest; the banners obscure the sun; there was no space for a drop of water to fall between them."

Kossovo proved the grave of Southern Slav freedom. Vouk Brankovich, who coveted the Serbian crown, chose the crisis of the battle to ride off the field with 12,000 men, and the battle was lost.

For seventy years more, Serbia retained a semblance of independence, under princes vassal to the Sultan. A few thousands, rather than submit to a foreign yoke, took refuge in the mountains above Cattaro, and forming the little principality of Montenegro, maintained their independence throughout the long centuries of the "Turkish Night." Others fled to Bosnia, and many thousands settled in Southern Hungary.

IV

Murad was stabbed on the field of Kossovo by a pretended Serbian traitor, Milosh Obilich, the hero of many a Serbian folk-song. Bayazid his son, called Yilderim or the "Thunderbolt" for his brilliant bravery in his father's Asiatic campaigns, stabbed his elder brother Jakub, in the presence of their father's corpse, and was acclaimed Sultan. He justified this fratricide, says the chronicler Seadeddin, by the text from the Koran, "Disquiet is worse than putting to death."

From that date it was for long the custom of Turkish sultans, when succeeding to the throne, to put to death or to imprison all their brothers and cousins, in order to prevent dynastic wars. Even Abdul Hamid and Mahommed V. kept the heir-presumptive a close prisoner during their own reigns. In later years, this unhappy practice contributed to the weak character of the Sultan, for instead of being brought up in an atmosphere of statecraft and politics, the Imperial princes were held close prisoners in the Sultan's harems, saw nothing of the world, and were not even kept conversant with current events.

Bayazid proved as masterful and ruthless as his father; a man of extraordinary physical strength, he was a clever and resourceful soldier, but his career was marred by the unnatural lusts to which he was a slave. It was a licentious age, yet the gross bestialities and hideous orgies of his court scandalised Europe. He was also the first Sultan to indulge in drink, a pleasure forbidden to all good Mahommedans by the Koran. Bayazid first completed the subjugation of Serbia and Bulgaria; in Serbia Stephen, the son of Lazar, was left as tributary prince, and bound to provide a contingent of men for the Turkish army; Despina Lazarevich, his sister, was forced into the Sultan's harem. Bulgaria was brought under the direct rule of the Porte, and thousands of Bulgars were transported to Asia Minor. The Danube was now the Turkish frontier, and in the following year Turkish predatory bands entered Hungary and Wallachia.

Bayazid then turned to Constantinople and

heaped fresh humiliation on the aged John Palæologus. His son Manuel was detained by the Sultan as a hostage, and, when the father began to fortify his capital, Bayazid threatened to put out Manuel's eyes. John died shortly afterwards, upon which Manuel made his escape to Constantinople and assumed the purple. Bayazid then commenced a land blockade of the city, which was to last for seven years, and was only raised by the Turkish disasters in Asia. At the same time the Osmanli were engaged in extensive operations against the Turkish amirates of Asia Minor, and had unsuccessfully attacked the Knights of St John of Jerusalem at Smyrna. But Bayazid was recalled from Asia by the serious situation which was threatening him on the Danube.

Sigismund of Luxemburg, son of the Emperor Charles IV. of Germany, had succeeded to the Hungarian Crown, as the son-in-law of Louis the Great. He was an energetic and far-seeing man, and, uneasy at the constant Turkish raids into his country, and at the threat to Hungary constituted by the Turkish occupation of the Bulgarian Danube towns, he determined to appeal to Christendom for a crusade against the infidels. He was supported by Pope Boniface IV. and King Charles VI. of France. Knights ambitious of glory and soldiers of fortune flocked to his standard from all parts of Europe. Jean *sans peur*, Comte de Nevers, heir to the House of Burgundy, came at the head of the chivalry of France; the Elector Palatine brought a large force of Bavarians; the Teutonic knights under Count

Frederic of Hohenzollern, and the Knights of St John of Jerusalem under de Naillac, their Grand Master, joined in the adventure. Augmented by Hungarians, Wallachians, and Bosnians, Sigismund's army amounted to 100,000 men.

The Christian knights were so sure of victory that they regarded the campaign as a picnic, and brought with them their mistresses and all the appurtenances of luxury. In the summer of 1396 they marched down the Danube to Nikopol, capturing Vidin and Sistova on their way. The camp at Nikopol was a scene of drunken debauchery when Bayazid, by a lightning march, arrived before the Christian lines. The French and German knights left their courtesans and their wine-cups for the battle, boasting that the Turks could never stand before them. In three hours the allied army was annihilated; de Nevers and his knights were prisoners, and Sigismund was flying down the Danube in a small boat. All the Christian prisoners were massacred, with the exception of the more illustrious nobles, who were redeemed for heavy ransoms.

The triumph of Bayazid was complete. He swore that he would overrun Italy and Germany, and that he would feed his horse with oats on the Altar of St Peter. He marched into Hungary, and a fit of gout which attacked him alone saved Buda. His troops, however, carried devastation throughout Wallachia, Styria, and Syrmia, while in the south another army overran Thessaly and the Morea.

Bayazid now commenced a clever policy of transporting thousands of Christians to Asia,

and colonising their lands with Turks and Tatars; a step calculated to weaken the Christians still more. He was preparing to possess himself of Constantinople when news of overwhelming disaster reached him from his eastern frontiers. A fresh wave of Tatar invasion was sweeping across Asia.

Timur Leng or the Lame, the chief of a small Tatar tribe in the neighbourhood of Samarkand, had in less than thirty-five years built up an empire which extended from the Wall of China to the Euphrates, from the Sea of Aral to the Persian Gulf. In 1400 he entered Armenia with 800,000 men and laid in ruins the great fortress of Sivas, the key to Anatolia. Next year he gave battle to Bayazid on the plain of Angora and utterly annihilated the Turkish army. Bayazid fell into his hands and the Ottoman Empire appeared to be irretrievably ruined.

However, three years later, after laying waste Asia Minor and Syria, Timur returned to Samarkand to prepare for the invasion of China, and there died at the age of seventy-one. He was a brilliant warrior and a far-seeing legislator, but his empire collapsed at his death, and its dissolution marked the end of the Tatar menace to the world.

Bayazid, after being dragged about in the train of his conqueror, had died in captivity a year before.

V

Timur Leng left the Ottoman Empire weakened, disorganised, and devastated. In Asia Minor it had almost ceased to exist. Tatar bands still hovered about the country, plundering and pillaging; the amirates reasserted their independence; civil war broke out between the four sons of Bayazid, each of whom coveted the Empire for himself.

It could hardly be expected that the territories in Europe could be held together, when support from Asia was no longer forthcoming. The princes of Wallachia and Serbia, and the Greek Emperor might have been expected to unite in an attempt to drive the disorganised Osmanli from Europe. But Stephen Lazarevich with the flower of Serbia had perished at Angora, fighting loyally as a vassal of the Sultan; Mirtchea the Old, the capable ruler of Moldavia, and the Emperor Manuel Palæologus contented themselves with intriguing alternately with one or the other of the rival Turkish claimants. In Hungary, Sigismund was fighting his nobles and against Venice, and intriguing for the crowns of Bohemia and the Empire. He was not in a position to pay attention to affairs on the other side of the Danube. The opportunity passed, and the Turks emerged from an internecine war, under a Sultan possessing the vigour and astuteness of his ancestors.

By the year 1413 Mahommed, the youngest of Bayazid's sons, had disposed of the last of his

brothers with the help of the Janissaries. He was an educated and enlightened man, desirous of peace, and anxious to consolidate his possessions, and he was mainly occupied in reducing the amirates to a renewal of their homage. Unfortunately for the peace of Europe he only reigned eight years, dying at Brusa of apoplexy at the early age of forty-seven (1421). Although of the first ten sultans he was the only one who did not gain increases of territory, he can lay claim to a high place among them, for he had held the Empire together, through defeat and civil war, without the loss of a single province.

Murad II., who succeeded at the age of thirty, much resembled his father in his vigour and ability. He was compelled successively to fight two pretenders to the throne, whose claims were supported by Manuel Palæologus. In answer to the Emperor's intrigues he besieged Constantinople, but on the latter's death consented to make peace with the new Emperor, John. In 1430 he took Salonika from the Venetians and sold the population into slavery. So great were their numbers that "a good-looking girl was sold for the price of a pair of boots."

He now became involved in a costly struggle with Hungary. The Hungarians are the descendants of a welter of savage tribes, who swarmed into the Pannonian plains during the first six centuries of the Christian era. The feudal nobility were descended from the Magyars, the last tribe to enter the country, coming probably from the banks of the Kama *circa* 830, and of Finno-Turkish origin. They accepted Christianity and

under Stephen (997-1038) they were welded into a powerful kingdom. Their position on the fertile plains of the middle Danube gave them a peculiar importance. They were a formidable wedge between the Slav peoples of Bohemia, Poland, and Croatia, and from early time oppressed the Southern Slavs and the Rumanians of Wallachia and Transylvania. They were the first nation of comparatively equal strength whom the Osmanli had encountered, and the struggle between the two races threatened to prove long and bloody.

In 1426 Sigismund of Hungary, having become also German Emperor and King of Bohemia, planned to bring all the strength of his three crowns against the Turks. But he was weakened by his wars with the followers of John Huss, by trouble with Venice, and by a rebellion in Transylvania, and two years later was forced to conclude peace. As a result, Bosnia and Wallachia became vassals of the Sultan. Sigismund died in 1437.

A national hero now arose in Hungary, who was for thirty years to be the terror of the Turks and the Paragon of Europe. He was John Corvinus Hunyadi, a natural son of Sigismund, by Elizabeth Morsinay, a Wallachian. Hunyadi, though a brilliant and inspiring leader, was not a good strategist; his victories were gained more by his impetuous daring than by his brains. He was the typical knight-hero of his age, but cruel and brutal in victory. He is known in Hungarian literature as the "White Knight of Wallachia" from his suit of silver armour.

Hunyadi gained two decisive victories over Turkish armies at Hermannstadt and Varsag (1443), and in the same year Murad was repulsed from before Belgrad. These successes heartened the Christians to a serious effort against the Turks. Vladislas of Poland, a grandson of Louis the Great, was now King of Hungary, and was able to bring the resources of Poland to bear against its enemies.

Under the auspices of the papal legate, Julius Cæsarini, the Bosnians and Wallachians were persuaded to join the Hungarians; George Brankovich, Prince of Serbia, promised his support; Venice and Genoa agreed to prevent the transport of reinforcements from Asia Minor; and many French, Bohemian, and German knights offered to serve under the famous "White Knight."

In 1493 the allies' army invaded Serbia, defeated an Ottoman army, and entered Nish; Hunyadi crossed the Balkans in winter, a difficult undertaking, but when he seemed to threaten Adrianople he suddenly retired. Murad asked for peace and by the Treaty of Szegeddin (1444) agreed to an armistice for ten years, relinquished Serbia, and acquiesced in the annexation of Wallachia by Vladislas. Then at the age of forty-one, he abdicated in favour of his son, anxious to spend the rest of his years in sensual ease, in his gardens and palaces at Magnesia. The succession of his son, Mahommed, a boy of fourteen, emboldened the allies to break the treaty almost before the ink was dry. News was to hand of rebellion in Asia Minor; the fleets of Venice and Genoa commanded

the Hellespont; the Turks appeared to be at a hopeless disadvantage; it seemed as though the opportunity to destroy them had arrived.

By subtle casuistry, Cardinal Cæsarini persuaded Vladislas to break his oath. "It is to God and to your fellow Christians that you have pledged your faith!" he argued; "that prior obligation annihilates a rash and sacrilegious oath to the enemies of Christ."

In the autumn of 1444 Vladislas and Hunyadi invaded Bulgaria and moved along the Danube to Varna; Murad, summoned from his pleasures at Magnesia, collected an army in Asia Minor, and bribed the traitorous Genoese to carry it across the Hellespont. On 10th November 1444 he suddenly arrived before Varna. A fierce battle ensued, and the Turkish wings were driven in. But the Janissaries stood firm, and Vladislas in a rash charge was unhorsed and slain. His blood-stained head was stuck on a lance, by the side of another, bearing a copy of the broken treaty, and the sight of his white face struck terror into the hearts of the Christians. Two-thirds of the Hungarian army, including Julius Cæsarini, perished, though Hunyadi escaped with his life. The defeat brought civil war to Hungary and placed Bosnia and Serbia again under the Turkish yoke.

Murad once more returned to Magnesia, but was soon recalled to subdue a revolt of Janissaries at Adrianople. Thus he had twice voluntarily abdicated and twice resumed power—a case probably unique in history. He did not again seek to return to his paradise, but remained at Adrianople for the last seven years of his life.

A desultory war against Hungary dragged on, and in 1448 Hunyadi suffered another severe defeat on the plain of Kossovo. Only in Albania were the Turkish arms temporarily repulsed.

The Albanians, the descendants of the ancient Illyrians, had been driven into the Adriatic highlands by successive barbarian invasions. The Ghegs of the north are mixed with Slavs, and the Tosks of the south with Greeks. They nevertheless speak a similar language. They were wild and intractable and lived on the clan system, and very much resembled, both in their courage and lawlessness, the Highlanders of Scotland. At this time a great patriot, George Kastriot, a former court favourite of Murad, had raised the tribes against the Turks, and for many years he carried on a successful guerilla warfare, inflicting defeats on several Turkish armies. At his death, however, the Albanian resistance collapsed and many of the clans adopted Mahommedanism.

Murad was, like his father, a moderate and broad-minded man; he loved literature and encouraged the development of the arts and sciences, and it may be said that, although he considerably increased the Ottoman power, he never sought war, but rather that it was always forced upon him.

VI

Mahommed II., who succeeded his father at the age of twenty-one, was to earn the proud sobriquet of the "Conqueror." In his boyhood he had twice become Sultan, and had been twice compelled to call in his father's assistance.

He proved, nevertheless, to be endowed with all the warlike virtues and brutal vices of his ancestors. Proud and overbearing, he combined the learning and accomplishment of his father and grandfather with the violent lusts and animal courage of the "Thunderbolt." But he held himself aloof from the world; he had no favourites, no friends, no confidants. "Essentially a lonely man" is the verdict of Sir Edwin Pears. He promoted men upon their merits and punished failure with the death penalty, regarding all men as mere pawns in the great game of world-conquest.

His father had proved the invincibility of Ottoman arms by defeating the united chivalry of Central Europe. He succeeded to the control of the most powerful military organisation of the contemporary world—of an empire which included the whole of the Balkan Peninsula and the larger part of Asia Minor.

Mahommed's first ambition was to make an end of the Byzantine Empire and to establish his capital at Constantinople. With this end in view, he gave an easy peace to the rebel amirs in Anatolia, made a three years' truce with Hunyadi, and sent an army into the Morea to prevent the Greek despots there from rendering any assistance to the city. He then took slow and deliberate steps for a complete blockade, and commenced to erect a fortress[1] on the European shore of the Bosphorus, on the very outskirts of the city, opposite another built by his father on the Asiatic shore, with the object of assuring command of the Straits.

The Emperor, Constantine Palæologus, a

[1] Rumeli and Anatoli Hissar.

moderate but brave man, very different from his predecessors, made matters worse by weakly threatening to let loose a pretender to the Ottoman throne.

The fortress was completed in the autumn of 1452, and with the one on the Anatolian shore, gave Mahommed complete command of the Straits. This he immediately exercised, by capturing some Venetian vessels on their way to the Black Sea, and putting their crews to death by sawing them in halves. The Conqueror recognised no laws but his own caprices.

Throughout the winter of 1452, Turks and Greeks hurried on their preparations. With what resources he had, Constantine made haste to repair the dilapidated walls of his capital, and sent frantic appeals for assistance to the Western Powers. He even went so far as to agree to the union of the Greek and Latin Churches, in order to placate the Holy See—a step which created dissension in the city, for many declared that they would rather see in their streets the turban of a Turk than the hat of a cardinal.

A few hundred Genoese under Giustiani, a soldier of fortune, and some Spanish and Italian mercenaries were all the help that came from Europe. Constantine could collect in all not more than 8000 men, a ridiculously inadequate number with which to hope to hold the walls; he lacked funds, too, for the wealthy Greek churches, angered at his heresy, refused to subscribe to the defence.

Mahommed had collected at Adrianople an army of 150,000 men, and with the help of a Wallachian renegade had cast some giant cannon, with which he proposed to level the city walls.

In the spring of 1453 he arrived before Constantinople, declaring that "he would either have it within his Empire, or lose both." His troops were filled with enthusiasm by the promise of a three days' sack, and the humblest in the army looked forward to a life of wealth and ease, which would follow the division of the vast treasures of the churches and palaces of the city, and the sale as slaves of the population.

After a seven weeks' bombardment by the giant but primitive artillery of the Turks, the walls had been broken in three places, more especially at the gate of St Romanus, where a breach of 400 yards had been made.

On 28th May the grand assault was made. The first wave was composed of light troops, Akinjis and Bashi-bazuks, who were sacrificed to exhaust the Greek fire; they were followed by the Anatolian infantry, who in turn failed to effect a lodgment; finally Mahommed, in person, directed a charge of his Janissaries. At this point the gates of the outer wall had been shut behind the garrison to prevent any desertions, so that it only remained to them to die fighting; but the issue was doubtful until the Genoese Captain, Giustiani, the soul of the defence, was mortally wounded. Then the Greeks became disheartened: Constantine, in vain attempting to rally them, was cut down, and the Turkish hordes swarmed into the city. An indiscriminate massacre ensued, which the Sultan finally stopped, only because he did not wish the population to be exterminated.

When the first few days of brutal licence were passed, Mahommed began to show a shrewd

statesmanship in his treatment of the city. He summoned Gennadius, the most important of the Greek Churchmen who had survived, and appointed him Patriarch of the Greek Church, promising him the royal friendship and the enjoyment of all the privileges of his predecessors.

It was a clever stroke, and the Sultan showed a far-sighted tolerance, which was lacking in his Christian contemporaries. Many of his fanatical beys and muftis had urged a wholesale massacre of the Christian population, but Mahommed recognised that it was necessary to people the former capital of the world with others than his own uncouth shepherd-soldiers. He not only allayed the fears of the remnant of the Greek community, but transported to his new capital large numbers of Christians from the Morea and the Ægean Islands. In fact, by the end of his reign, Constantinople was a far more flourishing and prosperous city than it had been under the later Palæologi.

Mahommed could foresee that the Turks were too proud, too indolent, and imbued with too much of the military tradition which despises trade ever to be able of themselves to form a commercial element in the population of the Empire. He therefore encouraged the settlement of Greeks within his conquests.

It has also been suggested that another motive for his religious tolerance was that he realised that the threat to force his religion on conquered peoples would only increase their resistance. In fact the Serbians and Bosnians afterwards showed that they preferred the scornful tolerance of the

Mahommedans to the violent bigotry of the Hungarians.

The conquest of Constantinople confirmed Mahommed in his colossal ambitions; he embarked on a series of wars, the extent of which at length elicited complaints even from his Janissaries, satiated and wearied by thirty years of war.

The Greek "Empire" of Trebizond was annexed. The Venetians were driven from Eubœa and their possessions in the Ægean, while in 1477 a Turkish army overran Friuli and reached the Piave, forcing the terrified Senate to an ignominious peace. The Genoese were expelled from the Crimea, and the Tatar khan of the hinterland became a vassal of the Sultan. Mahommed marched into Wallachia and defeated and deposed its inhuman prince, Vlad the Impaler. He finally reduced Bosnia, where the nobles preferred the rule of the Moslems to that of the Pope, and abjured their faith rather than lose their estates.

But the Turks were by no means uniformly successful, for they were defeated by Hunyadi in two great battles at Semendria and Belgrad; Belgrad was the "White Knight's" last victory, for three weeks later he died of the plague. "The world has lost its greatest man," was the Sultan's generous comment. In 1480 Mahommed unsuccessfully attacked Rhodes, the headquarters of the Knights of St John of Jerusalem, those devoted enemies of Islam. At the same time another army, directed against Ferdinand of Naples, the father-in-law of Ladislas, King of Hungary, landed in Apulia and captured Otranto.

Next spring a huge armament was collected at Constantinople, whether for this invasion of Hungary, the conquest of Italy, or another attack on Rhodes none ever knew, for on 3rd May 1481 the Sultan suddenly died.

Mahommed was a great empire-builder, equal almost to Alexander and Cæsar, whom he aspired to emulate. His leadership and his powers of administration had built up an empire, which threatened on the one hand Italy, Hungary, and Germany, and on the other Persia, Syria, and Egypt, and an army, which in equipment and organisation was far superior to the feudal levies and mercenary bands of Mediæval Europe.

VII

Bayazid II., who succeeded his father at the age of thirty-five, was a quiet austere man, devoted to poetry and philosophy. He consistently pursued a policy of peace—very necessary to the country after the meteoric conquests of Mahommed. He withdrew the Turkish army from Italy, and adopted a defensive attitude towards Hungary, where Matthias the Just, a great son of the great Hunyadi, was now king.

The only important addition made to the Empire during his reign was the incorporation of the Herzegovina in 1483. Bayazid, however, greatly increased the Turkish fleet, which Mahommed had first formed for the capture of Constantinople, and by 1500 it had become so powerful that it was able to meet on equal terms

the combined fleets of Venice, Austria, and the Papacy.

A romantic figure of this reign, who certainly deserves a passing reference, was Prince Djem, a younger son of Mahommed, who, after an unsuccessful rebellion, fled to Rhodes and later to France. An account of his adventures and intrigues would fill a volume, but it is sufficient to say that he was finally poisoned by the notorious Borgia Pope Alexander VI. at the instigation of the Sultan.

Bayazid was eventually forced to abdicate (1512) by the Janissaries, who, thirsting for further wars, declared him "old and sickly," and raised to the throne their idol, his youngest son Selim, a man of extraordinary ambition and vigour.

Although he only reigned eight years, Selim succeeded in almost doubling the area of his Empire by extensive conquests in Persia, and by the annexation of Syria, Egypt, and the Holy Cities of Arabia. He had none of the sensual vices of his ancestors, but he was a morose and bloodthirsty bigot, who was always attended by a bodyguard of mutes, employed to strangle or decapitate any person who might incur his momentary displeasure.

There are in Islam two opposing sects, those of the Shiis and the Sunnis. The theological difference between them is that the Shiis profess to follow the writings not only of the Prophet but also of his four immediate descendants, whilst the Sunnis adhere only to the Prophet himself. But the difference is really one of nationality, for the Persians and Arabs are generally Shiis, the Turks Sunnis.

In consequence of his war with Persia, Selim, prompted probably by the narrow dark-souled theologians with whom he consorted, carried out an indiscriminate massacre of the Shiis in his dominions. He was scarcely prevented from similar methods against his Christian subjects by the entreaties of the Mufti Djemail, a moderate and high-minded priest, who was the only man with any influence over his master's distorted mind.

Selim died in 1516, and such was the universal terror which he inspired, that for centuries it was a popular curse among the Turks, "May'st thou be a vizier to Sultan Selim!" For he had put to death seven Grand Viziers in as many years.

He was the first Sultan to pretend to the position of secular head of the Moslem world. He assumed from the last of the Abbasid Khalifs of Cairo, who claimed to be the successors of the Prophet, the title of Khalif, or Protector of the Holy Places, the Lieutenant of God upon Earth, the Head of the Mahommedan religion, and sent to Constantinople the alleged banner and cloak of Mahommed.

VIII

Suleiman (1520-66), the last of the great sultans, succeeded his father when he was twenty-six years old. His reign has been aptly called the Augustan Age of Turkey. This Sixteenth Century might also be called the Age of the Apotheosis of benevolent Despotism—or rather of Despotism non-decadent and triumphant over Baronism. An

age when some few hundreds were as gods, and some millions, over and above, as beasts. An age of burnings, of galley-slaves, of persecutions of Moors and Jews and other miseries—also of the Field of Cloth of Gold, of which History makes much—of Charles, master of Germany, Spain and the Indies; of Francis, fair youth of Valois; and of Henry, called the Bluff, turned reformer of religion for the black eyes of Anne Boleyn. An age when mere man might hang for the slitting of a pocket or the stealing of a sheep, but gods in silk and steel, gold-embossed, could slit a dozen throats and steal a kingdom to the admiration of their jackals. But an age also of two other events, of rough Martin Luther striking fear into fat shepherds of starving flocks, and of Christopher Columbus and some few others discovering lands where men might breathe and eat and sleep and think, without the leave of kings and popes and sultans. An age leading inevitably towards "martyr kings" and "cruel necessity" of Whitehall, and Bourbon god and daughter of Habsburg suffering the rude hands of Samson, and towards other things not yet fulfilled.

And in Turkey reigned Suleiman, called by foreigners "the Magnificent" and by his own people Kanuni or "the Law-Giver." He was a man more moderate and less licentious than his predecessors, a lover of literature and the arts and a tolerable poet, yet a brave soldier and a clever strategist.

He had that greatest of all gifts in rulers—the instinct to choose the right man for the right place. His viziers were often Greek and Italian

renegades, eunuchs, and Jews, but they successfully governed one of the greatest empires the world has ever seen—so successfully that in forty years not one of the twenty subject races revolted.

His admirals were seldom Turks—Kheir-ed-din Barbarossa was a renegade Greek from Mytilene; Dragut and Piale were Croats—yet by utilising the services of these Moslem corsairs, in conjunction with his own fleet, he obtained the command of the Mediterranean and the allegiance of the Arab states along the northern coasts of Africa.

The Turks are not a seafaring people; but the naval warfare of the day rather called forth the qualities of the soldier than of the mariner. The galleys generally hugged the coast; the working crew were Greeks from the Ægean sea-board and the oarsmen Christian slaves; the only duty of the complement of Turks and Janissaries was to fight.

From their bases in the Mediterranean—including for a time Toulon, in accordance with the terms of Suleiman's alliance with Francis I.—Suleiman's corsair-admirals carried their devastating raids, not only along the coasts of Spain, France, and Italy, but even as far as those of England and Ireland.

His military organisation was such that every year great armies could be collected at the capital and sent, with abundance of equipment and provisions, to the frontier of Austria or Persia—as the Sultan might choose.

During thirteen campaigns the Turkish armies were only once short of supplies—in the retreat

from Vienna in 1529; and so great was their strength that, with the exception of the disastrous battle of Mohacz, the enemies of Islam—even Charles himself—never risked a pitched battle. Suleiman's opponents were forced to rely on the defence of walled towns to break the force of the Turkish invasions—and these towns generally fell. Suleiman never left victory to chance—he always employed overwhelming forces. Yet, like Philip II., he never found it necessary to increase taxation in order to support his armies; they always lived on the invaded country.

The young Sultan signalised his succession by the capture of Belgrad, the key to Hungary, where such a disastrous defeat had been inflicted on Mahommed II. Next year he attacked Rhodes, and after a siege of nine months, during which bombs were used for the first time, the Knights were forced to capitulate and transferred their head-quarters to Malta. Suleiman then turned definitely against Hungary, weakened at that time by a peasants' rebellion and a civil war. Even the loss of Belgrad had not aroused the Magyar nobles to a sense of the national danger.

In 1526 Louis II., the weak young King of Bohemia and Hungary, was defeated and killed at the battle of Mohacz and Suleiman entered Buda. Next year, however, he was called to the Persian frontier, and dissension broke out again among the Hungarian nobles. One party, anxious to secure the assistance of the Empire, elected the Emperor's brother, the Archduke Ferdinand, as king, while the extreme national party chose John Zapolya, a conscientious, unimaginative man.

Zapolya was defeated and asked the support of the Sultan. A long and costly war ensued.

The struggle on the Danube was changed in character: Hungary and Turkey were no longer the combatants; it was a contest between the Habsburgs and the Turks for the possession of Hungary. In 1529 Suleiman, encouraged by the French king, again invaded Hungary, professedly to reinstate Zapolya, and with 250,000 men and hordes of irregular cavalry moved on Vienna. Then took place the memorable defence by Count Salm, a defence which resulted in the repulse of the Turks—the first serious set-back which they received. The war dragged on until 1538, when a truce for five years was concluded, leaving the Sultan in possession of Eastern Hungary, while Ferdinand kept the western portion in payment of an annual tribute of 30,000 ducats.

At sea, Suleiman's arms were crowned with success. The story of the rise of Turkish sea-power is one of the most amazing chapters of history. The huge red-bearded Kheir-ed-din, beginning with a single pirate galley, created in a few years a fleet which dominated the Mediterranean. He was in reality independent, but he chose to recognise the authority of the Sublime Porte,[1] and to confine his activities to the enemies of the Osmanli. After plundering the coasts of Naples (1533), Kheir-ed-din suddenly descended on Tunis and ousted its degenerate ruler, the

[1] This expression comes from the Italian Porta Sublima, and originated from the fact that in early Ottoman history the door of the chief's tent, where justice was administered, was higher than the doors of the other tents.

Mulai Hassan. Charles V. himself, with a huge armament, undertook to recapture the city, and the corsair was forced to abandon it. In 1538, however, he avenged himself by defeating the fleets of Spain, Venice, and the Papacy at the famous battle of Prevesa. In 1541 the Emperor failed in an attack on Algiers, and two years later Kheir-ed-din participated with the Duc d'Enghien in the capture of Nice. The savage old corsair died in his bed at Constantinople (1546), and strange to say, his vast wealth was bequeathed to found a college.

Another of these corsairs, Dragut Reis, conquered Tripoli, and a third, Piale, captured Oran, and in 1560 defeated the combined fleets of the Knights of St John, Genoa, and other Italian cities, under Andrea Doria, at the Island of Djerbe, off the coast of Tripoli. Two other admirals of Suleiman, Piri Reis and Sidi Ali, the one a geographer of note, the other a poet, defeated the Portuguese in the Red Sea, and captured Aden and several places on the north-west coast of Hindustan.

IX

In 1565 the old Sultan determined to utilise his powerful fleets to oust the Knights of St John from their stronghold at Malta, and to signalise the end of his reign by their extinction, as he had signalised the beginning by their expulsion from Rhodes. But after a desperate siege of four months, during which Dragut lost his life, the

Turks were forced to retire with a loss of 25,000 dead. Suleiman, now an old man in weak health, was childishly anxious to retrieve his honour, and determined to take personal command of a great army which was preparing to enter Hungary, where war had broken out again. In May 1566 he left Constantinople, carried in a litter at the head of his army.

The Turkish army invaded Hungary, but was checked by the heroic defence of Sziget. Before this fortress fell, the old Sultan died suddenly of apoplexy (that bane of so many of his hard-living ancestors), with the complaint on his lips that "the drums of victory had not yet beat." Thus passed "the Star of his Age."

Throughout his life he had been the arbiter of Europe. Although he never came to conclusions with Charles V., and although the successful defence of Vienna saved Germany from invasion, it may be claimed that Suleiman maintained the balance of power in Europe, at a time when the Habsburgs designed to bring the united strength of Germany and Spain against France, and to re-establish under Charles V. the Empire of Charles the Great. Suleiman ruled with an enlightenment and toleration, with which the bigoted policies of Henry VIII., of Francis I., and of Charles V. cannot be compared, an Empire which included not only Sunnis and Shiis but large populations of Roman Catholics, Orthodox Greeks, Jews, and Armenians, and numerous lesser denominations. He earned the honoured sobriquet of the "Lawgiver," by a series of moderate enactments which provided for the reform of the Turkish

feudal system, the regulation of wages, prices, and tariffs, and the mitigation of the existing severe punishments for criminal offences. Under his benignant rule, the condition of the Rayahs (Christian peasants) was far happier than that of the miserable serfs of France, Germany, and Russia, who were subject to every caprice of their lords. Creasy quotes a contemporary writer as saying: "I have seen multitudes of Hungarian rustics set fire to their cottages, and fly with their wives and children, their cattle and instruments of labour to the Turkish territories, where they know that beside the payment of the tenths, they would be subject to no imposts and vexations."

Thus it will be seen that after the miseries and slave-driving which followed immediately upon the Turkish conquest, the peasantry were allowed to settle down to a life far more tolerable than that which they had endured under their own tyrannical and factious barons. It was only under the later Sultans, when the reins of government were slackened, when full licence was given to oppressive governors, when restraint was removed from the alien land-owners, and when the unpaid and discontented Janissaries took to ravaging the country, that the lot of the Rayahs became intolerable, that racial and religious enmities were accentuated, and that the spirit of nationalism was aroused among the subject peoples. During the reign of Suleiman agriculture and trade flourished, and an excellent system of roads carried the corn of Bulgaria, the meat of Wallachia, and the farm-produce of Serbia to the markets of Constantinople and Ragusa.

Nevertheless, from the national point of view,

the position of the Rayahs was degrading. They remained nations of peasants, and there was no social progress. As nations, the Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks stood still for five hundred years. The Rayahs[1] were exempt from all military service, and in time of war were only required to perform such duties as transport, road-mending, and construction. The only career open to their manhood was service in the Janissaries—a career which required repudiation of race and religion.

Suleiman left an empire which, although it was yet to be extended, must be said to have reached the zenith of its prosperity. A population which has been variously estimated at from thirty to forty-five millions included twenty races, of which the chief were Turks, Tatars, Arabs, Egyptians, Nubians, Armenians, Greeks, Rumanians, Slavs, and Hungarians. The principalities of Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia sent heavy tributes to Stambûl. The rich corn-lands of Hungary and Bulgaria, the forest-lands of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia, the mountains of Albania, and the whole of Greece, with the Islands of the Ægean, excepting Cyprus and Crete, were divided into vilayets under the direct rule of Turkish governors. The Khan of the Crim Tatars, holding the Crimea and an indefinite hinterland, recognised the Sultan's suzerainty and, in war time, could put into the field hordes of irregular cavalry. In Asia, the Sultan ruled the whole of Anatolia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, then more prosperous, Syria, and the Holy Cities of Arabia; in Africa, he ruled Egypt

[1] Rayah signifies "cattle," by which the Turks contemptuously designated the Christian peasantry.

and Nubia, and held an indefinite suzerainty over Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers. But although these mighty territories were to be still further increased by the acquisition, during the succeeding reigns, of Crete and Cyprus, Podolia and the Ukraine, and of Azerbaijan, decay had already set in, even in the reign of the great Suleiman. Two hundred years, and the very existence of this great empire was to depend only on the jealousies of its enemies.

CHAPTER II

"LES ROIS FAINÉANTS" (1566-1792)

I

With the death of Suleiman in 1566 may be said to have begun the decline of the Ottoman Empire. This decline was due equally to domestic disorders and to military failure, caused mainly by these disorders. Creasy quotes Kotchi Bey, a Turkish historian who wrote in 1623, sixty years after the death of the great Suleiman, as attributing the decline in great part to abuses introduced during the individualistic régime of the "Magnificent"—abuses, harmless during the reign of a strong man, but which bore fruit during those of his degenerate successors.

Suleiman was the first Sultan to neglect the advice of his Divan or Grand Council of State for that of his favourites, and to elevate to the highest offices in the State, men, generally renegades or slaves, who had had no previous administrative experience. Suleiman was an astute judge of character, and he was seldom wrong in his choice, but he created a precedent which had disastrous results when pursued by sultans lacking in his balance and discernment.

There have been few greater statesmen in any country than Ibrahim, the Greek slave, who had originally attracted his master by his musical talent, and who was the virtual ruler of the Empire for thirteen years; but even Suleiman was mistaken in his choice of the notorious Rustem. This man made himself useful to the Sultan by his devices for obtaining unlimited supplies of money, and retained the Grand Vizierate for fifteen years. He introduced the pernicious system of "bakshish,"[1] whereby the highest appointments in the State could be purchased by men who might be utterly incompetent. This system quickly spread until it permeated the whole fabric of government. The results were far-reaching, for the buyers of appointments found it necessary to recoup themselves at the expense of their subordinates, so that the whole public service became corrupt to an extreme degree.

The right of collecting taxes was farmed out to men who considered themselves empowered to exact as much as they could from the common people. The judges sold their verdict to the highest bidders. Chaos ensued. This system of "bakshish" did not immediately affect the army, but during later reigns even high military commands were purchasable. Money and influence in the harem could effect anything. One of the worst examples of this was in the disposal of the positions of Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, which were at the Sultan's disposal, and which were openly bought by Greek and Rumanian nobles. Suleiman also introduced the

[1] Bribery.

custom of heaping huge fortunes on his grand viziers, and of confiscating this wealth in the event of the vizier suffering execution or disgrace. The result was that these viziers, sometimes able men, were overthrown for no other reason than that the Sultan might replenish his empty coffers. In fact, the spoils of disgraced officials became a recognised part of the royal revenue.

After the first ten sultans succeeded a line of twenty-seven rulers, eleven of whom were deservedly deposed, and most of whom were cowardly and sensual degenerates. The weakness of the characters of the later sultans has been attributed partly to the evil custom of keeping the heir-presumptive in seclusion or confinement until his accession, although it had been remarked that the only two sultans who were not so treated were as incompetent as the rest of their line. The stock of Othman, after Suleiman, appears to have been utterly exhausted. In fact, von Hammer gives credence to a contemporary rumour current in Constantinople that the new Sultan, Selim, was not the son of Suleiman but of a Greek Jew, a lover of Suleiman's mistress, the famous Roxelana.[1]

But manners and morals had everywhere degenerated during the reign of Suleiman, probably owing to the unprecedented prosperity. We have in the history of the Mongolian Emperors of India a parallel example of the effect of luxurious town life on hardy warriors from the steppe.

Under Selim, the centre of administration was transferred from the Divan to the Harem. Luxury became the fashion, and drunkenness, forbidden

[1] Roxelana : a corruption of la Rossa, " the Russian woman."

by the Koran, was indulged in by sultans, viziers, governors, judges, and muftis alike. Hafiz, the foremost poet of contemporary Islam, wrote that "wine was sweeter than the kisses of young girls," a remarkable declaration for one who spoke for a race whose chief failing has always been sensuality. When complaint of this was made to the mufti, he answered that when a Sultan took to drink, it was permissible for all to do the same, and for poets to celebrate it.

Voltaire, writing of a later Sultan, well describes them all, their apathy and their intrigues. "The Sultan," he says, "shut up in his harem among his women and his eunuchs, only sees through the eyes of his Grand Vizier. This minister . . . is generally deceived by or deceives the Sultan, who deposes him or has him strangled for his first blunder, to choose another, as ignorant or as venal, who behaves like his predecessors, and who soon falls like them." Roxelana or Ghowrem, the witty and attractive Russian concubine of Suleiman, had first made harem influence paramount, and had caused the Sultan to murder his two legitimate sons, in favour of her bastard Selim. From that time onwards, with rare intervals, the women of the harem ruled the Empire, and their intrigues made history. Some, long after their attractions had vanished, retained their influence by contenting the sensual, degraded animal who called himself "the Shadow of God," with constant fresh supplies of concubines in their pay. In this way the Sultana Baffo, a clever and accomplished Venetian, retained her power, even through the reign of her grandson, and for years

succeeded in averting war with the Republic of St Mark.

These disorders soon infected the army, and among the Janissaries and Spahis in the capital, the rival sultanas had their partizans, who often engaged in fierce fights in the streets.

The whole system of the Ottoman state was founded upon a military autocracy, and it should have been the first duty of the Sultan to be always in the saddle at the head of his troops, not reclining among the cushions in his harem.

So important did the early sultans consider their influence with their men that it was their habit to be enrolled as a private soldier in their first regiment of Janissaries, and in that capacity to come down to the barracks once a week to receive their pay from the commander. But after Suleiman, Mahommed III. and Mustafa II. were the only two sultans who accompanied their armies in the field.

The Grand Vizierate, and consequently the leadership of the armies, fell chiefly into the hands of the favourites of the Harem, generally incompetent, but occasionally very able adventurers. Ambitious renegades from almost every country in Europe flocked to Constantinople, where any man who was sufficiently daring and unscrupulous might rise to the highest positions. It would be possible to fill a page with the names of Greek, Italian, German, and Croatian adventurers who became viziers and pashas.

The admirals of Suleiman have already been mentioned, and it will be sufficient to add the names of the famous Herzegovinian Grand Vizier,

Mahommed Sokolovich; of his great admiral, the Italian Uludj Ali; of the Italian Cicala, victor of Cerestes; of the Albanian family of viziers, the Köprilis; of the Abyssinian eunuch Bashir; and, in the last century, of the Croatian clerk, Omar, the Turkish commander in the Crimea; and of the musician's son from Magdeburg, the unfortunate Mahommed Ali.

From the death of Suleiman to the extermination of the Janissaries by Mahmud II. in 1828, Constantinople was the theatre of endless scenes of blood, of mutinies, riots, and massacres, in which the rival corps of Janissaries and Spahis always took a leading part. This anarchy in the capital quickly spread to the garrison towns, where the Janissaries became virtually independent, refused to obey orders, relaxed all discipline, and terrorised the population. In Buda, Belgrad, and Sarajevo, the central authority was openly flouted. The fortifications were allowed to fall into ruins, and in war this corps, once the terror of Christendom, proved little better than an undisciplined mob, useless in battle and given to indiscriminate looting and plundering.

II

This was happening at a time when the very existence of the Empire was threatened by hostile coalitions, for towards the end of the Sixteenth Century circumstances combined to make the Osmanli no longer the aggressors but the aggressed, in a long series of wars which Austria, and later Russia, were to undertake, with the ultimate object

of the control of the Balkans and of Constantinople. The Turks, on their northern frontiers, were finding themselves no longer opposed by a disunited and feudal Hungary, but by the great House of Habsburg, and by a Russia whose potentialities for war no man knew.

The conquests of the Turks during the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries had been due greatly to that feudal system which hindered all united effort—a system whereby the fortunes of families and dynasties were considered of more moment than the future of a nation. The quarrel between Cantacuzene and Palæologus brought Orkhan into Europe; a disputed succession gave Bulgaria to Murad I.; the ambitions of Vuk Brankovich made Serbia an easy prey; fear of Hungary and Roman Catholicism caused the Bosnian nobles to surrender to Mahommed II.; the struggle between the nobles and the gentry gave Hungary to Suleiman. But at the end of the Fifteenth and the beginning of the Sixteenth Centuries, a generation of powerful kings had reduced their barons to impotence. In England, Henry VII. and Henry VIII., in France, Louis XI. and Francis I., in Spain, Ferdinand and Isabella, in Russia, the two Ivans, had established comparatively centralised monarchies. To a lesser extent, Charles V. accomplished the same in Germany, and although neither he nor his successors ever succeeded in ousting the rival reigning houses from all power, he placed the House of Habsburg definitely at the head of the German nation.

The passing of the barons was followed by the formation of royal armies — highly trained and

disciplined, very different from the headstrong chivalry and the raw levies of the previous century. The Turks were for the first time opposed to armies equal to their own in organisation. They no longer possessed the advantage of their centralised administration, and, at the same time, internal disorder was beginning to weaken their powers of resistance. And the Habsburgs could draw on the resources of Germany and Bohemia, and sometimes of Poland. The rich plains of Hungary were the first prize of the victor.

It was during the reign of Selim II. that, on the banks of the Volga and the Don, Turks and Russians first came into conflict. These hostilities were considered to be of little significance, but in reality the Osmanli had joined issue with a foe more powerful than either Austrian or Knight of St John. At the end of the Fifteenth Century, after two hundred years of national degradation, the Russians had at last thrown off the yoke of the Tatar khans, and under Ivan III., Vasili, and Ivan IV. (the Terrible) had built up an empire which extended from Lapland in the north to Kiev and Kazan in the south. But at that time Russia was so little known in Western Europe that in the reign of Mary of England, a charter was granted to certain merchants wishing to trade there, referring to "the discovery of the said country," "likening it," said Creasy, "to some region of savages where civilised man might then tread for the first time." At that time Swedes and Poles held the Baltic coast; Turks and Tatars, the lands to the north of the Black Sea. Great Russia was landlocked except for some hundred miles of

coast along the White Sea. Consequently all the wars of the early Tsars were directed in the north-west against Sweden and Poland, in order to obtain an outlet to the Baltic, and in the south against Turkey, who held the keys to the Black Sea.

Already Ivan III. had preferred a shadowy claim to Constantinople by marrying Sophia, the last Princess of the House of Palæologus. And in 1495, the first Russian Ambassador, sent to Constantinople to obtain satisfaction for grievances suffered by Russian merchants at Azov, had been instructed not to bend the knee to the kindly Bayazid, who had weakly allowed this insult to pass.

III

For two decades after the death of the great Suleiman the Ottoman Empire showed no visible signs of decay, for the administrative power remained in the hands of men appointed during his reign. Selim the Sot lived and died in his flower gardens by the Bosphorus, and Mahommed Sokolovich, a Herzegovinian Janissary, virtually ruled. The policy of this remarkable man was rather pacific than bellicose, and he was only driven into war by the force of circumstances, or by the erratic ambitions of the harem. He humoured his Slav compatriots by the re-establishment of the Serbian Church, and constituted his own brother, Macarius, Patriarch at Ipek. He further formed two ingenious schemes, whereby the naval and economic power of the Turks might have been enormously increased.

The first was to cut a canal across the Isthmus of Suez, so that the Turkish fleet might enter the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, and it was only a revolt in the Yemen which prevented the anticipation of de Lesseps, by three centuries. The second was to join the Volga and the Don by canal, so that the Turkish fleet might enter the Caspian from the Black Sea, and attack the northern provinces of Persia. It will be seen that the economic advantages would also have been considerable, for the entire trade of Central Asia would have been thrown open to the Black Sea merchants.

In pursuance of this latter plan, a large army of Turks and Crim Tatars, in 1568, attacked the Russians at Astrakhan, where the Volga flows into the Caspian. But the expedition miscarried, the greater part of the Turkish army perished, and a scheme was frustrated which, had it been successful, would have made Sokolovich famous as the foremost engineer of his time.

The policy of Sokolovich appears to have been to refrain from offensive action in Europe, as evidenced by his opposition to the Venetian campaign, and to devote the energies of Turkey to expansion in Mahommedan lands. He fought a successful campaign in the Yemen, and sent the Italian, Uludj Ali, to take Tunis from the Spaniards. In 1578, after the Venetian war, he attacked Georgia, then ruled by a Christian prince under the protection of Persia, and annexed the Persian Caspian provinces of Azerbaijan and Laristan.

The war with Venice in 1570, which resulted in the disastrous battle of Lepanto, is said to

have been provoked by Selim, who loved the wine of Cyprus, then an appanage of the Republic, and wished to possess himself of that island in order to ensure himself of a certain supply. Accordingly, in opposition to the advice of Sokolovich, an expedition was fitted out under the command of his rival, the notorious Lala Mustafa, and Famagosta, the chief fortress of Cyprus, was captured after a protracted siege, in which the Turks lost 50,000 men. Christendom was aroused by this unprovoked attack and by the atrocities which had accompanied the capture, and a powerful fleet, made up of Spanish, Venetian, and Papal vessels, was collected at Messina, under the command of Don John of Austria, a natural son of Charles V. On 7th October 1571 Don John engaged the Turkish fleet in the Gulf of Lepanto, and inflicted a crushing defeat; 50,000 Turks lost their lives, and 15,000 galley-slaves were liberated. Uludj alone escaped with about forty galleys.

For the moment, Turkish sea-power was annihilated, and an attack might have been made on Constantinople itself, but the Christian fleet dispersed after the victory, and the youthful John returned to receive the ovations of a delighted Europe. By superhuman efforts, in which even Selim participated, the losses were repaired. In the following year the Turkish fleet was as strong as it had been before Lepanto, and the Christians carefully avoided another combat with Uludj. Eventually, in 1573, the Republic of St Mark concluded a humiliating peace with the Porte, by which they recognised the Turkish possession of Cyprus, and paid an

indemnity of 300,000 ducats, the cost of its capture. For many years yet the Ottoman fleet, in alliance with the African corsairs, maintained its predominant position in the Mediterranean.

IV

In 1578 Mahommed Sokolovich died, and the pernicious influence of the harem soon began to be felt. War broke out with Austria in 1593, and everywhere Turkish arms met with failure. The Hospodar of Wallachia, Michael the Brave, massacred every Turk in his principality, deposed Andrew Bathori, the Prince of Transylvania, a Turkish nominee, and assumed the title of "Prince of Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia" (1599). For a moment it seemed as if a powerful and united Kingdom of Rumania might be formed. In the meantime, the Emperor Maximilian II. crossed the Danube and marched to Varna.

There was consternation at Constantinople; the Janissaries refused to fight unless the Sultan, the cowardly Mahommed III., placed himself at their head. The latter was at last dragged from his harem by his tutor, the great historian Seadeddin, and after unfurling the banner of the Prophet in the hope of arousing the fanaticism of his troops, marched northwards at the head of a large but disorderly army. The Austro-Hungarian army withdrew across the Danube into Hungary, and in the autumn of 1596 a three days' battle was fought on the plain of Kerestes. In the first two days the Turks were worsted, and the Sultan

was with difficulty restrained from a precipitate flight; but the situation was saved by the Italian renegade Cicala, who routed the Austrians by a brilliant cavalry charge whilst they were engaged in looting the Ottoman camp. Maximilian fled for his life, leaving 30,000 men dead on the field, and the Sultan returned to Constantinople to receive the credit for the victory won by Cicala.

The war dragged on until 1606 when by the Treaty of Sitvatorok, Turko-Austrian claims in Hungary were compromised; but the Rumanian principalities again passed under the suzerainty of the Sultan, who nominated to be voivode of Transylvania that Bethlen Gabor who figures so prominently in the chronicles of the Thirty Years' War as the inexorable enemy of the House of Habsburg.

Michael's dream of a Greater Rumania had vanished with his death (1601). He had alienated the sympathies of the Wallachian peasantry by his extortions, and of the Transylvanian peasantry by his support of their Magyar lords who themselves secretly hated him, and whom he was not strong enough to offend. And so, left unsupported by a nation who should have rallied to him as their deliverer, he was defeated and killed, and the realisation of his plans was delayed for three hundred years. The war with Austria now lapsed for half a century, for the House of Habsburg, engaged in a life and death struggle with Sweden and Protestant Germany, was in no position to pursue an aggressive policy towards the East. It was not until the Peace of Westphalia (1608) had

crowned the efforts of Richelieu and Oxenstiern that the Emperor was able to resume the "Drang nach Osten."

V

During this period the condition of the Ottoman Empire grew steadily worse. The system of corruption and place-seeking, which had begun under Suleiman and had assumed such proportions under Selim and his successors, was producing the most deplorable results.

The history of these times is a dreary story of the plots and intrigues of the ladies of the harem — of sultans, sensualists, degenerates, and imbeciles, murdered or deposed, or murdering their own sons through fear of rebellion — of bloody riots and mutinies among the Janissaries and Spahis, only subdued by wholesale executions or enormous bribes—of brave and honest men (and there were few enough) hounded to death—of revolts in Asia Minor — of plagues, famines, massacres, and misery everywhere.

"It has become," wrote Sir Thomas Roe, who visited Turkey in 1622, "like an old body, crazed through many vices, which remains, when the youth and strength is decayed." Writing after the murder of Osman II. by the Janissaries (1622) he says: "The ruined houses in many places remain, but the injustice and the cruelty of the government hath made all people abandon them. All the territory of the grand Seignior is dispeopled for want of justice, or rather, by reason of violent oppression. So much so, that in the best parts

of Greece and Natolia a man may ride three, four, and sometimes six days and not find a village able to feed him and his horse, whereby the revenue is so lessened that there is not wherewithal to pay the soldiers and to maintain the court. It may be patched up for a while out of the Treasury, and by exactions which are now grievous upon the merchant and labouring man to satisfy the harpies; but when those means fail, which cannot long endure, either the soldiery must want their pay, or the number must be reduced; neither of which they will suffer; and whosoever shall attempt either remedy shall follow Othman to his grave. This is the state of this so much feared greatness; and the wisest men in the country foresee it, and retyre their estates as fast as they can, fearing that no haste can prevent their danger. I can say no more than that the disease works internally that must ruin this Empire; we daily expect more changes and effusion of blood. The wisest men refuse to sit at the helm, and fools will soon run themselves and others upon the rocks. This State, for sixteen months since the death of Othman, hath been a stage of variety; the soldiers usurping all authority, placing and displacing 'more vulg.' as the wynd of humour or dissatisfaction moved them. In this mind I have seen three emperors, seven grand viziers, five aghas of the Janissaries, and in proportion, as many changes of governors in all the provinces, every new vizier making use of his time displacing those in possession and selling their favours to others.

"The pirates of Algiers have cast off all

obedience to the Empire, not only upon the sea, where they are masters, but presuming to do many insolences even upon the land and in the best parts of the Grand Seignior."

"The country," wrote a contemporary traveller, "sweated blood," and another went on to describe the peasants "as poor, miserable captives, none of whom dare lift up his head."

The condition of the people of Wallachia and Moldavia, where they were ruled by their own Hospodars, was quite as bad as that of the rayahs of Bulgaria and Serbia. The Hospodars first purchased their appointment at Constantinople by means of heavy bribes among the eunuchs and favourites of the harem, and, since they were changed with each new vizier, they were compelled to maintain their interests by continued heavy presents. They naturally did not scruple to recoup their purses at the expense of the country which they came to rule, and their first step was always to oust the existing officials, and to sell their places to the highest bidder. These in their turn wrung the purchase money from the unhappy peasantry.

The boyars or nobles of the country spent their lives in intriguing for these appointments on the advent of each new Hospodar. Manners and morals were at a low ebb: divorce was the fashion; the sole ambition of the women was to make a good marriage, and to appear at court in the expensive velvets and silks of Genoa; the men led a life of sensual ease, endeavouring in their palaces at Bukharest and Jassy to ape the Oriental luxury of Constantinople. The boyars paid no

taxes, and were entitled to make the peasantry work on their land and to exact a tenth of their crops. With the exception of a few men such as Michael the Brave and John the Terrible (originally a diamond-merchant in Constantinople), the Hospodars showed no national spirit and little desire to redeem their country from the domination of the Turk.

After the death of Michael, the country fell more and more under the influence of the Greeks. The Porte did not hesitate to sell the position of the Hospodar to members of the wealthy Greek families of the Phanar (a district of Constantinople), and the disorder of the principalities was still further accentuated by the hostility which the boyars evinced for these foreign interlopers. However, between 1633 and 1654, Basil the Wolf in Moldavia and John Matthew Bassarab in Wallachia, by a series of severe and ruthless laws, succeeded in re-establishing a semblance of order and culture in their respective principalities.

The laws of Basil the Wolf are interesting as showing the extreme rigour of the criminal code at that age, and the inequality of the treatment of nobles and peasants.[1] The man who set a house on fire was burnt alive; the serf convicted of rape was disembowelled; the bigamist was mounted on a donkey and whipped naked through the streets; the seducer had boiling lead poured down his throat. But the boyar and his family might be neither hanged, impaled, nor sent to work in the salt mines; decapitation and banishment were considered the only punishments

[1] Miller, *The Balkans*, p. 57.

commensurate with their dignity. Even to harbour an escaped serf was a crime, but to ill-treat him met with no penalty.

After the deaths of Basil and Matthew in 1653 and 1654, there succeeded a long line of Phanariot Hospodars, and the country sank again into a condition of misery and want, which contrasted strangely with the luxury of the little courts at Bukharest and Jassy.

In Bulgaria and Serbia the Greek element proved almost as oppressive as in Rumania. The independent Serbian and Bulgarian churches of Ipek and Ochrida were not suppressed until 1766-67; but the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople was always recognised by the Turks as the secular head of the Christians, and in Bulgaria and later in Serbia the bishops, who had to buy their sees, as the pashas did their pashaliks, proved almost as oppressive as the military governors. Under their influence, all religious services were conducted in Greek. Greek was made the language of trade and legislation, and the Slav tongues came to be regarded as peasant dialects.

But the Bulgars were happier than the Wallachs and Moldavs in that they had not to suffer the additional burden of a self-seeking and degenerate national aristocracy, though their lot was deplorable enough, victims as they were of the arrogant tyranny of the pashas, of the extortion of the Greek bishops and tax-collectors, of the excesses of the Janissaries and Bashi-Bazuks, of the corvée, the *droit de seigneur*, and the blood-tax.

The country, subject to the constant passage of mutinous bands or of opposing armies, was in

many parts a wilderness, the villages and homesteads in ashes, the live-stock slaughtered, the crops burnt. Among the Serbs, the Spahi or military fief-holders took the place of the ancient nobility, exacted two-days-a-week forced labour, and received tithes of all agricultural produce. In summer the peasants were marched away in droves to work in the meadows of the Sultan round Constantinople.[1]

But it must be emphasised that the antagonism between Christian and Moslem, Rayah and "Turk," was not so much religious and racial as social. The Christians represented the oppressed and down-trodden mass of the peasantry, the "Turks," the official, the military, and the land-owning classes. It is necessary to invert the word "Turk," because it included not only the original stock of the conquering race but many thousands of apostates, the Slav land-owners of Bosnia, Serbia, and Bulgaria, who had adopted Islam in order to save their possessions. It was a huge political blunder, when by making Mahommedanism the privileged religion, the sultans identified it with the interests of the land-owning class, as opposed to Christianity which remained the religion of the masses—the national religion. The begs of Bosnia, the Spahi of Serbia, and the aghas of Bulgaria became the supporters of the Ottoman domination, because the feudal and reactionary interests were identified with its maintenance.

When the strong sultans held a tight rein on the land-owners, the peasantry remained contented and unrebellious. In fact, as has been mentioned,

[1] Miller, p. 299.

the rule of an alien people and of a strange religion proved more tolerable to many thousands of Hungarian and Rumanian peasants than the tyranny of an arrogant aristocracy and a bigoted priesthood. History has proved that it is misrule alone that rouses the spirit of nationality among subject races, and that persecution only can breed revolution. The great mass of a people take little interest in politics, and so long as they are well ruled, care little whether it be by a Mahommedan sultan or by a Christian king. But, when they are misruled, their nationality and their religion become the concrete organs through which they can collectively express their discontent with existing conditions and their will-to-freedom. The government of the Turk and of the Moslem was to the Rayahs the government of the oppressive governor, of the privileged landowner, of the extortionate tax-collector, and of the outrageous Greek priest. When they rose it was not against Mahommedanism but against feudalism, soul-killing, reactionary, destructive.

It is true that the Turkish Government used the fanaticism of the Moslem peasants in order to repress the nationalism of the Rayahs. But fanaticism is bred of ignorance, and the Turkish peasant is the most ignorant in the world. In reality the Porte appealed not to their fanaticism but to their predatory instinct. Tell an ignorant, lazy peasant that he may win Paradise by plundering the goods of his more prosperous Christian neighbour, by violating his daughters, and by appropriating his sheep and cattle, and he will prove a most fanatical follower of the Prophet.

The first signs of national revolt amongst the subject Bosnians, Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks was the growth of bands of patriotic brigands, the Hayduks of Bosnia and Serbia, the Haidutin of Bulgaria, and the Klefts of Greece. These bands, somewhat after the style of Robin Hood, devoted their activities to attacks on the Turks, and to the protection of the poor peasantry. In summer they descended from the mountains upon the Turkish caravans, making the highways unsafe for traffic, and generally successfully resisted or eluded the punitive expeditions of the Valis. In winter they buried their arms and took refuge in the villages, where they were fed and clothed during the cold months by their admiring compatriots. Professor Miller states that to this day the secret sign, which marked where their arms were buried, may be observed, scratched on the bark of aged trees. These picturesque robber-patriots were the heroes of many quaint lays and folk-songs, and it was the glamour of their doings which kept alight the fire of nationalism during the long years of the "Turkish Night."

VI

Sir Edwin Pears, quoting the indictment of one who was a keen observer of the Turk, says: "Convulsive fanaticism alternating with lethargic torpor, transient vigour followed by long and irremediable decay; such is the general history of Mahommedan government with its races."[1]

[1] Pears, *Turkey and its Peoples*, p. 39.

It was such a period of "transient vigour" which passed over Turkey during the latter half of the Seventeenth Century, when Murad IV. and the remarkable family of Köprili succeeded in temporarily checking the course of corruption and decay.

Murad IV. was made Sultan at the age of eleven, amidst scenes of anarchy and bloodshed, which have been well described by Sir Thomas Roe. For eight years he suffered all the humiliations and perils of a monarch without power, in a capital controlled by dissolute women and an unrestrained soldiery. He was a silent, moody young man, we are told, strong in physique and handsome in appearance, but his face was marred by a never-absent scowl which denoted the darkness of his soul. Creasy relates the story of the Turkish historian, Evliya. "When Sultan Murad entered the Treasury after his accession, my father, Dervish Mahommed, was with him. There were no gold or silver vessels remaining—only 30,000 piastres in money, and some coral and porcelain in chests. "God willing," said the Sultan, after prostrating himself in prayer, "I will replenish this Treasury fifty-fold with the property of those who have plundered it"—this from a boy of eleven.

In 1632, when Murad was twenty, the Spahi mutinied, threatened his life, and were only appeased by the delivery to them of all the Sultan's ministers. However, in the following year, Murad carried out a coup d'état with the aid of some loyal Janissaries, and obtained command of the capital. He then instituted such

a reign of terror against all wrongdoers that he earned for himself the sobriquet of the Man-slayer. In seven years it is calculated that no fewer than 100,000 were put to death. He marched through Asia Minor, restoring order and justice with an iron hand. But later, this justifiable severity degenerated into a sullen savagery, from which not even the most innocent were exempt. He caused a party of women dancers to be drowned because their noise disturbed him. Utter abandonment to drink accentuated his blood-lust. He marched against the Persians, who fifteen years before had captured Bagdad, and in two campaigns retook that city and captured Erivan. But on his return from Bagdad, in the winter of 1640, he died suddenly from the effects of drink. On his deathbed he gave orders for the execution of his surviving brother Ibrahim, whose life was only saved by a deception practised by their mother.

Had Ibrahim succumbed to the bow-string, the House of Othman would have become extinct, and it is supposed that it was Murad's sombre wish that he should go down to history as the last of his race. As it was, Ibrahim proved a degenerate and sensual sadeist, and anarchy, cruelty, and corruption reappeared in their most virulent forms. That the Empire should have survived as an offensive military machine during these years of apparent dissolution, is a great tribute to the foresight and organising powers of the earlier sultans. For it was during the reign of this despicable Ibrahim that a Turkish army drove the Cossacks from Azov, while another landed in Crete and

besieged the Venetians in Candia. That the siege of an island-fortress could be undertaken and brought to a successful conclusion after twenty-five years' fighting, proves that there were yet many men of outstanding ability and energy among the Turkish officers. The question of commissariat alone must have been one of considerable difficulty.

VII

It was during these years that the British, in the interests of trade, first began to intervene in the affairs of Turkey. We have seen Sir Thomas Roe come to Constantinople to protest against the excesses of the Barbary corsairs, who in five years had captured no less than four hundred British merchantmen. In 1620 Admiral Mansell had made an abortive attack on Algiers; but it was not until 1655 that Admiral Blake bombarded Tunis and destroyed the major portion of the Dey's fleet, and proceeding later to Algiers, obtained a surrender of all British slaves without firing a shot. This action was undertaken without first declaring war on the Porte, and is evidence that the Sultan held little, if any, authority over the African coast by that date. However, in 1663, it was officially agreed between the British Government and the Sultan that the corsairs might be attacked without endangering the relations of the two governments.

The interests in the Near East of the Dutch traders and of the English Levant Company were now becoming more important, and we shall

frequently see Dutch and English influence brought to bear against Russia and France, and English intervention accepted in Austro-Turkish wars—notably at the Peace of Carlovicz in 1698, when Lord Paget was entrusted by the Austrians with the money to bribe the Turkish representatives. At the beginning of the Sixteenth Century English consuls had been named to Chios and Crete, but it was Queen Elizabeth who first took active steps to obtain for her subjects, trading facilities in the Levant. In 1582 Master William Harebone went as first English ambassador to Constantinople, not as the representative of the Queen, but of the Levant Company. His semi-political, semi-commercial appointment was typical of English methods of those days, for Harebone was instructed at the same time to obtain the alliance of the Grand Seignior against the Spaniards, who were then preparing their great Armada. His arguments to prove that the principles of Protestantism and Mahommedanism were the same in that both forbade the use of images and pictures, were at least ingenious.

But French influence, fostered by Francis I. and Henry IV., was then paramount in the Levant. The brilliant Valois, who had begun his reign by advocating a crusade against the Turk, had seen of what immense assistance Suleiman might be to him in his struggle against the House of Habsburg, and had finally concluded an alliance against Austria, to which reference has already been made.

At the same time, by the Capitulations of 1535, French subjects received permission to trade in all Turkish ports, while the ships of other nations

might only do so under the French flag; Frenchmen in Turkey were permitted the full practice of their own religion; and the custody of the Holy Places of Palestine was given to French Catholics. In 1604 Henry IV. renewed these Capitulations, and, with fluctuations, the Franco-Turkish understanding continued until the Revolution, although Louis XIV. was forced to send his fleet to the Dardanelles in 1673 to ensure recognition of his protectorate of the Eastern Catholics.

All through the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries French influence was predominant at Constantinople, and the French language and manners were correspondingly spread throughout the Levant. Nevertheless, England, Holland, and Venice proved none too negligible rivals.

VIII

In 1566 the old Mahommed Köprili,[1] once a kitchen boy in the Sultan's palace, became Grand Vizier through the intrigues of the Sultana Validé.[2] During the next forty-six years the Köprili family, with intervals, ruled the Empire in the name of the incapable Mahommed IV. and his successors. Their rise is the one case in Turkish history of the growth of a great family, for in Turkey the hereditary landed classes, which controlled the government of contemporary Europe, were non-existent. Mahommed Köprili appears to have

[1] Köprili: from Köpri in Anatolia, his birthplace.

[2] Sultana Validé was the title borne by the mother of the reigning Sultan.

been an extraordinarily strong-minded man, since he refused to accept the Vizierate unless he were guaranteed a free hand in the control and reform of the administration. He used his authority with relentless severity, and a swift nemesis overtook all wrongdoers, whether they were mutinous officers, venal judges, or incompetent officials. In vigour of punishment, he bade fair to outdo Murad IV. It is estimated that 45,000 people were put to death in five years. Sulfikar, the chief executioner of Constantinople, boasted that he himself had strangled 4000 victims. Nevertheless, Mahommed succeeded in temporarily checking the canker of misgovernment, and by drastic reform in the army and navy raised the Ottoman Empire once more to a position of influence among the European Powers.

Mahommed died in 1661, and was succeeded in the Grand Vizierate by his son Ahmed, an honest and energetic young man of twenty-six. Ahmed proved to be a statesman of great foresight and moderation. Although a strict and scrupulous Moslem, he set himself to improve the condition of the Christian rayahs, and to reconcile them to Moslem rule by abolishing the restrictions on the building of churches.

In 1663 war broke out with Austria, and a long struggle ensued which was to decide finally whether Turk or Austrian was to possess the fertile Hungarian plain. The pusillanimous and bigoted Emperor Leopold by his anti-Protestant, anti-national policy had alienated the Hungarians, and the disorganised state of the country invited a Turkish invasion.

In 1663 Ahmed Köprili captured the important fortress of Neuhausel, while the Khan of the Crimea ravaged Moravia with a horde of Tatars. Köprili then captured Serinvar, and on 26th July reached Komorn on the Raab, where his outposts came in contact with those of the Imperial army under Count Raymond Monticuculi, one of the greatest strategists of his time. On 1st August, round the Convent of St Gotthard, was fought the first great battle between European and Asiatic troops since Kerestes, nearly seventy years before. But, while the Ottoman armies had deteriorated both in discipline and in organisation, the Austrians had profited by the experience of the Thirty Years' War, and had been trained by some of the greatest generals of the Seventeenth Century. The Turks were completely defeated. Their military prestige, which had remained unbroken since the battle of Mohacz, was entirely destroyed. In the following half-century the Imperial generals, Charles of Lorraine, Louis of Baden, and Eugène of Savoy, were to continue this work of Monticuculi, to drive the Turks from Hungary, and to establish in a dozen battles the superiority of Western organisation and strategy. However, in spite of this victory, Leopold was content to conclude the humiliating Treaty of Vascar, which left the Turks in possession of Serivar and Neuhausel, and recognised their nominee, Michael Apafi, as Prince of Transylvania.

Ahmed Köprili now devoted his attention to the reduction of Candia, which the Turks had been besieging since 1645. In spite of a relieving fleet, which Louis XIV. and the Pope despatched in

the summer of 1669, Morosini, the Venetian commander, finally capitulated on favourable terms, and a treaty was concluded with the Republic of St Mark, recognising the Sultan's possession of the island.

In 1672 an appeal to the Porte by the Ukrainian Cossacks, who had risen against the Poles, precipitated a war with Poland. After a short campaign, the weak and incompetent King, Michael Korybut Wisnioviecki, concluded the Peace of Bucsacz, by which Podolia, with the important city of Kaminiecz, was ceded to the Porte.

But the nobles repudiated this treaty, and in 1673 John Sobieski (elected king in the following year) defeated Ahmed Köprili at Khoczim, and again at Lemberg (1675). But the country was in a state of utter disorder, and Sobieski found himself unable to maintain a large army. He was defeated by Ibrahim Shaitan or the Devil, and forced to renew the Treaty of Bucsacz by that of Zurawnow (1676).

A few days after the signature, Ahmed Köprili died from the effects of drink. He may be described as the last of the builders of Turkey, for he had increased the Empire in Europe by important acquisitions in Hungary, Poland, and the Ægean. Though past the height of its power, the Ottoman Empire was at this date at the zenith of its territorial expansion. On the death of Ahmed, it was hoped that the Sultan would confer the Grand Vizierate on his brother, Zadé Mustafa Köprili, a man of considerable ability; but unfortunately Mahommed's choice fell on Kara

(black) Mustafa Pasha, a blood-thirsty, avaricious man who was his favourite in the chase. It was not until thirteen years later that Zadé Mustafa was made Grand Vizier—and this interval was one of overwhelming disaster for the Turks.

In 1682 the Hungarians again revolted against the intolerable rule of the Emperor Leopold, and Kara Mustafa considered it a favourable opportunity to attack the Austrians. In 1683 he moved on Vienna at the head of an army of 300,000 men and a horde of Tatar horsemen. Leopold fled to Passau and left the defence of his capital to the heroic Count von Stahremberg. It has already been observed that Bayazid's gout once saved Buda; the caprice of a woman was now to save Vienna. John Sobieski was married to Marie d'Arquiens de la Grange, the daughter of a French gentleman to whom Louis XIV. had refused a dukedom. It was Louis's policy to prevent the relief of Vienna, and with this object he addressed himself to John Sobieski, who was then preparing to advance against the Turks. But the offended Marie d'Arquiens opposed the propositions of the French ambassador, and Sobieski committed that which, in 1848, Tsar Nicholas I. stigmatised as "the fatal blunder of saving the Austrian Empire."

With 50,000 men the Polish king joined Charles of Lorraine, the Imperial commander, and on 12th September 1683 the united Austro-Polish army, numbering then only 70,000 men, attacked the Turkish camp before Vienna. Kara Mustafa, confident of victory, had neglected the most elementary precautions, and was quite

unprepared to resist an attack in rear. The Turkish army fled in desperate rout towards Buda-Pesth, and Vienna—and Germany—was saved. The Austrian capital could not have held out for more than five days longer.

Venice and Russia now joined in the coalition against the Turks. The Venetians invaded Dalmatia and the Morea; the Poles entered Moldavia; the Russians advanced into the Crimea; an Austrian army overran Croatia. But it would be laborious to detail at length the events of a war which lasted, with varying fortunes, for sixteen years. In a series of brilliant victories, Charles of Lorraine and Eugène of Savoy captured Neuhausel (1685) and Buda (1686), defeated the Turks in a great battle on the historic field of Mohacz (1687), entered Belgrad (1688), and penetrated far into Bosnia and Serbia. Morosini "the Peloponnesian," the heroic defender of Candia, overran the Morea; only eastwards were the Turks more successful, for while the Tatars invaded Poland, a Russian army was defeated in the Crimea; but in 1695 Azov surrendered to Peter the Great.

In 1689 Zadé Mustafa Köprili, a man as capable and as virtuous as his brother, was made Grand Vizier. In a successful campaign he drove the Austrians out of Macedonia and Serbia, while the Hungarian Tekelli reconquered Transylvania for the Turks. But in 1691 Köprili invaded Hungary and met the army of Louis, Markgraf of Baden, at Zlankamen, near Pietervaradin. The Turks were defeated and Köprili killed. At this crisis the new Sultan, Mustafa II. (1695-

1703), showed himself a worthy descendant of Murad I. and Bayazid I. By superhuman efforts he succeeded in collecting another army, and in the summer of 1696 defeated the Duke of Saxony near Temesvar. But next year Eugène of Savoy inflicted a heavy defeat on the Turks at Zenta on the Theiss, and occupied the greater part of Bosnia. Zenta was the last great battle of the war.

The Austrians, Poles, and Venetians were as eager as the Turks for peace; of the belligerents, Peter of Russia alone was dissatisfied when the Dutch and English ambassadors proposed to mediate.

William III. was planning to bring Austria into his coalition against France, and wished the Emperor to be unembarrassed on his eastern frontiers; so Louis XIV. made desperate efforts to persuade Hussein Köprili, the new Grand Vizier (a nephew of Zadé Mustafa), to continue the war. But the exigencies of the situation, and, it has been suggested, the gold of William of Orange, proved of more weight than the vows of Louis that he would never rest until he saw the Turks repossessed of Hungary, and on 24th October 1698 the plenipotentiaries met at Carlovicz, a little town on the Danube below Pietervaradin.

The Peace of Carlovicz has been aptly called "the First Partition of Turkey." By the terms agreed upon, Austria received all Hungary (except the Banat of Temesvar), Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania; Dalmatia, Albania, and the Morea went to Venice; Podolia was receded to Poland; Russia gained Azov and the districts north of the

sea of that name, but Peter at the same time expressed his dissatisfaction, and would only consent to a truce of two years; the other signatories agreed to a peace for thirty-five years.

The Peace of Carlovicz is a landmark in European history. It was the most important agreement concluded during the Seventeenth Century, for the results were more far-reaching than those of the Peace of Westphalia. Firstly, it definitely marked the end of the Turkish menace to Germany and to Christendom; Turkish armies had everywhere been shattered, and the superiority of Austrian arms and Austrian strategy had been conclusively proved; Turkey was no longer to be feared, but rather to be the object of the aggrandisement of her neighbours. Secondly, the House of Austria was enormously strengthened; the Peace of Westphalia had seen the nadir of the Habsburgs; the Peace of Carlovicz in the east, and the Peaces of Utrecht and Rastadt (1713-14) in the west, were to bring them to their zenith; for the next half-century Austria was to be the predominant power on the Continent. Thirdly, Russia received a port on the Black Sea, and a base from which future wars of aggrandisement might be carried on against Turkey; the acquisition of a sea-board on the Black Sea was as integral a part of Peter the Great's imperial policy as his annexations of the Baltic lands; ice-free ports and naval bases were vital to Russia, if she was to be raised to the position of a World Power.

IX

The Eighteenth Century was an age of endless, complicated, bloody, devastating wars. They were essentially "trade" wars, as contrasted with the religious wars of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth, and the baronial wars of the Fifteenth, Centuries. Thus, from 1702 till 1711, England, Holland, Austria, and France fought for the wealth of the Spanish colonies; the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War were fought between England and France for the World-Power which must belong to that nation which should control the commerce and colonisation of India and America, and between Austria and Prussia for the possession of the rich coalfields of Silesia. In the war of the Polish Succession (1737) Louis XV. was willing to sacrifice his father-in-law (Stanislas Leczinski) for the ore-fields of Lorraine; likewise Charles XII. and Peter the Great fought for the mastery of the Baltic coasts in which the stakes were, for Sweden, the control of Northern Europe, or the position of a second-rate power; for Russia, progress and prosperity, or reaction and poverty. It was an age of grasping and unscrupulous statesmen, culminating in the crime of the Polish Partition and the nemesis of the Revolution. Turkey, shattered by the "First Partition," was the object alike of the calculated Imperialism of Russia and of the ambitious opportunism of Austria. The Russian wars were initiated with the definite object of obtaining control of the

Black Sea, and eventually of Constantinople and the South Slav lands; the Austrian attacks were entered upon either with the object of taking advantage of the weakness of the Turks, or of obtaining compensation in the Balkans for territory lost to France and Russia.

In 1711 Peter the Great, having attained his objects on the Baltic sea-board and in Poland by the final defeat of Charles XII. at Pultowa (1709), diverted his efforts against Turkey. Elated by his victories over the great Swede, he seems to have regarded the defeat of the Turks as a comparatively easy matter, and committed the fatal blunder of under-estimating his opponents. He entered into negotiations with the Rumanian Hospodars, and in the spring of 1711 entered Moldavia at the head of 50,000 men, "in the name of the Saviour and of Christianity." The Hospodar of Moldavia, Demetrius Cantemir, who has left us a history of Turkey, received the Tsar at Jassy, and the bells of the cathedral pealed in honour of the coming of a Christian emperor. But the provisions which Cantemir had promised were not forthcoming, and the Russian troops were starving. Constantine Brancovano, the Wallachian Hospodar, turned traitor and informed the Porte of Peter's plans. Then Baltadji Mahommed, who had risen from a woodcutter to be Grand Vizier, moved along the right bank of the Pruth with 200,000 men, and came upon the Russians at the little village of Hussh. Peter, with his army reduced to 24,000 men, was in a hopeless position, hemmed into a marsh, and dominated by the Turkish guns on the surrounding hills. When

surrender seemed inevitable, his brave and diplomatic wife Catherine, the daughter of a Lithuanian peasant, succeeded in opening negotiations with the Vizier, and an armistice was obtained. The Swedish king, brilliant and mad, was then at Bender, after his flight from Pultowa, and made every effort to prevent a peace; but he had offended Baltadji by his insolence, and the Vizier had no mind to listen to his arguments.

Accordingly, a treaty was concluded by which Peter and his army were allowed to return to Russia, but Azov was receded to the Porte, Russian troops were to be withdrawn from Poland, and Charles XII. was to receive a safe-conduct through Russia to his own country. Baltadji was later disgraced for the leniency of his terms to the Russians; but it is difficult to see what object could have been attained by the capture of Peter the Great, unless it were the furtherance of the ambitious schemes of Charles XII. As it was, the war had been successfully concluded, and Azov had been regained without even the necessity of a pitched battle.

The defeat of Russia, and the exhaustion of Austria after the War of the Spanish Succession, now tempted the Turks to recover yet another of their losses at Carlovicz. It is said that at Carlovicz, the Turkish delegates only consented to the enormous concessions to Venice, because her weak and impoverished condition led them to expect that it would not be long before an opportunity would be afforded the Porte of retaking all that had been lost. The great Morosini was

now dead, and the Greek population of the Morea was ready to rise against the Venetians, whom they considered to be more oppressive than the Turks.

In the summer of 1715, the victorious army of the Pruth was marched down to Thessaly, and Sultan Ahmed's favourite son-in-law, the ambitious young Ali Kumurji, son of a charcoal-burner, laid siege to Corinth. This city, the key to the Morea, fell, after a siege of seven weeks, and in three months the whole province had been reconquered. Too late to save the Morea, the Emperor Charles VI. concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with the Doge, war broke out with the Porte, and in September 1716 Ali Kumurji, with 150,000 men, crossed the Danube at Belgrad. He met the veteran Prince Eugène at Pietervaradin, and was defeated and killed. Temesvar fell, and the Turks were compelled to raise the siege of Corfu. Next year, Eugène laid siege to Belgrad, defeated a greatly superior Turkish army coming to its relief, and in August received its surrender. The Austrians then overran the greater part of Wallachia and penetrated far into Serbia.

In the winter of 1717-18 the Treaty of Passarovicz was concluded, through the mediation of England and Holland. The Banat, Wallachia as far as the Aluta, and large parts of Bosnia and Northern Serbia went to the Emperor; but Venice, on whose behalf Austria had entered into the war, was compelled to acquiesce in the loss of the Morea, and of her former possessions in the Balkans retained only Corfu and a few ports on the Albanian coast. By the

cession of the Banat of Temesvar the Turks lost their last foothold in Hungary.

Travellers tell us that a few years after the departure of the Turk, no trace of them remained —the army of occupation had evacuated the country. And with them departed the sprinkling of Turkish peasants and the scattered Spahi land-owners; they piled their goods and their families on their rough country carts and followed their armies in retreat, as centuries before their ancestors had trekked with Er-Togrhul from the heart of Central Asia.

And the Turk was gone like an evil dream, leaving nothing behind him save bad roads, smells, and a few tumbling minarets.

In 1735 the Empress Anne, encouraged by her favourite, the German Marshal Münnich, who was anxious to gain fresh laurels as the conqueror of Constantinople, prepared to attack the Turks. The old Abyssinian eunuch, Bashir, then supreme in the councils of the Harem, was anxious to avoid war, and was supported in his pacific policy by the ambassadors of England and Holland. At the same time, Anne was endeavouring to secure the alliance of the Austrian Emperor, while the French ambassador at Constantinople, the Marquis de Villeneuve, had been instructed to embroil Austria in a war on the Danube. The situation remained critical, until in the summer of 1735 Münnich invaded the Crimea, while Lacy, an Irish Jacobite in the Russian service, captured Azov. However, the Russians were later compelled to withdraw from the Crimea, and it was not until the spring of 1737 that the Emperor

Charles VI., after protracted negotiations with the Porte, concluded a secret alliance with the Russians and declared war.

While Münnich marched round the coast of the Black Sea and captured Ochakov, and Lacy ravaged the Crimea, an Austrian army under Seckendorf captured Nish and Vidin. But the discipline of the Turkish army had been greatly improved by a corps of French officers, chief of whom were de Tott and Bonneval. And in the campaign of 1738, while the Divan still asked for peace, the Grand Vizier, Yegen Mahommed, captured Orsova and Semendria. Next year the Austrians were again beaten at Krotzka, between Semendria and Pietervaradin, and asked for peace. Villeneuve then negotiated the Treaty of Belgrad, by which the Turks recovered all their losses under the Treaty of Passarovicz, with the exception of the Banat. Meanwhile, Münnich, after defeating the Turks at Khoczim, had reached Jassy in Moldavia, but, finding a Turkish army of 200,000 men fresh from the victory of Krotzka threatening his flank, was forced to come to terms, by which the Russians surrendered all their conquests, except a strip of coast, and were prohibited from maintaining a fleet either in the Black Sea or the Sea of Azov. It was a signal triumph for Turkey. The Austro - Russian coalition had been withstood, and Münnich's grandiose schemes on Constantinople had been frustrated.

X

There followed a period of twenty-nine years in which Turkey was at peace with the European Powers, but it was none the less a time of disorder and conflict within the Empire. Europe was embroiled in two long years which were finally concluded by the Treaty of Versailles in 1763. The settlement left Austria, Prussia, and Russia free to pursue their designs in Eastern Europe. The chief of these were the dismemberment of Poland, which was then being plotted by the three unscrupulous monarchs. Frederic the Great, who during the Seven Years' War had sought the alliance of Turkey against Russia, was now not opposed to Russian aggression in that quarter, in exchange for compensation elsewhere. On the other hand, Turkey protested against the First Partition, but was unwilling to embark on a war for the protection of Poland. The Russians showed that they intended to force a war on the Porte by constant frontier violations, and by encouraging revolt in Montenegro, the Morea, Georgia, and the Crimea.

In October 1768 war broke out, and Prince Galitzin invaded Moldavia. The Turks suffered disaster after disaster. Wallachia and Moldavia were overrun; the Crimea was invaded; the Turks were driven from Mingrelia and Georgia; a Russian fleet entered the Ægean to assist the insurgents in Greece, Egypt, and Syria, and defeated the Turkish fleet off the Island of Chesmé. Peter the Great's policy of exploiting

the sympathies of the Sultan's Christian subjects, and of posing as the protector of the Greeks, Rumanians, and Montenegrins, was now being developed by the shrewd Empress Catherine.

At the end of the campaign of 1771 an armistice was signed, but after long discussions the fighting was resumed. The Grand Vizier, Musinzadé Pasha, retired into the Quadrilateral, formed by the fortresses of Silistria, Rustchuk, Varna, and Shumla, covering Eastern Bulgaria and blocking an advance from the Dobrudja. This Quadrilateral was to play a prominent part in future Russo-Turkish wars. The Turks were successful in the defence of Silistria and Varna, but Musinzadé suffered an overwhelming defeat in the field, and asked for an armistice (1774).

Catherine must have been anxious for peace, for she was engaged in the Partition of Poland, while at home a dangerous insurrection had broken out among the Don Cossacks, who had captured Kazan. Accordingly, after seven hours' discussion, a treaty of peace was signed at the little village of Kutchuk Kainadji. Although the terms appear extremely moderate, historians have always regarded the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainadji as one of the most disastrous events in Turkish history. The Russians agreed to evacuate Wallachia, Moldavia, Bessarabia, and the Crimea in Europe, Georgia and Mingrelia in Asia, provinces which they had completely subjugated. The Crimea was to be recognised as an independent state under a Tatar prince, but the Russians retained the fortresses of Yenikale and Kertch, which gave them control of the Sea of Azov, and the towns of Azov and

Kilburun—the possession of which meant that they could overrun the Crimea at any time; and the most important article in the Treaty was a reservation by which the Porte promised "to protect constantly the Christian religion and Church, and to allow the ministers of Russia at Constantinople to make representations on their behalf." This last term practically established a protectorate of the Tsar over all the Sultan's Christian subjects, and gave the Russians a pretext for aggressive action whenever it might suit them.

II

The Treaty of Kutchuk Kainadji proved little more than an armistice, for war between Russia and Turkey broke out again in 1787. The Empress Catherine was devoted to her fantastic "Oriental Project." In 1779 a second grandson had been born who had received the name of Constantine, and had been brought up by Greek nurses and tutors, with the idea that he should one day ascend the throne of a resuscitated Byzantine Empire. She also designed to carve a kingdom out of Wallachia and Moldavia for her favourite, Potemkin, a Pole who had risen from a sergeant in the army to be the virtual ruler of Russia.

In 1784 the Crimea was definitely annexed in violation of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainadji, but even then the Turks hesitated to declare war. Catherine made a triumphal march through Southern Russia, and at Kherson was met by the Emperor Joseph, travelling incognito as Count Falkenstein.

The two sovereigns passed through an arch facing towards the east, and bearing the inscription, "This is the road that leads to Byzantium."

A partition of Turkey in Europe was arranged, by which Russia was to receive Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bulgaria; Austria was to obtain Bosnia and Serbia; a "Greek Empire" for the Grand Duke Constantine was to be formed out of the Morea, Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, and Constantinople.

Meanwhile, political agitators disguised as priests were stirring up insurrection in the principalities and Greece. On 15th August 1787 the Porte declared war, and a Turkish force under the old corsair Ghazi Hassan, the Turkish commander at Chesmé, unsuccessfully attacked Kilburun. Russia was engaged in a war with Sweden and was unable to concentrate a large army against the Turks, and so the main Ottoman force were sent to meet the Emperor Joseph who had invaded Wallachia at the head of 200,000 men. He proved an execrable general, and after a partial defeat began to retreat on Temesvar. In the night one part of his army mistook the other for the Turks, an internecine battle ensued, and he only extricated himself with the loss of 70,000 men and most of his baggage and guns.

Next year Marshal Loudon, a Scotsman, invaded Bosnia and met with some success; but in 1789, the Emperor Joseph opened negotiations for a separate peace. The French Revolution had broken out, the Belgians had risen, and Prussia was intriguing for his deposition. In 1790 he died and was succeeded by Leopold II. who was not in

favour of a Russian alliance; so the Treaty of Sistovo was concluded through the mediation of England and Prussia, on the basis of *status quo.* But the defection of Austria did not, as in 1738, prove fatal to Russian plans, for Catherine had concluded peace with Sweden, and was now enabled to bring her whole strength to bear against the Turks.

In 1789 the great Russian strategist, Suvorov, had defeated Ghazi Hassan at Foksani and Rimnik, and next year he carried the Danube bridge-head at Ismail, by assault. Pitt was beginning to negotiate for intervention, and it was upon hearing of this last victory that the Empress Catherine observed sarcastically to the British ambassador: "I hope that those who wish to drive me out of St Petersburg will allow me to retire to Constantinople."

The Western Powers were regarding with apprehension the success of Catherine's "Oriental Project." Louis XVI., who saw that French interests in the Mediterranean would be imperilled by the advent of Russia on the Bosphorus, had made a fruitless attempt to form a coalition with England and Prussia against Russia as early as 1785, after the annexation of the Crimea.

France was now in the throes of the Revolution, and it was the King of Prussia who was the first to renew the proposals for European intervention. England, Holland, and Prussia having already been successful in making peace between Austria and Turkey, in the course of 1790 proposed mediation to Catherine, who indignantly refused it.

Until this date, British policy in the Near

East had been almost consistently pro-Russian; we read of Lord Chatham declaring that he was "quite a Russ" on the eve of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainadji, and when Charles James Fox was Foreign Secretary he consistently repulsed the advances of the French ambassador for intervention over the Crimean question.

It was now rather in fulfilment of his alliance with Prussia than of any Near Eastern policy of his own that the Younger Pitt opposed the expansionist schemes of Catherine. He desired to maintain the Balance of Power, and believed that the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia, would react to the disadvantage of Prussia and of the smaller Northern Powers.

"Prussia," he said (Parliament, 28th March 1791), "of all European Powers is the one who would be the most useful ally of England. . . . The Turkish Empire is of great weight in the general scale of European Powers, and if that empire is diminished or destroyed, or even rendered unstable or precarious, the situation of Prussia would be seriously affected. . . . Could anyone imagine that the aggrandisement of Russia would not naturally affect the disposition of other Powers —that it might not produce an alteration in Poland, highly dangerous to Prussia . . . the safety of all Europe might afterwards be endangered. . . ." Pitt, in asking for a vote of credit to equip fleets to be despatched to the Baltic and the Black Sea, was hotly opposed by Fox, who asserted that "Russia was the natural ally of England"; and Edmund Burke joined with his rival in declaring that "the Turks were essentially Asiatic people,

who completely isolated themselves from European affairs"; and that "the minister who would give them any weight in Europe deserved all the ban and curses of posterity." So strong was the opposition to war with Russia that Pitt decided to abandon his support of King Frederic William, and recalled the threatening despatch, which was on its way to St Petersburg.

Meanwhile, the Turks had suffered two further defeats in the Dobrudja, and in Asia the Russians had overrun the province of Kuban. But the Poles had risen under Thaddeus Kosciusko, and the Empress was anxious for peace in order to carry out the final Partition, while in Potemkin had died the moving spirit of the "Oriental Project." Accordingly, the Treaty of Jassy (August 1791) was concluded, by which Russia evacuated all the conquered territories, with the exception of Jedistan, the Turkish province between the Bug and the Dniester. The Greeks, who had throughout the campaign given their support to the Russians, were unscrupulously abandoned to the mercies of their masters.

The condition of Eastern Europe was now materially changed from that of ninety-three years ago, when the Treaty of Carlovicz had been signed. Austria, who had then appeared to be destined to oust the Turk from Constantinople, had acquired only the Banat of Temesvar as the result of three costly wars, and was threatened with revolution and disruption. Venice, who had assumed the mastery of the Adriatic and the Ægean by her acquisitions in Albania and Greece, was to lose her independence in less than ten

years; the Poles who had saved Vienna were no longer a free nation; but Russia, who had gained least at Carlovicz, was now the dominant Power in Eastern Europe, and Catherine the Great, by the annihilation of Poland and the conquest of the Crimea, had far exceeded even the ambitious hopes of Peter. Already the jealousy of Pitt and Frederic William had been roused, and they had begun to regard with lively apprehension the prospect of the Tsar superseding the Sultan at Constantinople.

But the Bastille had fallen, "the greatest event in history," France had gone mad, and the world of Succession Wars and Family Compacts, of Pretenders and Partitions, of pillories and *autos-da-fé*, seemed to be tumbling about the ears of those who had made it.

CHAPTER III

REVOLUTION AND REACTION (1792-1871)

I

"Man was born free, and is everywhere in chains."

With that dangerous, genius-inspired phrase, Jean Jacques Rousseau, botanist, publicist, and neurotic Revolution prophet, roused the seething misery of France. The rotten structure of Bourbon bureaucracy — "du-Barryism" Carlyle calls it—was swept away, the Condés and Artois', doleful phantoms of another world, took flight across the Rhine, and the soldiers of France, shoeless, ragged, and starving, but irresistible in their new-found faith, marched over the Alpine passes to carry into Italy, Austria, and Germany the Gospel of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. The mediæval oligarchies of Italy, the feudal aristocracies of Germany, the priest-ridden bureaucracy of Spain, crumbled, and Pitt, with his stolid "middle-class" Whigs, alone proved capable of withstanding the delirious doctrines of the Jacobins. Then appeared the "Enemy of Europe," and the soldiers of Liberty became the soldiers of French World-Power. Napoleon might have liberated Europe, and destroyed the

Dynastic System, but he chose to rebuild the Empire of Charlemagne. The glorious energy of France was squandered on the banks of the Danube, among the mountains of Spain, and in the snows of Russia; Waterloo re-established the dynasties for another hundred years, and emperors, kings, and electors slunk back to their thrones to form the Holy Alliance for the suppression of revolution.

Turkey played but a minor part in that great world-drama, but it is notorious that Napoleon had thought out a far-reaching reconstruction of South-Eastern Europe, and, had not affairs in Spain and Germany occupied his attention, the Balkans would have become the main theatre for his activities. Had he adhered to the original principles of the Revolutionary wars, he might have liberated the Serbs, Rumanians, Bulgars, and Greeks in a single campaign, and have proved the benefactor of Europe by annihilating Turkish rule on this side of the Bosphorus. But he was carried away by his dreams of world-conquest, and he pursued instead his fantastic project for the conquest of Egypt and the invasion of India. When this had failed he designed to annex Greece and the Ægean Archipelago to the French Empire, in order to assure his command of the Mediterranean, and was willing to barter away the rest of the Sultan's European dominions to Russia. But he failed to come to an agreement with Tsar Alexander over the question of Constantinople, and, as usual, Turkey was saved from partition by the jealousies of her enemies.

II

In 1793 Selim III., a young man of energy and excellent intentions, wore the Sword of Othman. He wished to carry out the usual favourite designs of reforming Turkish sultans — the modernisation and disciplining of the army and the purging of the bureaucracy — but the country had sunk to a condition which was past reforming. Revolution and disruption seemed inevitable. The Austrian and the Russian wars of the Eighteenth Century had shattered the royal armies and had disorganised the civil administration in the European provinces, and the Sultan's personal mandate scarcely extended beyond the walls of Constantinople. Even in the capital his authority was set at naught, and every attempt at reform was opposed by the fanatical Ulemas—the "Old Turk" party—and the mutinous aghas of the Janissaries. Mob-law was rampant. The Janissaries, the Spahi, and the Bostanjis, or bands of armed gardeners who acted as the Sultan's bodyguard, established a veritable reign of terror, and the streets of the capital were the scenes of constant riots and open robbery and looting.

We may be pardoned for quoting at length Mr Eton,[1] a friend of Prince Potemkin, and a resident for many years in Turkey and Russia, who wrote in 1798: "Casting our view over the pashalics or governments most immediately connected with the seat of government, we shall find them distracted, disorganised, and scarcely yielding

[1] Eton's *Turkish Empire*, pp. 278-286.

more than a nominal obedience to the Sultan . . . these unfortunate countries . . . suffer, though in different degrees, from the harpy touch of Turkish despotism. The great pashalic of Bagdad has been in reality independent, ever since the days of Achmet Pasha, who defended it against Nadir Shah . . . the Sultan only confirms the pasha, whom the people, and principally the soldiery of Bagdad, have appointed to govern them with despotic power . . . the Porte draws no revenue from this extensive province. In Armenia Major and all the neighbouring countries there are whole tribes or nations of independent people, who do not even acknowledge the Porte, or any of its pashas. The three Arabias do not acknowledge the authority of the Sultan, who only possesses a few unimportant towns. . . . The Pasha of Ahiska (Akhaltsikh) cares very little for the Porte; and the famous Haggi-Ali Yenikli Pasha of Trebisonde was the master of all that country: he could bring a large army into the field and often set the Porte at defiance. In the country about Smyrna there are great aghas, who are independent lords, and maintain armies, and often lay that city under contribution. . . . All the inhabitants of the mountains, from Smyrna to Palestine, are perfectly independent. . . . The mountains of Antilibanus are inhabited by Druses and Christians . . . they have more than once taken Damascus and plundered it. . . . On the coast of Syria the Sultan only virtually possesses the ports of Laodicea, a small shallow harbour and a ruined town; Alexandretta or Scanderon, a miserable village, the air of which is so bad that it, perhaps,

has not its equal in the world for insalubrity; Tripoli and Sidon, Jaffa, and a few very insignificant places. The caravans which go from Scanderon to Aleppo are obliged to go by way of Antioch, as all the country through which the direct road leads belongs to the Curdes, who will not suffer the Turks to pass it. All Egypt is independent. The pasha sent to Cairo is in effect a prisoner during his government, which is only nominal. . . . The Turks have at different times got possession of Cairo, but never could maintain themselves in the government . . . yet Constantinople depends very much on Egypt for provisions, and above all, for rice. . . . The actual power resides in the Mamluks, and the bey, who has most of them in his suite, is consequently the most powerful. . . . The tribute which Egypt ought to send the Porte is frequently withheld . . . a long procession of mules and camels sets out annually from Egypt, with the pretended revenue for the Sultan, which, instead of silver, consists mostly of bags of rice, and, not unfrequently, stones. . . . In Europe, the Morea, Albania, Epirus, and Skutari are more or less in a state of rebellion; Bosnia and Croatia obey the Porte only as long as it suits them, and the Sultan reaps little benefit from them . . . they are continually fighting among themselves, district against district, and often even village against village, besides individual quarrels of families. . . . Lately we have seen almost all European Turkey in arms against the Porte, Adrianople in imminent danger, and even Constantinople itself trembling for its safety."

The large towns, such as Adrianople, Belgrad,

and Sarajevo were in the hands of their mutinous Janissary garrisons, while the countryside was subject to the rule of the Dereh beys—Lords of the Valleys—the great Moslem land-owners, who acknowledged no central authority, exacted their own taxes, made their own laws, and raised their own levies, like the French and German barons of the Middle Ages.

Speaking of Albania, Sir John Hobhouse (afterwards Lord Broughton) pictures a state of affairs which may be taken as an example of the conditions of the whole of European Turkey. "Specimens of almost every sort of government are to be found in Albania. Some districts and towns are commanded by one man, under the Turkish title of Bolou (boluk, a company) Bashee, or the Greek name of Capitan, which they have borrowed from Christendom; others obey their elders; others are under no subjection, but each man governs his own family. . . . There are parts of the country where every agha or bey, which, perhaps, may answer to our ancient country squire, is a petty chieftain, exercising every right of the men of the village. The Porte, which in the days of Ottoman greatness divided the country into several small pashalics and commanderies, is now but little respected, and the limits of her different conditions are confused and forgotten."[1]

At Vidin and Janina, the Turkish pashas had established themselves as virtually independent sovereigns. Osman Pasvanoghlu, the Pasha of Vidin, was a Bosnian Mussulman, and he steadfastly opposed himself to all the well-meant reforms

[1] Creasy, p. 451.

of Sultan Selim. He had the support of the Serbian Janissaries, and from the "Virgin Fortress" he successfully resisted any forces which the Porte might send against him, levied his own taxes, coined his own money, and terrorised the neighbouring districts of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Wallachia, while he sent his own ambassador to Paris to treat with the Directory.

The more famous Ali Pasha, "the Lion of Janina," has become known to readers in the poetry of Lord Byron. An Albanian Mussulman of Tepelen, he became Pasha of Janina in 1788, and soon established himself as despot of a large part of Epirus. He became a formidable factor in the Balkans, and the Turks, the Greeks, and the French, alike sought his support. His cruelty, his courage, and his treachery make him one of the most picturesque figures of his time. A contemporary traveller has described him as "a mixture of magnificence and meanness." He was a man of insatiable ambition, and when a Frenchman visited him in 1792, he compared himself to Pyrrhus, declaring, "You will see that Ali Pasha, the successor of Piros, will surpass him in every kind of enterprise."[1]

III

Such was the state of Turkey, when in June 1798 the youthful Bonaparte landed at Alexandria, with his veterans and his savants, dreaming to emulate Alexander, "to drive the English from all their Oriental possessions," and "to undertake a

[1] Eton, p. 369.

conquest of which the effects upon the civilisation and the commerce of the world will be incalculable." "I shall arm the tribes," he declared, "I shall be in a position to attack Constantinople. I shall turn the British Empire upside down." But the defence of Acre ruined his plans, for "in that miserable fort lay the fate of the East," and the Battle of the Nile forced him to relinquish all idea of Eastern conquest, and eventually to desert his army and to return to France.

The victory of the Nile had caused the Sultan to declare war on the French, and to ally himself with Britain and Russia. By the Treaty of Amiens (1802) Egypt was restored to the Turks, and the Sultan became joint protector with the Tsar of the newly formed Septinsular Republic—the Ionian Islands—which the French had held since the fall of the Venetian Republic. By a separate agreement with Russia, the Sultan agreed that the Rumanian Hospodars should not be deposed without the consent of the Tsar, and that their term of office should be seven years.[1]

Napoleon now changed his policy towards Turkey, and sought to obtain the Sultan's co-operation in his plans against Austria, Russia, and Britain. Colonel Sebastiani, monk turned diplomat, was sent as French envoy to Constantinople, and a violent diplomatic struggle ensued between France and Russia and England for the alliance of Turkey.

In 1805 the Battle of Ulm brought Austria to her knees, and by the Treaty of Pressburg Dalmatia and part of Croatia was ceded to France.

[1] Miller's *Ottoman Empire*, p. 31.

Marmont was appointed Governor of Dalmatia, and created Duke of Ragusa. He began the construction of military roads and of naval bases at Gravosa and Cattaro, which seemed to menace Albania and Bosnia. On the other hand, the attitude of Russia was equally threatening, for Italinski, the Russian ambassador at the Porte, demanded the conclusion of a defensive and offensive alliance against France, and the recognition of the Tsar as Protector of the Ottoman Christians. Talleyrand suggested a compromise by which he advised the cession of the Danubian principalities to Austria, in order to create a bulwark between Russia and Turkey.

Finally, at the instigation of Sebastiani, the Sultan deposed the Rumanian Hospodars without the consent of the Tsar, a breach of the agreement of 1802, and a Russian army invaded Rumania, occupying Jassy and Bukharest without resistance. Britain supported Russia, and Admiral Duckworth forced the Dardanelles, anchored before Constantinople (February 1807) and delivered an ultimatum, demanding the expulsion of Sebastiani, a declaration of war against France, an alliance with Britain and Russia, and the cession of the Danubian principalities to Russia. Constantinople lay at the mercy of the British fleet. But the Sultan gained ten days by clever negotiation, and the city was fortified with feverish haste. When the negotiations were broken off, Duckworth was forced to the conclusion that a bombardment would be ineffectual. He withdrew through the Dardanelles, subjected to bombardment from the Turkish batteries, and two of his corvettes were

sunk by enormous stone balls, with a loss of 600 men. Elsewhere British arms were equally unsuccessful. A force which landed in Egypt (March 1807) was defeated by Mahommed Ali, the Albanian commander of the Turks at Cairo, and forced to evacuate the country. Eventually, in 1809, Great Britain and Turkey concluded the Peace of the Dardanelles as a result of the threatened Franco-Russian coalition.

IV

Meanwhile the Slav peasants of the Belgrad pashalic had risen against the Serbian Janissaries, and with that event the Near Eastern question entered upon another phase.

During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries the so-called Near Eastern question had been whether Austria or Russia should succeed the Turk in his European possessions. The Balkan peoples, if they were considered at all, were regarded as pawns in the great game, the prize of which was Constantinople. Peter the Great, and Münnich and Potemkin played with the Rumanians and Greeks, and championed the Eastern Church in order to arouse a Holy War against the Turks. But the Russian wars were essentially wars of aggrandisement, not of liberation, and alike at Falksen, Kutchuk Kainadji, and Jassy, the interests of the subject races were sacrificed to the requirements of Russian Imperialism. If Catherine demanded a protectorate of the Eastern Christians, it was only that she

might the more effectually intervene at the critical moment in Turkish affairs.

And likewise, the Habsburgs utilised the services of the Serb settlers in Hungary in their troubles with the Hungarians. In the great war of 1683-98, when the Imperialists defeated the Turks and the Hungarian rebels, the Serbs flocked to the standard of the Habsburgs, in the hope that Leopold intended to restore the ancient Serbian kingdom. But they saw Serbia restored to the Turks by the Treaty of Carlovicz, and, in his chagrin, Arsenius, the Serbian Patriarch of Ipek, migrated to Hungary with 37,000 families. From 1718-39 the Austrians held Serbia, and the House of Habsburg remained the hope of the South Slavs. But the Belgrad pashalic was surrendered to the Turks by the Treaty of Belgrad, and Maria Theresa further deprived the Hungarian Serbs of their privileges, upon which 100,000 migrated in despair to the banks of the Dnieper. Again in 1788 the Serbs rose for the Austrians, and the poet Obradovich hailed the Emperor Joseph as the saviour of the Serbian race. "Give us back," he cried, "our ancient heroes, our ancient country." Colonel Mikhailovich captured Krushvacz, the holy city of Serbia, and the churches, which the Turks had used as stables, were purified. But the Treaty of Sistova gave back Serbia to the Turks.

During the Nineteenth Century, however, national revolution broke out among the Serbs, and later among the Greeks and the Rumanians, revolutions stimulated by the doctrines of the French Revolution, not engineered by the agents-provocateurs of Vienna and St Petersburg. The

old conception of the solution of the Eastern question had been expansion for Austria and Russia, compensation for France and Venice, a Danubian kingdom for a Münnich or a Potemkin, a fanciful Greek Empire for a Grand Duke Constantine. There now arose the counter-idea of nationalism, of "The Balkans for the Balkan peoples"—an idea which was to be developed during a century of war and revolution, of massacres, royal-kidnappings, and *coups-d'état*—an idea which had to combat with the stifling, short-sighted "steam-roller" Imperialism of Russia, with the intrigues and bargainings of Habsburg dynasticism, with the treacherous animosity of Magyar chauvinism, and with the calculating, unscrupulous "Welt-politik" of capitalist-militarist Pan-Germanism.

The Serbian Revolution, which broke out in 1804, was not at first a nationalist movement, but a spontaneous revolt of the peasantry against the tyranny of the Janissaries. The Janissaries of the Belgrad pashalic had instituted a military dictatorship; they not only terrorised and abused the Christian peasantry and the Spahi Moslem land-owners alike, but they defied the authority of the Sultan, and in 1801 had murdered the Pasha of Belgrad, the gentle and humane Hadji Mustafa, who had earned from a grateful peasantry the nickname of "the Mother." The Serbs appealed in vain to the Sultan for redress which he was unable to give, and finally, early in 1804, enraged by the massacre of their head-men, rose against the Janissaries, and chose as their leader Kara (black) George, a swine-herd, who could

neither read nor write. The guerilla warfare of the Austrian campaigns had accustomed the Serbs to the use of arms, and the disorganised Janissaries were unable to stand against them. Selim sent the Vali of Bosnia to assist the insurgents, and in a short time the remnants of the Janissaries were driven on to the island of Ada Kaleh,[1] opposite Orsova, and there massacred.

So far the attack on the Janissaries had been carried out with the concurrence and assistance of the Sultan, but when the Serbs found themselves in armed possession of their country, they had no mind to submit to the return of the Turkish officials and to trust in the Sultan's promises of reform. They still regarded the Habsburgs as their natural protector, and Kara George went so far as to demand the annexation of the whole of Serbia to the Empire. But Austria was, at that time, threatened by Napoleon, and was not prepared to undertake fresh responsibilities in the Balkan Peninsula. The Serbs then sent an embassy to St Petersburg, with the suggestion that an autonomous principality under a Russian Grand Duke should be formed out of Serbia and Austrian Syrmia, with an outlet to the sea at Cattaro. But the Russians desired the alliance of the Turks against Napoleon, and advised the Serbs to submit to the Sultan.

In 1805 the Pasha of Nish invaded the Belgrad pashalic, and the struggle definitely assumed the form of a revolution against the Turkish Government. The Turks were defeated and driven out of the country, and a few months later the first

[1] Ada = island; Kaleh = castle.

Serbian National Assembly or Skupshtina met in a deserted monastery. The executive power was vested in a Soviet or Senate, formed of elected representatives from each district, but the virtual power remained in the hands of Kara George.

In 1807, while the Russians were overrunning Moldavia and Wallachia, the Janissaries deposed and murdered Selim III., because he was planning to remodel his army on the French pattern. A counter-revolution followed, and Mustafa Bairaktar, the Pasha of Rustchuk, crushed the Janissaries with an army of Albanians and Bosnians. He, in his turn, was murdered in a counter-revolt of the Janissaries, and the young Sultan, Mahmud II., only escaped with his life because he was the last surviving male of the House of Othman. While these palace-revolutions were in progress, the first Russian consul arrived at Belgrad, to assure the Skupshtina of the paternal interest of the Tsar in the affairs of Serbia.

But, in the summer of 1807, Napoleon and Alexander met at Tilsit to "form an Imperial Duumvirate of the world," and an armistice was arranged between Russia and Turkey. The partition of the Othman Empire formed one of the chief subjects of discussion. Napoleon was willing to allow Russia to annex all the Rumanian lands and Northern Bulgaria; Austria was to be placated with Bosnia and Serbia; he claimed for himself Albania, Thessaly, the Morea, and Crete, which would give him command of the Eastern Mediterranean, and Syria and Egypt, which would open the road to India. But these negotiations

and the subsequent discussions at Erfürt broke down over the question of Constantinople. The Tsar insisted on its assignment to Russia, but Napoleon, we are told, placed his finger on that spot on the map, and passionately exclaimed: "Constantinople! Constantinople! never! for it is the empire of the world."

"Thus," philosophises Creasy, "wrangled they over the ideal proceeds of an uncommitted crime, little thinking that Moscow was soon to blaze with French invaders for her occupants, and that Paris, in a few more years, was to yield to Russian cannon, while the House of Othman proceeded to complete its fourth century of unbroken dominion at Constantinople."

In 1809 the Russians recommenced hostilities against Turkey; Rustchuk and Sistovo fell, and, in the course of 1811, negotiations for peace began. Napoleon was preparing for his Moscow campaign, and was anxious for a Turkish diversion on the Pruth. But the Russians were willing to make concessions and offered to return most of the conquered territory. Accordingly the Treaty of Bukharest was concluded, by which Bessarabia was ceded to the Tsar, while Wallachia and the larger part of Moldavia was restored to the Sultan. Serbia was practically abandoned, although the Russians stipulated for a general amnesty and a restricted autonomy. The Rumanians registered an energetic protest against the cession of Bessarabia, as they had done when the Bukovina was ceded to Austria (1779). Rumanian lands were still further divided, and the day of national emancipation seemed more distant than ever.

V

The meteoric career of Napoleon was finished, and in 1815 the Congress of Vienna sat to settle the affairs of Europe—and the best settlement they could achieve was an endeavour to return to the *status quo ante* 1789, to be guaranteed and sustained by means of the "Holy Alliance." The policy of the Holy Alliance could not but react upon the situation in European Turkey. Russia and Austria, exhausted by the Napoleonic wars, were in no position to pursue an aggressive programme at Constantinople, while their anti-revolutionary principles prevented them from supporting the Serbian and Greek insurgents. The Tsar temporarily deserted the vaunted cause of Christianity, and the subject races of Turkey were left to work out their own salvation.

The history of the Balkans in the Nineteenth Century falls naturally into three phases.

The first phase, from 1815 to 1830, was a period of Nationalist Revolution, and witnessed risings in Serbia and Rumania and the great struggle for Greek independence. It roughly corresponded to similar movements throughout Europe, which took the form, in Britain, of a bloodless constitutional struggle; in France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, of anti-dynastic risings; and in Russian Poland, of a nationalist revolt.

The second phase, from 1830 to 1870, was a period of revolutionary stagnation, of attempted administrative reform, and of constant intervention on the part of the great Powers.

Sultan Mahmud II. was the contemporary of a number of European statesmen, who may be described as benevolent reactionaries. Louis Philippe in France, Metternich in Austria, and the Emperor Nicholas I. in Russia, in foreign affairs continued the anti-revolutionary policy of the Holy Alliance, while at home they endeavoured to allay the general unrest by the grudging introduction of reforms on constitutional lines. In Turkey, Mahmud attempted reform *à la Turc*, as Arsène Perlant so aptly calls it, and, when his methods failed, the Emperor Nicholas intervened to prevent Mahommed Ali from destroying the Ottoman dynasty.

In the new-born Balkan states was played a long tragi-comedy of dynastic plots and petty political intrigues, the inevitable troubles of peoples emerging from a long period of national degradation; and the cause of Nationalism lay dormant.

It was only after the events of 1848 had exhausted the elements of revolution for half a century to come, that the Emperor Nicholas ventured to renew his traditional policy of expansion at the expense of Turkey. He embarked on the Crimean War, but Britain, France, and Sardinia united to frustrate him. However, it was the last attempt of Britain and France to maintain the Balance of Power in the Mediterranean by armed support of Turkish integrity. Even Stratford de Redcliffe heart-brokenly admitted the impossibility of reforming the Turkish administration, and the fall of the Second Empire made it impossible for Britain actively to resist a Russian repudiation of the Treaty of Paris.

The third phase, from 1871 to 1914, opened with a revival of Russian aggression at Constantinople, and a corresponding renewal of Nationalist agitations among the Bosnians, Bulgars, and "Unredeemed" Greeks. The crisis of 1876, which began as a movement of the subject races against an intolerable administration, was temporarily settled by cynical compromise between the Great Powers, by which Russia hoped to obtain control of the Danube lands and Rumelia, Britain gained prospective commercial and moral advantages in Asia Minor, Austria received Bosnia, France was permitted to possess herself of Tunis, and the Nationalist claims of Greece and Serbia were only very meagrely satisfied.

The Treaty of Berlin was, like the Treaty of Paris, essentially a temporary arrangement. In the following thirty years the situation radically changed. Britain, satisfied with Cyprus and Egypt, ceased to be interested in the maintenance of Ottoman integrity; Russia, disappointed in Bulgaria, and weakened by the Japanese War and the threat of revolution, was forced to modify her attitude; the foreign policy of Austria, after the formation of the Triple Alliance, was subordinated to that of Germany, who became the most powerful factor in the Balkans; Germany gained a predominant influence at Constantinople, at first, by supporting Abdul Hamid's régime, and later, by financing Enver Pasha and his clique. An unscrupulous diplomacy, combined with a clever commercial programme, made German influence predominant in Turkey, and not only gave them control of the Straits and Asia Minor,

but prepared the way for the subjection of all the Balkan countries—and the cause of Nationalism and the future of the Balkan states was shipwrecked on the nefarious Treaty of Bukharest (1913).

VI

By the Treaty of Bukharest in 1812, the Russians had left Kara George and the Serbian insurgents to their own resources.

An overwhelming Turkish army invaded Serbia, Kara George and the principal insurgent leaders fled into Austria, and a Turkish pasha was once more established at Belgrad. But on Palm Sunday, 1815, the revolutionary flag was unfurled at Takovo by Milosh Obrenovich, a local notable, and the revolt quickly spread through the whole pashalic. The fortress of Passarovicz was captured and the Turks were driven from the country. Kara George returned from exile, anxious to take a leading part in the movement, but Obrenovich was unwilling to share his power with another, and sent the Liberator's head to the pasha of Belgrad. Sultan Mahmud, under pressure from the Russian ambassador, was now inclined to grant terms to the Serbs. Accordingly an agreement was concluded by which the insurgents retained their army, but acknowledged the Sultan as their suzerain—and were permitted to collect their own taxes, and to participate in the administration of justice.

But while the Sultan was coming to a settlement with the Serbs, revolution was threatening

in another part of his dominions. The Greek War of Independence did not commence as the Serbian, in a casual peasant rising. It was a widely spread and carefully organised movement, planned by educated men, imbued with the sentiments of the French Revolution, and financed by wealthy Greeks in different parts of Europe. The Greeks were the most influential, the most cultured, and the wealthiest of the subject races; the Greek Church was the predominant Christian denomination in the empire; the Greeks formed the most intelligent and the most prosperous element in the large towns. Their hopes had been raised by the promises of Catherine the Great, and the arrival of Orlov in the Ægean (1770) had occasioned a widespread rising among the Greeks of the Morea. But Musinzadé Pasha had collected an army of Albanians, who were only too glad to satisfy their predatory instincts with the spoils of the Moreote towns, and the movement had been mercilessly crushed. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainadji, Russian agents continued to stir up the Greeks, and, in the spring of 1790, Catherine received in St Petersburg a deputation of Greeks, who demanded her assistance "to free the descendants of Athens and Lacedæmon from the tyrannous yoke of ignorant savages." Some wealthy Levantine merchants fitted out a fleet of thirteen frigates, under the command of Lambros Caviziani; but he was defeated by a Turko-Algerian squadron, and when Russia concluded the Treaty of Jassy in 1792 the Greeks were deserted, as twenty years later the Serbians were to be at Bukharest.

After the Treaty of Jassy, it became evident to the Greek leaders that independence could never be achieved by reliance on foreign assistance, and that their only hope lay in a national revolution, organised and conducted entirely by Greeks. In 1814 the Philiké Hetairia, or Friendly Society, was founded at Odessa, and during the following six years its agents were working everywhere throughout the Morea and the islands. Many of the Moreote nobles became members of the Society, and it was even suggested that Ali Pasha should be asked to join it. A Phanariote noble, Prince Alexander Ypsilanti, a general in the Russian service, and son of a former Wallachian Hospodar, was named by the Society "General Commissioner of the Supreme Authority." In March 1821, supported by the two Phanariote Hospodars, he raised the flag of Greek Independence at Jassy in Moldavia. A month later a sympathetic movement broke out in the Morea.

But Ypsilanti proved a visionary and an idealist. The Rumanian peasantry had nothing in common with the Greek princes, and did not support them; the Tsar, then engaged in repressing revolution in Naples, repudiated Ypsilanti, and caused his name to be removed from the Russian army list; Michael Soutsos, the Moldavian Hospodar, lost heart and fled to Russia; the Œcumenical Patriarch, on the orders of the Sultan, excommunicated the rebels.

Ypsilanti, without any definite plan, moved slowly on Bukharest at the head of a small force of Greek volunteers. On entering Wallachia, he

was faced by a fresh difficulty. A peasant rebellion, aimed more against the Greek nobles than the Turks, had broken out, under the leadership of Tudor Vladimiresco. The latter met Ypsilanti at Bukharest, disclaimed all hostility to the Sultan, and declared to the Greek leader that "Greece belongs to the Greeks, Rumania to the Rumanians." Ypsilanti, deprived of any hope of popular support from the Rumanian peasantry, now despaired of success. While he still negotiated with Vladimiresco, the Turks entered Bukharest, and the "Sacred Legion," recruited from among the young Greek nobility, was routed at Dragashani. Ypsilanti, after causing Vladimiresco to be murdered, ignominiously retired across the Austrian frontier, leaving the remnants of his supporters to save themselves as best they could. These were finally surrounded by the Turks at Skuleni on the Pruth, where three months before their leader had initiated his rash enterprise, and only a hundred succeeded in escaping into Russian territory.

Thus ended the Greek Revolution in Rumania —a curious instance of an alien nobility attempting to rouse the enthusiasm of a peasantry for a cause which was not their own. The only material result was that the Sultan in future nominated the Hospodars, not from among the Phanariotes, but from among the native boyars.

But elsewhere the revolution had followed a very different course. During April there had taken place a general rising among the Moreotes, and the surrender of the Turkish garrisons at Kalavrata and Kalamata had been followed by indiscriminate massacres of the Moslem population.

The Sultan was engaged in a war against Persia, in suppressing the rebellion in Rumania, and in a campaign against Ali of Janina, and consequently had few troops to send against the insurgents. Athens and Missholonghi joined the national cause; Anthimos Gazes raised Thessaly; the islands of Spetsai, Psara, and Samos proclaimed their union with Greece; and in Crete, "the worst-governed province of the Turkish Empire," the Sphakiotes came down from their mountains and blockaded the Turks in Canea. These early successes were won by local leaders who, though generally members of the Friendly Society, acted independently of any central authority. However, on 7th June 1821, a "Peloponnesian Senate" of eight native magnates and primates, was formed with dictatorial powers. A few days later Demetrius Ypsilanti, a brother of Alexander, made his appearance, and, although the disaster of Dragashani had already taken place, he was acknowledged as generalissimo. It was not long before he quarrelled with the Sénate, who, on hearing the news of Dragashani, wished to deprive him of his command.

Meanwhile Monemvasia was captured, and the Greeks were laying siege to Tripolitza, the capital of the Morea. This town fell on 5th October, and its fall was accompanied by the massacre of 8000 Moslems and Jews, for the insurgents boasted that "not a Turk should remain in the Morea."

After the fall of Tripolitza, the "Peloponnesian Senate" was abolished and a National Assembly was convened at Argos, which on 13th January

1822 proclaimed the "Constitution of Epidauros," an enactment which professed to establish all the machinery of a democratic form of government by a stroke of the pen. Alexander Mavrocordatos, an able and enlightened Phanariote, who had been living in exile at Pisa, was appointed President, to the exclusion of Ypsilanti. But already there was dissension among the Greek leaders, and while they haggled over the intricacies of their model Constitution, the Sultan was making energetic preparations to crush the whole movement.

Mahmud II.'s policy of reform *à la Turc*, that is of Turkification and centralisation, very much resembled that of the Committee of Union and Progress, ninety years later. When the news of the revolution reached Constantinople, he resorted to wholesale massacre to terrorise the population of the Greek territories which had not yet revolted, as in our time the C.U.P. inaugurated their programme of Turkification by the systematic extirpation of Albanians and Armenians. And Mahmud's policy may be said to have justified itself from his point of view, in that he succeeded in localising the revolution and in keeping half the Greek race under his rule. The massacres of Moslems in the Morea were answered by the murder of the Patriarch and many Phanariote notables, and by holocausts at Constantinople, Smyrna, Rhodes, Cyprus, and Chios.

Meanwhile old Ali Pasha had been shot to death in his summer-house on the Lake of Janina, and the powerful army which had been concentrated against him in Epirus, could be turned against the insurgents.

Aboulabad, the Pasha of Salonika, had already pacified Macedonia and Khalkidice, and Dramali Pasha had reduced all Thessaly except Volo. In many of the islands, such as Hydra and Syra, the rich merchants were reluctant to risk their wealth in the perils of a revolution, and in Crete, the Sphakiotes had quarrelled with the Moreote commissioner, who had been sent to advise them.

In the spring of 1822 Omar Vriones, the renegade Greek pasha of Janina, defeated the Greeks at Peta and Phanari and commenced the siege of Missholongi, while Dramali Pasha advanced as far as Argos. But the year ended in disaster for the Turks, for the siege of Missholongi proved a failure, the Turkish garrison of Nauplia was forced to capitulate, and Dramali was badly defeated, dying a few weeks afterwards at Corinth.

The repulse of the Turks gave the Greeks a respite—and an opportunity for further dissension. A National Assembly convoked at Argos early in 1823 placed all the power in the hands of the primates, and offended the "military" party, headed by the famous klepht, Theodor Kolokotrones, and even Lord Byron, who in August landed on the Island of Cephalonia, was unable to compose a reconciliation. Kolokotrones dissolved the senate at Argos by force of arms, and when its members reconstituted themselves at Kranidi opposite Hydra, set up an opposition government at Tripolitza. Meanwhile the Powers, in congress at Verona, had discussed the affairs of Greece; but although George Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, evinced Philhellenic sympathies, nothing

resulted, except a suggestion from the Russian delegates for the formation of three autonomous principalities of Eastern and Western Greece and the Morea, which was intended to place the Greeks in the same position of dependence on Russia as the Rumanians.

While the quarrels between Kolokotrones and the primates were still in progress, Byron died of malaria; the most heroic of idealists, he had come to the land of classic glory to help a race, reduced to ignorance and barbarism by four hundred years of servitude, and whose leaders proved to be mostly uneducated priests, crude brigands, and incompetent adventurers. Byron was not long dead before another civil war broke out, in which Kolokotrones and the primates, supported by the inhabitants of the islands, were ranged against the Moreote chiefs, and which finally resulted in the defeat and imprisonment of the great Klepht.

Meanwhile Mahmud, engaged in the modernisation of the army, and openly opposed by the Janissaries and the reactionary "Old Turk" party, had recognised that he was incapable of suppressing the Greek insurgents by his own resources, and had applied for assistance to Mahommed Ali, the Pasha of Egypt. The son of an Albanian tobacco-grower of Kavalla, Mahommed Ali had first distinguished himself against the British in the Egyptian campaign of 1807, and had later, after destroying the Mamluks of Cairo, made himself the virtually independent ruler of Egypt. He met with the usual meteoric success of the energetic Eastern despot, and by 1825, by means of an

excessive and uneconomic system of taxation, had built up an excellently equipped and well-disciplined army and navy, trained by ex-officers of Napoleon. In a successful campaign he had already defeated the Wahabite sectaries of Arabia, and restored Turkish rule in Mecca and Medina.

Mahmud, with the promise that Syria, Damascus, and Crete should be added to his pashalic, induced this powerful vassal to intervene in Greece, and at the end of 1824 Ibrahim, Mahommed's son, and as able a soldier as his father, reduced the islands of Psara and Kassos, and carried off their inhabitants into slavery. He anchored in Suda Bay, but the Cretan insurrection had flickered out in the quarrels and disputes of the Sphakiotes and the Greek commissioner. He sailed thence to Modon, a former Venetian settlement, and, landing with 11,000 men, laid siege to Navarino. A Greek relieving army was utterly defeated and Mavrocordatos narrowly escaped with his life.

Kolokotrones was released and appointed generalissimo, but he could not stay the advance of the victorious Ibrahim. Reshid Pasha Kioutages co-operated from the north with an army of Albanians. The Greeks were exhausted by four years of incessant warfare. Missholongi, Athens, and Corinth fell, the Greek Government removed to the Island of Poros, and the whole country drifted into a state of anarchy. Ibrahim threatened to deport the whole population of the Morea into slavery, and to repeople it with Arabs and Egyptians.

VII

But by this time the sympathy of Europe had been aroused. The death of Byron, first, and later, the active part taken in the revolution by such distinguished foreigners as Colonel Heideck, the agent of the King of Bavaria, Lord Cochrane, General Gordon, Sir Richard Church, the Italian Santa Rosa, and the French Colonel Fabvier, had attracted universal interest. Finally, the death of Tsar Alexander I., who, although the official protector of the Orthodox Greeks, had refused to countenance revolution in any form, precipitated intervention. He was succeeded by his son, Nicholas I., a young man who inherited all the Pan-Slavist ideals which had been the driving power of Russian policy in the previous century, and who was desirous of continuing the Eastern expansionist schemes of Catherine the Great.

On the other hand, George Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, was personally a Philhellene, while he regarded the continuance of disorder in the Near East as a menace to the peace of Europe, and as a possible occasion for Russia to attack Turkey. In the course of 1826, the Duke of Wellington proceeded to St Petersburg and came to an agreement with the Emperor Nicholas, which was afterwards qualified by the Treaty of London of 6th July 1827, and received the adherence of the French Government. By its terms the Greeks were to be accorded autonomy, on payment of a fixed tribute to the Sultan, and a secret article stipulated that "if within one month the Ottoman

Porte does not agree to accept the mediation of the three Powers and consent to an armistice, the signatories of the treaty will find the necessity for an approximation with the Greeks, and will employ all their means for the accomplishment of the objects of the treaty without, however, taking any active part in the hostilities between the two contending parties." However, this threat of intervention merely roused the indignation and fanaticism of the Porte, who only prolonged negotiations to allow time for large reinforcements to reach Ibrahim in Greece. The National Assembly at Nauplia convoked after the landing of Ibrahim in the summer of 1825, had themselves come to the conclusion that it would be hopeless to continue the struggle without assistance and protection from some foreign Power. One party wished to unite with the Ionian Islands under the protectorate of Great Britain ; their rivals favoured Russia ; and a third faction advocated the candidacy of the Duc de Nemours, the son of the Duc d'Orleans, as the first king of Greece. However, this suggestion met with the disapproval of Charles X., ever jealous of the junior branch, and the Francophils finally joined the Russophils in the election as President, at Damala, in April 1827, of Count John Capo d'Istria, a distinguished Corfiote diplomatist in the Russian service, who had been the confidant of Alexander I., and had represented his adopted country at Vienna, Paris, and Aix-la-Chapelle.

The French and British Governments, who had advocated intervention only to prevent a Russo-Turkish war, had played into the hands of the

Emperor Nicholas. On the refusal of the Porte to accede to the terms of the Treaty of London, a united Anglo-Franco-Russian fleet, under the command of Admiral Sir E. Codrington, blockaded the Turko-Egyptian fleet in the Bay of Navarino. The situation was critical, and on 20th October 1827 a battle was precipitated, which resulted in the complete destruction of Ibrahim's fleet. The results were disastrous to the Turks. Ibrahim found himself cut off from Egypt, and was forced to conclude a convention with Codrington whereby he was allowed to evacuate the Morea and withdraw his army to Egypt.

In January 1828 John Capo d'Istria arrived in Greece. He despised and quarrelled with "the men who had fought, while he had only written"; but nevertheless his personality infused fresh energy into the Greeks. Mahmud, engaged in the Russian War, was unable to maintain his garrisons in the Morea, and in the course of 1827 the Greeks, assisted by a French force, succeeded in driving the last Turks across the Gulf of Corinth.

VIII

In spite of the destruction of his fleet, the Sultan, during the first months of 1828, had still pertinaciously refused to accede to the moderate demands of the Powers, and had further repudiated the Convention of Akkerman, by which, under pressure from Russia, he had consented to the free navigation of the Black Sea and to certain reforms in the administration of the Danubian

principalities. He declared that Russia was the hereditary foe of the Osmanli. But his fleet was lost, and with it the command of the Black Sea, while he had further weakened his position by the famous massacres of the Janissaries. These troops, so long tyrants of the capital and the masters of the Harem, had mutinied when the Sultan attempted to enforce his new military reforms, and they had been mown down by Mahmud's new field-guns in the At Meidan[1] of Constantinople (14th June 1826).

Similar massacres had followed in all the great garrison towns, and the Sultan's authority was once more supreme. Nevertheless, several years must pass before Mahmud could complete the organisation of his new Europeanised army. The Emperor Nicholas feared this strong reformer, and determined to strike before Mahmud could carry out his schemes. He had witnessed the success of Mahommed Ali's disciplined Fellahin, and he had good reason to fear the formation of a really efficient Turkish Moslem army, and the re-establishment of Turkey as a competent military power. The Emperor then declared war (April 1828), on pretext of the breach of the Convention of Akkerman and the Sultan's refusal to accept the Treaty of London. Britain and France, although they had stipulated that the Sultan should not be forcibly coerced, were compelled to remain neutral.

In Asia Minor the Turks suffered disastrous defeats, for their troops were ill-disciplined and badly equipped, many only with spears. The Russian General Paskievich, later notorious as

[1] The Hippodrome or Horse Parade.

the conqueror of Poland, captured Kars (1828) and Erzerum (1829), and was moving on Trebizond, when the armistice was concluded. In Europe, however, Mahmud's raw battalions of Anatolian peasants, fresh from the hands of their French and German instructors, offered an obstinate resistance. Von Moltke, then a captain attached to Turkish headquarters, has given us a detailed account of the campaign. The Russian army, under the veteran general Diebich, overran Moldavia and Wallachia, and on 8th June crossed the Danube. But Mahmud's young recruits defended Shumla and Silistria with a "courage and steadiness far above all praise," and the Russians were forced to raise the siege of these two fortresses. The campaign of 1828 closed with the treacherous surrender of Varna by Jussuf Pasha, a wealthy Anatolian land-owner, who received the news during the investment that his property had been confiscated by the Sultan. Next year (1829) Reshid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, was defeated in a great battle at Kulevcha, Silistria fell, and Diebich crossed the Balkans and appeared before Adrianople. But his army was so reduced by disease that he could only dispose of 20,000 men. Shumla was still untaken in his rear, and Mustafa, the Pasha of Skutari, having reached Sofia with 40,000 Albanians, was threatening his flank. The situation was critical, but Diebich proved as clever a diplomatist as he had proved skilful a strategist. He took advantage of the panic which reigned at Constantinople, and of the Sultan's ignorance of the approach of the relieving army of Albanians, to bluff Mahmud into an armistice. Mahmud

had always resisted when he should have yielded; now he yielded when he should have resisted. "It is certain," says von Moltke, "that this treaty released Diebich from a position as perilous as could well be conceived, and which, if prolonged for a few more days, might have caused him to be hurled down from the summit of victory to the lowest depth of ruin and destruction."

The Emperor Nicholas was in no position to impose harsh terms: apart from the dangerous situation of Diebich's army, Britain and France were not likely to permit any great accretion of territory to Russia, while at home a series of reactionary measures had driven the Poles to the verge of insurrection. Of all the treaties concluded between Russia and Turkey, the Treaty of Adrianople was the most favourable to the subject races. Russia gained only Anapa, Poti, and Akhaltsikh, in the Caucasus, and an indemnity of £5,000,000 for the expenses of the war.

The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were thrown open to the shipping of all nations.

The Rumanians, who had suffered terribly during the war from the exactions of the Russian military authorities, were confirmed in their autonomy and exempted from various tributes to the Porte. But the continuance of the Russian occupation for several years (until the Turks had carried out the terms of peace) served to strengthen Russian influence, while the oppressive enactments of Count Paul Kisilev, the Russian governor-general, increased the rights of the boyars over the peasantry.

The autonomy of Serbia was recognised, several

districts were added to the existing territory, the tribute to the Porte was fixed, no Turks except the garrisons of the Turkish fortresses were to live in Serbia, and Milosh Obrenovich was recognised as hereditary prince.

The question of Greece was definitely settled. As in the case of Bulgaria in 1878, Britain and France feared that Greece might become a mere Russian dependency, and therefore contrived that her boundaries should be as restricted as possible. Epirus and Thessaly, districts which had taken a leading part in the War of Independence, were excluded from the new Greek kingdom, together with many of the islands, including Crete, which Mahmud made over to Mahommed Ali. The whole settlement of the Greek question was unsatisfactory, and could not but lead to fresh complications. The Greek Crown was offered to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who afterwards became King of the Belgians, but owing to the intrigues of Capo d'Istria he was induced to refuse it.

Then the French and Polish revolutions broke out, and Capo d'Istria took advantage of the preoccupation of France and Russia to attempt to make himself dictator.

But by the autumn of 1831 the Polish patriots were straggling along the roads to Siberia, and although Charles X., aged grandson of "God-given" Louis, "sat desolate at Gratz," Egalité's son reigned in his stead, and the Old Order was preserved for another two decades.

In October 1831 Capo d'Istria was assassinated, and the civil war continued between the rival

parties, encouraged by the French and Russian Residents, until the arrival of the seventeen-year-old Otho of Bavaria (February 1833), the newly chosen king, brought temporary peace.

A foreign ruler without any preconceived leanings towards any one political party was at that time absolutely necessary to the Greeks, who by their dissensions had shown that they were as yet unsuited for a democratic form of government.

IX

The Powers had scarcely achieved a temporary settlement of the Greek question by the nomination of Otho, when they were again compelled to intervene in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Old Mahommed Ali had been little pleased by the frustration of his son's successes in the Morea, and he considered the hereditary pashalic of Crete as but poor compensation for the destruction of his fleet at Navarino. The Egyptian viceroy could command an excellent and well-equipped army, while his arbitrary economic policy put enormous financial resources at his disposal. Turkey, unstable and disorganised by reason of the recent civil wars and of the Russian invasion, and the efforts of Mahmud to transform the Empire from a mosaic of feudal principalities into a centralised autocracy, was passing through the period of military weakness which always accompanies political transition.

It is difficult to fathom the original ambition of Mahommed Ali. It seems probable that, at

first, he aimed at making himself the independent ruler of Egypt and Syria, but that later, encouraged by the facility and swiftness of Ibrahim's victories, he actually aspired to displace the House of Othman at Constantinople, and to establish there the family of the fisherman of Kavalla. In 1831, on Mahmud's refusal to invest Ibrahim with the pashalic of Damascus, Mahommed Ali ordered his son to invade Syria. The Egyptians captured Jaffa, Jerusalem, Acre, and Damascus. The army of Hussein Pasha, the Seraskier, was routed, and Ibrahim crossed the Taurus. The Grand Vizier Reshid was defeated and captured, and the Egyptians entered Konieh. Constantinople seemed to be at the mercy of the Albanian adventurer. Mahmud appealed in vain to Britain and Austria for intervention, and then "as a drowning man clings to a serpent," turned to the Emperor Nicholas. Nicholas, who in 1828 had attacked the Turks in order to interrupt Mahmud's military and administrative reforms, was now unwilling to allow the establishment on the Bosphorus of a vigorous and enterprising adventurer who, were he given time, might prove capable of resuscitating the Ottoman Empire as a military machine, and of reviving the forces of Pan-Islamism. He also regarded Mahommed Ali as the instrument of France, for French influence was then predominant both in the Egyptian army and in Egyptian financial enterprises, and he foresaw with consternation the possibility of French commercial penetration of the whole of Asia Minor and the danger of the supremacy of French diplomacy at Constantinople. The policy of Nicholas seems to

have been to maintain Turkey in a position of instability and weakness, always dependent on and at the mercy of Russian arms. "Il suffira de dire qu'avec Méhémet-Aly la Russie verrait succéder un voisin fort et victorieux à un voisin faible et vaincu. Toutes ces considérations réunis ont porté notre auguste maître à penser qu'il est de l'intérêt bien-entendu de son empire de contribuer, s'il se peut, à prévenir la chute du Sultan et de maintenir ainsi la Turquie dans l'état stationnaire où elle se trouve. . . ."[1] Accordingly, in February 1833, a Russian fleet entered the Bosphorus, and an army was disembarked on the Anatolian shore. Ibrahim, who had reached Brusa, was forced to be content with the Convention of Kutayeh, by which his father received the pashalic of Syria, and himself the collectorship of Adana. This prompt intervention was a singular triumph for Russian diplomacy. On 8th July 1833 Mahmud signed the Treaty of Khunkiar Iskelesi (the Steps of the Bloody One) by which he submitted to a virtual protectorate by Russia. Russia was to give Turkey military assistance in case of need, but in return the Sultan agreed, in the case of hostilities between Russia and any European Power, to close the Dardanelles to the warships of the latter. The fundamental idea of this treaty was to guarantee the Sultan against Franco-Egyptian aggression, while, in return, the closing of the Dardanelles was calculated to secure the southern coasts of Russia from attack. However, the British and French governments regarded it as an audacious attempt by Russia to gain access

[1] Buxton, pp. 50-59, Instructions to Count Orlov.

to and eventually to dominate the Mediterranean. M. Guizot observed that "Ainsi le cabinet de St Petersburg, convertissant en droit écrit le fait de sa prépondérance à Constantinople, faisait de la Turquie son client officiel, et de la mer noire un lac russe, dont le client gardait l'entrée contre les ennemis possibles de la Russie, sans que rien la génât elle même pour en sortir et lancer dans la Mediterranée, ses vaisseaux et ses soldats."

Lord Palmerston sent an emphatic protest to Constantinople declaring that if future events should lead to "the armed intervention of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey . . . the British Government will hold itself at liberty to act . . . as if the treaty above mentioned were not in existence." The uneasiness of the British Cabinet was further aroused by the rumours of an Austro-Russian coalition for the partition of Turkey. For in September a secret convention, the terms of which were not then known, was concluded at Münchengrätz, between Nesselrode and Metternich: the contracting parties engaged to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but, in the event of its dissolution, agreed to act together. For the next six years the situation at Constantinople remained critical until, early in 1839, Mahmud precipitated an issue. Assisted by von Moltke and other foreign instructors, he had been feverishly organising an army with the object of expelling the Egyptians from Syria, and now considered himself strong enough to accomplish this. In April his army crossed the Euphrates and invaded Syria, but two months later was completely destroyed by Ibrahim at Nisibin.

Mahmud died on 1st July before the news of this last disaster reached him.

La Jonquière compares him to Peter the Great, and calls him *la figure la plus énergique et la plus grande de la Turquie moderne.* In the history of the Nineteenth Century he stands out an heroic, almost a pathetic figure. He is the type of the old sultans, cruel, ruthless, unscrupulous, yet courageous and determined. He set himself to destroy the old system, the corruption, ignorance, and fanaticism of which had brought his empire to the verge of dissolution, and he aimed at the establishment of an ordered and centralised bureaucracy. In the destruction of the *ancien régime* he was almost successful. The Janissaries ceased to exist; the reactionary Bosnian begs were crushed; the fanatical sect of Bektashi dervishes was abolished; the dereh beys of Rumelia and Anatolia, the rebellious pashas of Janina, Vidin, and Scutari were, in turn, killed or brought to submission. Mahmud sent French-speaking, frock-coated, cigarette-smoking officials from Constantinople to administer the provinces, and commenced to organise a national army on the European pattern.

But the whole essence of his statesmanship is summarised in his substitution of the fez for the turban. He thought that by wearing French clothes he could turn Turkey from an Asiatic despotism into a Western bureaucracy.

"La réforme," says Arsène Perlant, "a consisté surtout en choses extérieures, en noms et en projets. On a fait une armée sur le modèle européen, avec les tuniques russes, un réglement

français, des fusils belges, des turbans turcs, des selles hongroises, des sabres anglais, et des instructeurs de toutes nations."[1]

He aroused the fanaticism of reactionary Islam, without conciliating the nationalism of the subject races. He wished to bring all nationalities and all creeds to the level of Ottoman subjects, and failed to realise that he had to deal with men of as widely differing types as the Arab dervish and the Greek patriot. Thus he massacred Moslem Janissaries and Greek insurgents without discrimination.

Mahmud's statesmanship was the negation of Nationalism, of Democracy, and of all modern conceptions of international ethics. Nevertheless, he was a great Sultan. And it may be said that he was principally responsible for the continued existence of that artificial political expression known as the Ottoman Empire.

XI

The reign of the new Sultan, Abdul Medjid, opened with the betrayal of the Turkish fleet to the Egyptians at Alexandria. A general European conflict seemed about to be precipitated. It was known that the French Premier, M. Thiers, was prepared to support Mahommed Ali; Nicholas declared his intention to adhere to the Treaties of Unkiar Iskelesi and Münchengrätz; Palmerston was determined to send a British fleet to Constantinople, if Russian warships entered the Bosphorus.

[1] Arsène Perlant (General Torcom), *Eternelle Turquie*, p. 29.

However, Nicholas' personal desire to humiliate Louis Philippe caused him to play into the hands of Palmerston. He sent Baron Brunnow to London with an offer to allow the Treaty of Khunkiar Iskelesi to lapse, in return for British support. Accordingly, on 15th July 1840, the Treaty of London was concluded between Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, to the exclusion of France, wherein it was agreed to coerce the Egyptian viceroy. In France, public indignation rose to such a height that war seemed imminent; military and naval preparations were undertaken, and the modern fortifications of Paris were then commenced; Egalité's son, fearing already for his throne, talked excitedly of "unmuzzling the tiger" of Revolution. But all the efforts of M. Thiers could not save Syria for his protégé, and when Mahommed Ali concluded a convention with Sir Charles Napier, whereby he was only to retain the hereditary pashalic of Egypt, the French Premier proffered his resignation.

The final settlement of the question arising out of the Treaty of Khunkiar Iskelesi was embodied in the Straits Convention, concluded at London on 13th July 1841, which stipulated that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles should be closed to the warships of all nations so long as the Porte was at peace. Thus the rival ambitions of the Powers were temporarily compromised and peace was at last imposed in the Near East.

The young Sultan set himself to continue the policy of his father, and to carry out the sweeping charter of reforms embodied in the famous Tanzimat or Hatti-Sherif of Gûl-Khaneh, which

he had published on his succession in 1839. The lives, property, and honour of his subjects of whatever nationality or religion were guaranteed, taxation was regulated, and the European system of recruitment was introduced. But a series of revolts which soon broke out in the Lebanon, Crete, and Montenegro, and a massacre at Kerbela soon proved that the promises of Abdul Medjid were as empty and as incapable of fulfilment as those of his predecessors. In fact the very publication of the Tanzimat caused a dangerous reaction at Constantinople, as a result of which the moderate Grand Vizier Reshid gave place to the corrupt and fanatical Riza.

But, in December 1841, there arrived in Constantinople, as the Ambassador of Great Britain, one of the most remarkable men of the Nineteenth Century. Stratford Canning (later Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe) had first gained distinction in 1812, when at the age of twenty-six he had been instrumental in the conclusion of the Treaty of Bukharest. Later he had assisted at the Congress of Vienna, and had taken a leading part in the establishment of the Swiss Confederation and of the Greek Kingdom. He had been four times previously ambassador to the Porte, and, with brief intervals, was to hold that post until 1858. A man of commanding personality, majestic bearing, and haughty address, he soon obtained a complete moral ascendency over the weak and well-meaning young Sultan. The Turkish ministers dreaded the displeasure of the "Great Elchi," for his nod could bring about their fall; but he was regarded by the Christian rayahs

almost as a god, and Bulgarians, Greeks, and Armenians alike looked to him as their protector. He worked unceasingly for the improvement of the lot of the rayah, for in reform, he believed, lay the only hope of salvation for the Ottoman Empire. In those days the position of an ambassador was much more responsible, owing to the difficulty of communication, and he almost exercised the powers of a foreign secretary. Canning practically directed the Eastern policy of Britain during the period of his office at Constantinople: he often acted on his own initiative, and even when in receipt of instructions from London, sometimes treated them with cool contempt. Many have laid on him the responsibility for the Crimean War, and Mr Lionel Moore used to tell an interesting story, the truth of which is based on Canning's known enmity for the Emperor Nicholas II., who, in 1832, had refused to receive him as Ambassador to St Petersburg. As Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople it was Moore's duty to take up the despatches announcing the Declaration of War (1854) to the Ambassador, who was shaving at the time. Canning cut himself in his agitation, exclaiming, "At last I am revenged on Nicholas." Be this as it may, it cannot be denied that it was only the personality of the Great Elchi which prevented Nicholas from crowning his triumph at Adrianople and Khunkiar Iskelesi by further oppressive treaties in 1848 and 1853.

In 1845 Stratford de Redcliffe prevailed upon the Sultan to dismiss Riza Pasha and the reactionary gang, whose maladministration he stigmatised as "a dunghill of corruption, abuse,

and ignorance," and to restore to power his friend Reshid Pasha, a man who, though "timid and tardy," had always proved an anxious advocate of reform.

XII

In 1848 a third great wave of Revolution swept across Europe. "A general inundation," wrote Canning, "seemed to be coming on. The rising waters beat against our own cliffs, and the spray of their surge was driven inward even as far as London." But there it ended in a "ridiculous display" on Kennington Common. From Paris came "William Smith" to bury his head at Claremont, and from Vienna sly old Metternich, boasting that he had "never yielded to an insurrection." All over Germany quailing princelings hastened to grant the fullest of constitutions, and His Majesty of Prussia was constrained to salute revolutionary corpses. Lombardy and Hungary were seething with revolt, and the wave swept over the Danubian Principalities and dethroned a Hospodar at Bukharest. The Emperor Nicholas, the reactionary *par excellence* of the Nineteenth Century, was determined to prevent the triumph of democratic principles on his own borders. He marched an army into Moldavia, under the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople, requested the Turks to repress the movement at Bukharest, and on 1st May 1849 re-established the Rumanian oligarchies by the Convention of Balta Liman. Nicholas then proceeded to use Moldavia as a base for his operations against the Hungarian

rebels, and when the Porte protested, assumed a decidedly dictatorial attitude. But Canning encouraged Reshid Pasha to resist the Emperor's demands. A crisis was precipitated when the Hungarian leaders took refuge on Turkish soil, and the two emperors demanded their extradition. The Porte, at Canning's instigation refused, and when Nicholas massed troops in Bessarabia, a Franco-British squadron appeared before Constantinople. The Emperor, surprised by the alliance of the two Western Powers, found himself compelled to yield, and on 7th November withdrew the demand for extradition "in deference to the pronounced expression of public feeling in England."

Nicholas had suffered a decided rebuff, but although disinclined to measure his strength with the two Western Powers, he did not discontinue his aggressive policy.

The Nationalist and Socialist movements of the Year of Revolutions had caused him to change his point of view with regard to Turkey, and he had become convinced that it was no longer possible to maintain her *dans l'état stationnaire où elle se trouve,* as a great "buffer" state across the south-east of Europe. He was equally convinced of the inadvisability of attempting a partition without the consent and co-operation of Great Britain.

In the last month of 1852 his friend, Lord Aberdeen, became Prime Minister. This event, no doubt, encouraged him to make the unofficial advances, which were communicated by Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador to St Petersburg, to the London Cabinet during the early

months of 1853. "We have on our hands a sick man—a very sick man," was the Emperor's famous simile. "It will, I tell you frankly, be a great misfortune if one of these days he should slip away from us before all necessary arrangements were made . . . now Turkey has by degrees fallen into such a state of decrepitude that, eager as we all are for the prolonged existence of his life, he may suddenly die on our hands; we cannot resuscitate what is dead. If the Turkish Empire falls, it falls to rise no more, and I put it to you, therefore, whether it is not better to be provided beforehand for a contingency than to incur the chaos, confusion, and the certainty of a European war, all of which must attend the catastrophe, if it should occur unexpectedly, and before some ulterior system has been sketched. . . . I repeat to you the sick man is dying, and we can never allow such an event to take us by surprise. We must come to some understanding."

He suggested that the Rumanian Principalities, Serbia and Bulgaria, should be constituted as independent states under Russian protection, while he had "no objection to offer" to the occupation by Britain of Egypt and Crete. He further declared that, although he would not allow Britain to "establish" herself at Constantinople, he was willing to give an engagement that Russia would not permanently occupy it. Lord Clarendon, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, replied that "English views upon Egypt did not go beyond the part of securing a safe and ready communication between British India and the Mother Country," and expressed the view that "Turkey only requires

forbearance on the part of its allies . . . in order not only to prolong its existence, but to remove all cause for alarm respecting its dissolution."

Meanwhile a dispute had broken out between the French and Russian governments, centring round their respective claims to the Protectorate of the Latin and Greek Christians. The immediate difference was whether Latin or Greek should have the custody of the Holy Places, but the ultimate issue was whether French or Russian influence should predominate in the Levant.

On 2nd December 1852, the Prince-President, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, had been elected Emperor of the French. The caprice of fortune and the magic of his uncle's name had made this obscure adventurer, first, President, and then Emperor. He was a strange mixture of the charlatan and the hero. He was possessed of all the ambition of his great namesake, but of none of the genius. On his accession he had loudly declared that "Empire means Peace," but the very combination of sentiment and chauvinism in the French national character, which had been the cause of his elevation, made it necessary that he should embark on a successful war. Forty years of peace had bred a generation which had forgotten the shame and the horrors of the allied occupation, and only remembered that glorious name "Napoleon Bonaparte." Louis Napoleon was not alone to blame for the fact that his reign was one long series of military adventures—in the Crimea, in Italy, in Syria, in Mexico, culminating in the degradation of *l'année terrible.* Historians have denounced Nicholas I., Stratford de Redcliffe, and

Napoleon III. as the chief authors of that senseless conflict known as the Crimean War, but there is no doubt that hostilities might have been prevented had it not been for the strength both in England and in France of the popular "war-fever," inflamed by a bellicose press.

Through the spring of 1852 a triangular struggle was in progress at Constantinople between the representatives of Britain, France, and Russia. Nicholas, disillusioned in his hopes of a Russo-British coalition, yet continued to press his aggressive policy towards the Porte, and took advantage of the controversy over the Holy Places, by attempting to renew a Russo-Turkish Alliance on the pattern of the Treaty of Khunkiar Iskelesi. With this object he sent as ambassador to Constantinople, General Prince Menshikov, an overbearing and undiplomatic soldier, with a proposal to support Turkey with an army of 400,000 men against any Western Power, in return for an extension of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainadji, by the recognition of a further Russian Protectorate over the Orthodox Christians.

Stratford cleverly undermined the position of the Russian ambassador, by obtaining a settlement of the question of the Holy Places, and by urging immediate reforms on the Porte. Nevertheless Menshikov was instructed to repeat the Russian demands. Reshid Pasha, encouraged by the arrival of the French fleet off Salamis and prompted by Stratford de Redcliffe, returned a firm refusal, though promising an inquiry into existing administrative abuses. Menshikov then broke off diplomatic relations, and on 2nd July 1853 a Russian

army crossed the Pruth and occupied the Principalities.

But Nicholas remained confident that, in spite of Stratford de Redcliffe's threatening attitude at the Porte, the British Cabinet was not inclined to go to war.

While the Franco-British fleet moved to Besika Bay, the representatives of Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia met at Vienna and composed a note, which embodied a compromise of the Protectorate question. The Russian Emperor, now anxious to avoid a European war, accepted it, but the Porte, secretly prompted by Stratford de Redcliffe, refused to assent to it, but suggested an amendment which the Emperor, in turn, rejected.

A fortnight later the third Russo-Turkish war of the century broke out, and the British fleet, at the request of France, entered the Dardanelles. Turkish arms met with surprising success. Omar Pasha (Michael Lattas), a Croatian renegade, defeated the Russians at Kalafat and Oltenitza in Wallachia. But on 30th November the Russian Black Sea fleet destroyed a Turkish squadron at Sinope. This last event called forth an indignant outcry in the English press, and war seemed inevitable. The Russophile Aberdeen resigned, and the bellicose Palmerston rejoined the Cabinet. A Franco-British ultimatum demanded the evacuation of the Principalities, and, on a Russian refusal to comply, war was declared. Thus Britain virtually "drifted" into war.

XIII

During June 1854, French and British troops landed at Varna, and Paskievich, the veteran of the war of 1828-29, was forced to raise the siege of Silistria. He retired on Bukharest, and by the beginning of August had completely evacuated the Danubian Principalities.

By this evacuation the object of the Franco-British intervention had been achieved, and there was no conceivable reason for a continuance of hostilities. Austria and Prussia, although unwilling to declare war, were prepared to use diplomatic pressure with the Emperor. In fact, Austria now consented to occupy the Principalities with a military force until the conclusion of peace. But the enthusiasm of the British and French peoples had been aroused by the easy successes on the Danube, and while Louis Napoleon considered it a suitable occasion to strengthen his position by a brilliant military triumph, Stratford de Redcliffe wrote that "in the interests of the civilised world this great opportunity of giving a permanent check to Russia must not be relinquished."

It was impossible to undertake an invasion of Russia without the active co-operation of the two German Powers, and it was therefore decided to confine military operations to an invasion of the Crimea and the destruction of the new Russian naval base at Sevastopol.

On 13th September 1854 a Franco-British army, numbering some 60,000 men, under command

of Marshal St Arnaud and Lord Raglan, together with 7000 Turks under Omar Pasha, landed on the west coast of the Crimea, and after defeating Menshikov's field army on the Alma, laid siege to Sevastopol. Later the allied troops were joined by a force of 15,000 Sardinians under Count de la Marmara, sent by the wily Cavour, who hoped by obtaining a seat at the coming peace deliberations, to procure the admission of Sardinia into the Concert of Powers.

The fortress of Sevastopol was defended with great courage by Admiral Kornilov and General Todleben, and it was only after the bloody victories of Balaklava, Inkerman, and Traktir, and the costly capture of the Malakov redoubt, that the allies gained possession of its ruins (9th September 1855). Meanwhile in Asia Minor the Turks had been defeated at Akhaltsikh, and Kars had fallen after a gallant defence by Fenwick Williams and the Hungarian exile Kmety. In the Baltic and the Pacific the allied fleets had not achieved any remarkable success. Nicholas had opened negotiations for peace as early as December 1854, but he died during the discussions, and the new Emperor, Alexander II., having refused to yield with regard to the proposed reduction of the Russian Black Sea fleet, negotiations had been broken off. But after the fall of Sevastopol the French began to weary of the war, and towards the end of 1855 the Emperor Napoleon came to a secret understanding with Russia. The British Cabinet wished for a further campaign, but they soon saw that they would have to fight alone. Napoleon, personally, was desirous to remain loyal

to his alliance, but he dared not risk unpopularity, and the French public was now as delirious for peace as eighteen months previously it had been for war. Accordingly, the belligerents accepted the mediation of Austria, and on 25th February 1856 a Peace Congress met at Paris. Even then Stratford de Redcliffe did not despair of giving "a permanent check" to Russia, and in a letter to Lord Clarendon advocated the cession of Bessarabia to the Rumanian Principalities, the revival of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and the establishment of an independent Circassia. But Clarendon at Paris was a witness of "the bitterness of feeling towards us, and the kindly . . . almost enthusiastic feeling towards Russia," and feared that Britain might be confronted with a Franco-Russian combination. Accordingly he was forced to consent to the Treaty of Paris, the terms of which constituted but a temporary check to Russian aggression. The territorial *status quo ante bellum* was restored, except that Russia ceded part of Southern Bessarabia to the Principality of Moldavia, and the islands at the mouth of the Danube to the Porte. The mouths of the Danube, however, were placed under the control of a commission, composed of a delegate from each of the seven riverain states, Würtemburg, Bavaria, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Turkey, and the Principalities.

The Black Sea was neutralised, both Russia and Turkey agreeing neither to maintain fleets there, nor naval arsenals on its shores; this virtually gave to the Turkish Mediterranean fleet the command of the Black Sea in a war against Russia.

The "collective guarantee" of the contracting Powers was substituted for the protectorate of Russia over the three tributary principalities of Serbia, Wallachia, and Moldavia. Lastly, the Ottoman Empire was admitted into the Concert of Europe, and the other signatories undertook to guarantee its "independence and territorial integrity." In return, the Sultan issued on 21st February 1856 a hatti-humayun, confirming the former Hatti-Sherif of Gûl-Khaneh, and promising to his subjects, "who in my sight are all equal and equally dear to me," full liberty of worship and equality before the law; and the Powers answered by disclaiming all right to collective or individual intervention between the Sultan and his subjects. This repudiation of the right of intervention, designed to prevent future Russian interference in the internal affairs of the Porte, defeated its own ends. For it could not be expected that the Mahommedan local authorities, if the fear of foreign intervention were removed, would make any serious attempt to improve the lot of the Christians, by carrying out the terms of the hatti-humayun. Stratford de Redcliffe realised this when he said, "I would rather have cut off my right hand than have signed that Treaty." He saw in it the negation of his lifelong efforts to obtain administrative reforms, and the ruin of his hopes for the regeneration of Turkey. "The Porte," he wrote, "will never of its own accord carry the provisions of the firman seriously into effect. The Treaty . . . will therefore confirm the rights and extinguish the hopes of the Christians. . . . I fix my thoughts

on that coming day, when the Treaty of Paris will be felt in its miserable consequences."

His prophecies proved true. Before the "Great Elchi" left Constantinople for the last time (1858), the reactionary Riza had returned to power. Massacre and revolt followed as the results of the short-sighted policy of the fanatical Mussulman party, and of the apathy of the provincial governors. In 1861 the accession of Abdul Aziz, a light-minded and careless voluptuary, tended to increase the confusion and corruption in the public services, while his personal extravagance involved the Porte in financial bankruptcy. An insurrection in the Herzegovina, two wars with Montenegro, two insurrections in Crete, and a series of massacres in the Lebanon, proved the impracticability of carrying out the reforms promised in the Hatti-Humayun of 1856.

XIV

The Crimean War, though a temporary check to Russia's aggressive policy in the Near East, was not an unqualified triumph for British statesmanship. The war was undertaken in pursuance of a definite Eastern Policy, the basis of which was always the defence of India. And it is a debatable question as to how far the injury to British prestige, resulting from the reverses suffered by British arms in the Crimea and the failure to relieve Kars, was responsible for the Indian Mutiny, which broke out in the year following the Peace of Paris. In the subse-

quent years, the vigorous Russian advance in Central Asia and Caucasia (in great part a direct sequel to the "permanent check" in the Balkans), and the commercial penetration of the regions south of the Caspian, gave rise to renewed misgivings as to the ultimate designs of the Russian Government on British territories in the Middle East. Politicians and journalists asserted that this absorption of the native Mussulman states of Central Asia was but the first step towards the invasion of India, and amateur strategists pointed out that the exploits of Chernaiev and Kauffmann in Khiva and Bokhara might be repeated in Afghanistan and Kashmir. But this advance of civilisation from the north was, in reality, the natural corollary of the movement which had begun with the accession of Peter the Great. It was inevitable that a great military and commercial state should absorb all the misgoverned and backward communities which lay in proximity to its frontiers.

For the military defence of India, it was regarded as desirable to maintain a string of "buffer states" along the north-western frontiers, in order to avoid the enormously increased expenditure which would be incurred if it became necessary to compete with the armies of a great Power, whose frontiers might become contiguous with those of India. Hence the British were compelled to consolidate their control of the mountain approaches to India, and to maintain the independence of Afghanistan on the north and of Persia on the west. As early as 1839, some years before the khanates were finally

subdued, a blundering and inconclusive campaign was fought against the tribes of Afghanistan, in order to enforce a protectorate over the Amir, and to gain possession of the passes into Central Asia. But it was not until forty years later that the Indian Government finally established their authority in those inhospitable mountains, and consolidated a formidable line of frontier defence.

XV

In European politics British statesmanship suffered two affronts in regard to the Polish Question of 1863 and the Danish Question of 1864.

The restless genius of Louis Napoleon was a constant danger to the peace of Europe. Two years after British and French soldiers had fought together in the trenches before Sevastopol, the French Emperor was contemplating the invasion of England, and was seeking a Russian alliance against Austria.

The expulsion of the Austrians from Italy (1859-66) and from the German Confederation (1866) profoundly affected the foreign policies of the great Powers, and the principle of the maintenance of the Balance of Power. The old German Empire was compelled to seek the support of the new German Empire. The Habsburgs, with their large and "separatist" populations of Hungarians, Slavs, Poles, Rumanians, and Italians, relied on the loyalty of the German element for the security of the Throne, and hence

were obliged to subordinate themselves to the more powerful German state. The Magyar oligarchy, whose vital interest it was to retain their hold over their extensive non-Magyar lands, favoured this radiation towards Berlin as the only policy by which the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire could be prevented. Thus after 1866 the other nationalities of the Empire sank still more into the position of "subject races," whose future lay not with the monarchy subordinated to the German Empire but with their compatriots beyond the Austrian frontiers.

The fall of the Second Empire in 1870 marked the end of Louis Napoleon's adventurous Imperialism. It was the inevitable result of a statesmanship which had weakened Austria and Russia and alienated Britain. The triumph of Bismarck was complete. Germany was the leading military Power of the Continent. It remained to reward Russia, who had maintained a friendly neutrality during the attacks on Denmark, Austria, and France. In August 1866 General Manteuffel had gone to St Petersburg to convey to the Tsar the details of the battle of Sadowa, and incidentally to inquire, as King William remarked in his letter, "if there are any Russian interests, the satisfaction of which might strengthen the ties which have united us for a century." Accordingly in 1870 the Tsar, assured of the support of a victorious Prussia, decided that the moment had come to repudiate the obnoxious clauses of the Treaty of Paris with regard to the neutralisation of the Black Sea, and to reassert the position of Russia in those waters. In a Circular Note

to the signatory Powers, Prince Gorchakov announced that Russia could no longer consider herself bound by these onerous restrictions. Lord Granville, for Britain, vehemently protested, but Gorchakov had already received Bismarck's formal assurance of support. Britain seemed threatened by a formidable Russo-Prussian coalition, and Granville was constrained to yield. In January 1871 a conference of the signatory Powers met at London which authorised the abrogation of the Black Sea clauses.

Thus within fifteen years of the signature of the Treaty of Paris, Russia had been enabled to annul the results of a victory which had cost Britain 28,000 lives, and an anti-British coalition seemed to be about to replace the anti-Russian coalition of Napoleon III. Never had the political condition of Europe been more favourable to the fulfilment of Russian designs on Constantinople. British prestige in the East had been severely shaken by the Indian Mutiny, while in England it might be expected that the mass of the people would be unwilling to consent to another war for the defence of Turkish integrity. In France the Republicans were not likely to continue the Turkish policy of Louis Napoleon. The interest of French financiers and soldiers was being centred on Northern Africa, and the possibilities of the formation of a great Colonial Empire were becoming evident. France, who in 1855 had gone to war to prevent a Russian Partition of Turkey, would now have been content to take Egypt and Syria as her share of the spoil. In Italy, hungry eyes were already turned towards Albania and Tripoli.

Russia could count on the friendship of Germany and the acquiescence or alliance of Austria. Midhat Pasha in 1875 had, indeed, ample justification for looking forward to the future with apprehension, when he observed that "the feelings of the Powers have changed towards us, and they entertain hostile intentions towards our country."

CHAPTER IV

BALKAN NATIONALISM AND THE "DRANG NACH OSTEN"

I

THE Nineteenth Century was an age of disappointment. It opened in Revolution and closed in the Armed Neutrality. The fair plant of Nationalism grew into the choking creeper of Imperialism. The revolutionary enthusiasm of France developed into the hysterical chauvinism that could idolise the two Napoleons; the spirit that united Germany rejoiced in the humiliation of France; the sons of the heroes of the Risorgimento died at Adowa and Tripoli.

Inventions to improve methods of manufacture and to facilitate world-communication had led to greatly increased prosperity, which in turn led to increased population and to increased demand for raw material. The Nation States which had grown up out of the ruins of the old Dynastic States consolidated and sought expansion. Britain and France acquired the major portion of the virgin territories of Africa: German commercial influence extended south-east along the valley of the Danube, and east into the border-lands of

Russia and Poland: Russian enterprise spread south and east into Central Asia, Siberia, and Manchuria, and reaching the Pacific, came into conflict with Japanese commerco-Imperialism.

It was the struggle for existence between man and man on a world scale. And in the course of this struggle there developed an industrial system which sacrificed humanity to output; a social system which could cynically smile at the sweating misery of the "great unwashed"; a colonial system which could flog rubber out of docile black labour.

The conflicting interests of the rival Imperial states met in the Eastern Mediterranean. The legitimate desire of Russia for an outlet to the seas of the world clashed with Austro-Magyar schemes for the domination of the Balkans, the Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean, and with the later German scheme for the military and commercial penetration of Asia Minor and Persia; both Russian and German schemes came into conflict with the traditional British policy of the Balance of Power in the Mediterranean, necessary for the defence of the routes to India, and with French and Italian projects to control the Mediterranean and to exploit Northern Africa.

Both to Russia and to Austro-Magyar-Germany, Constantinople meant in Napoleon's phrase "The dominion of the world." For with Russia in possession of "The Queen City," German schemes for the domination of the Balkans and Asia Minor would become impracticable, while with Austro-Magyar-Germany in possession, the Mediterranean would be definitely closed to Russia, and her

southern coasts would be vulnerable to military attack. The Crimean adventure had already taught Russia the danger of the control of the Straits by a rival European Power.

The decay of the Turkish Empire had raised the question whether a Mediterranean Sea-Power, the Central European Powers, represented by the Habsburgs, or Russia, should eventually succeed to the possession of the Straits. In discussing the partition of the Sultan's territories both Alexander I. and Nicholas I. had found that Constantinople was the greatest obstacle to an agreement with the other Powers. Pitt, and later the Congress of Vienna, had evolved the principle of the Balance of Power as the best means to preserve the peace of Europe, and an essential corollary to this principle had been the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Turkey was a remnant of mediævalism and an anomaly in the European State system, but the principle of the Balance of Power demanded the preservation of "the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire." Whenever internal movements threatened the disruption of Turkey, the Powers collectively intervened to bring about a compromise and to regulate her future government, their mutual desire being to prevent the predominance of any one of their number in the "debatable lands."

The interests of the subject peoples composing the population of the European territories were only considered by the Powers in so far as their unrest and discontent threatened the authority of the Sultan. France and Austria pursued a policy of opportunism; Russia deliberately promoted

disorders in order to bring about further disintegration; Britain advocated administrative reform as the means best calculated to obviate renewed Nationalist outbreaks.

When a subject race, or a part of it, threw off the Turkish yoke, the Powers imposed their protectorate, and a struggle was immediately initiated between their representatives to obtain the supreme influence in the direction of the affairs of the new state. The subsequent confusion was augmented by dynastic and party strife, by a steady movement among the liberated masses towards a democratic form of government, and by a universal desire for union among their co-racials under foreign rule.

II

In Serbia, which in great part owed its independence to Russia, the Russian influence was strong, owing to the support of the Nationalist party, which accepted with enthusiasm the Russian Pan-Slav programme advocating a Greater Serbia, a programme directed alike against Turkey and Hungary. Nevertheless, the geographical position of the little principality made her economically dependent on and subject to the military coercion of Austria and Turkey. Thus Milosh Obrenovich and his son Michael were, in turn, deposed through the influence of the Russian Government, the first being considered too independent towards his Protector, the second too friendly towards Austria. And in 1848, when the Serbs of the Banat and the Croats

rose against the Hungarians, they were given every assistance by their compatriots of the Principality. But during the Crimean War, when Menshikov endeavoured to induce Prince Alexander, son of Black George, to co-operate with the Russian army in Wallachia, a Turkish army at Nish and an Austrian army on the Save enforced neutrality. The Treaty of Paris substituted the collective protectorate of the Powers for that of Russia, but nevertheless Russian influence was speedily re-asserted, and during the next twenty years the Pan-Slavist movement gained impetus.

Karageorgevich, accused of servility to Austria, was deposed, old Milosh was restored, and on his death Michael Obrenovich became Prince for the second time. While carrying into effect some excellent administrative reforms, including the introduction of a graduated income-tax,[1] he pursued an aggressive foreign policy, and devoted himself to the training of an efficient regular army.

In 1858 an insurrection in the Herzegovina, and the cattle-raiding expeditions of the Montenegrins into Albania, had involved those war-like mountaineers in hostilities with the Turks, and the signal defeat of a Turkish army at Grahovo had excited the enthusiasm of the subject Slavs in Turkey. In 1862 war broke out again between the Turks and Montenegrins, and Prince Michael prepared to participate in a movement which promised to become general. But Omar Pasha reduced the rebellious tribes by an invasion of the Zeta valley, and the youthful Prince Nicholas was

[1] Miller, *The Balkans*, p. 334.

forced to subscribe to the humiliating Convention of Skutari. Michael, who had attacked the Turks at Belgrad, and had demanded the expulsion of the Turkish garrisons from all the Serbian fortresses, gladly submitted to the mediation of the Powers. Five years later, however, the temporary weakening of Austria's influence caused by the defeat of Sadowa, and the embarrassments of the Turks in Crete, tempted the Prince to demand once more the evacuation of the fortresses. To this the Sultan eventually agreed, on the advice of the British Ambassador, who considered that the anomalous position of the Porte in Serbia was a weakness rather than a strength.

On 6th May 1867 the last Turkish soldier quitted the soil of the Principality. But this triumph did not satisfy the more violent Pan-Slavs among the Serbian politicians. Elija Garashanin advocated a Balkan confederation, and treaties were actually signed with Prince Charles of Rumania and Prince Nicholas of Montenegro; the Mahommedan Serbs of Bosnia came to an understanding by which they promised their neutrality if the Serbian army should cross the Drina; negotiations were opened with the Bulgarian National Committee recently formed at Bukharest; and a secret society, known as the Omladina ("Youth") was founded, with headquarters at Neusatz in Southern Hungary, whose programme was declared to be the union of the South Slav race. In 1868 Michael, whose moderating influence had been asserted in opposition to the hysterical influence of Garashanin and the Omladina, was assassinated, and Yovan Ristich,

another ardent Pan-Slav, became Regent for the young Prince Milan.

III

Meanwhile the doctrine of Pan-Slavism had made considerable progress among the other branch of the Slav race subject to Turkish rule. The stolid Bulgarian peasantry, by the geographical position of their country less exposed to external influences and more subject to the central authority at Constantinople, had, unlike the Serbs, never made any attempt to regain their independence. The country between the Danube and the Balkan range, flat and undulating, was unsuited to guerilla warfare, while the mountainous districts stretching towards the Ægean were inhabited by Pomaks (Bulgarian Mahommedans) and gypsies, who felt no hostility towards Moslem rule.

But during and after the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29, Pan-Slavist intrigues commenced with the object of rousing the national spirit of the Bulgarians. These at first took the form of a cultural movement; in 1835, on the initiative of the Bulgarian colony at Odessa, the first Bulgarian school was founded at Gabrovo, and in less than ten years there were more than fifty in existence. This was followed, in 1848, by the erection of the first Bulgarian church at Constantinople, by the omission of the Greek Patriarch's name from the prayers in all the churches in Bulgaria, and by a demand for the official recognition of an autocephalous Bulgarian Church and the appointment

of Bulgarian bishops. Some, anxious to gain the protection of France, advocated the union of the Bulgarian Church with that of Rome, and in 1861 Pope Pius IX. consecrated Sokolski, a brigand turned monk, first Archbishop of the Bulgarian Uniate Church. But the movement came to nothing.

Finally, as a result of the Cretan insurrection of 1866-69, the Sultan, with the idea of striking a blow at the Greek Church, and prompted by General Ignatiev, the Russian Ambassador, established by a firman the independence of the Bulgarian Church. But neither this concession nor the benignant régime of Midhat Pasha (Vali of the Danube vilayet, 1864-67) satisfied the Pan-Slavists. A committee, formed at Bukharest during the Crimean War, whose programme demanded a politically independent Bulgaria, organised a series of abortive insurrections, in none of which the peasantry participated in any numbers. But the Porte took energetic measures to check the growth of this nationalist movement, by the colonisation of the most fertile districts with Mussulman immigrants. Thus in 1861 12,000 Crim Tatars arrived in Bulgaria, founding the town of Tatar-Bazaarjik; and in the following years 40,000 Circassian families, driven from their mountain-homes by Russian invasion, settled in the country.

IV

But before the Pan-Slavist agitations cumulated in a dangerous crisis, the Porte and the Powers

were confronted with nationalist movements on the part of the Rumanians and the Greeks.

Both in Wallachia and Moldavia there was a universal desire for the union of the two principalities, for all educated Rumanians deprecated a political separation which accentuated the dependence of their country on the three neighbouring empires. Turkey, supported by Great Britain, opposed a union which threatened to weaken the Sultan's suzerainty, and Russia for converse reasons advocated it. Austria-Hungary, with a numerically predominating Rumanian element in Transylvania, also opposed it. But the Rumanians had the sympathy of their two sister-Latin countries, France and Sardinia, and Napoleon III. considered that the formation of a strong Latin principality on the Danube would constitute a check to Austria and to Russia. At a meeting with Queen Victoria and her Consort at Osborne, he attempted to compromise the question of union; but the Rumanians decided the matter for themselves by the election, in January 1859, of Colonel A. J. Cusa as Prince of both Wallachia and Moldavia.

Austria, defeated by the two Latin states in the Lombardy campaign of the same year, was not in a position to intervene, and Great Britain eventually withdrew her opposition, But although the Union had been effected, the situation remained unsatisfactory. The agrarian question called for immediate reform, and Cusa, by attempting to effect it, alienated the nobles and the powerful Conservative party. At the same time he failed to please the Liberals, the more advanced of whom

advocated the candidature of a foreign prince, who would command the respect of Austria and Russia. The Liberal leaders, Bratianu and Rosetti, gained the sympathy of Napoleon III. by denouncing Cusa as the instrument of Russia, and asked for the appointment of Prince Charles Louis of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a choice which contented both Napoleon and Bismarck, since he was connected with the reigning Houses of France and Prussia.

Finally, in the early hours of 23rd February 1866, the unfortunate Cusa was dragged from the bed of his mistress and compelled to sign an act of abdication. A provisional government, formed of members of the Conservative and Liberal parties, immediately offered the throne to Prince Charles. While the Powers protested, the young Prussian arrived incognito in Bukharest, and Bismarck, who had sent him, was able to confront Europe with a *fait accompli*. The European situation was favourable to the Prince, for Austria was soon embroiled in war with Italy and Prussia, while Britain advised the Porte to recognise him. Consequently in October he received a firman, recognising him as "Hereditary Prince of the United Principalities."

He found himself faced with many difficulties. The country was economically fettered, being subject to the capitulations in existence between Turkey and the Powers; the civil administration was disorganised; there were no railways and few roads; the peasants were crushed under an abominable agrarian system; the large Jewish urban population was subject to a persecution

reminiscent of the Middle Ages; the army was undisciplined. In addition to this Prince Charles' personal regard for his own country came into serious conflict with the traditional sympathy of his subjects for France, and when anti-German riots took place in Bukharest during the spring of 1871, he was with difficulty restrained from abdicating.

But although he took little interest in internal reforms, and left the civil administration in the hands of his ministers, he proved an able diplomat and soldier. During the stormy years which followed, he pursued with consummate skill a policy which required, at the same time, the conciliation of Austria, Russia, and Turkey. A member of the proud House of Hohenzollern, he accepted the throne with the resolute intention of throwing off the Ottoman suzerainty, and of asserting his position as an independent sovereign. His personal friendship with Bismarck, the fact that he was training his army on the Prussian model, and the strong financial interests which Germans were acquiring in the country, made him incline towards a German and consequently an Austrian alliance.

As early as 1871 Bismarck had suggested to Count Beust, the Austrian Foreign Secretary, the possibility of an Austrian-German alliance, and had hinted at expansion for Austria at the expense of Turkey. Consequently an understanding with Rumania became of greater importance to Austria, and in 1875 was initiated by a commercial treaty between the two countries.

In the Greek-speaking provinces of Turkey

there was "peace" for more than twenty years after the creation of the Greek kingdom.

Exhausted by the War of Independence, the Epirotes and Thessalians made no attempt to rise, and an insurrection which broke out in Crete in 1841 was easily repressed. In the kingdom of Greece there was much material progress, and men were occupied in a constitutional struggle, which culminated in the granting of a constitution by Otho and the expulsion of his Bavarian ministers (1843).

Otho was conscientiously anxious to carry out the dictates of the Guaranteeing Powers, and had no wish to engage in hostilities with Turkey, but his romantic and high-spirited queen, Amalia of Oldenburg, proved an ardent protagonist of Hellenic nationalism. During the Crimean War the Nationalist politicians urged an alliance with Russia, and sympathetic revolts broke out in Epirus and Thessaly, organised by officers in the Greek army. But a Franco-British force occupied the Piræus to enforce neutrality, and the risings were repressed by Turkish troops.

Otho's attitude offended the British and Turkish governments without satisfying the powerful Nationalist party. In 1862 a military revolt drove him from the throne, and the Guaranteeing Powers refrained from interference.

After protracted negotiations Prince George of Schleswig-Holstein, a scion of the Royal House of Denmark, was chosen king, and brought with him the Ionian Islands, which Britain ceded at the suggestion of Mr Gladstone, since their inhabitants were discontented with British rule and

demanded union. But when a formidable insurrection broke out two years later in Crete, and the insurgents demanded union with Greece, the new Conservative Cabinet in London renewed their policy of opposition to Greek expansion and steadfastly supported the continuance of Turkish rule, while Russia took advantage of the crisis to forward the interests of the Bulgarians. In the Kingdom there was a popular cry for war against the Turks; but the army was unprepared, and the free Greeks were forced by circumstances to remain neutral during the cruel repression of an insurrection which had opened with every promise of success. The Powers in 1869 intervened to effect a reconciliation between the Greek and Turkish governments, and to cause the introduction of a series of "paper" reforms in the administration of "the Great Greek Island."

V

Thus it will be seen that Turkish maladministration, European Imperialism, and Balkan Nationalism, that is the intolerable injustice practised by an alien and reactionary bureaucracy, the clashing ambitions of Austria-Germany, Russia, and Great Britain, and the aspirations towards unity and self-expression of Slavs and Greeks, were the elements which combined to bring about the crisis of 1875-78. The understanding between the three emperors, the desire of Prince Charles of Rumania to raise his adopted country to a position of independence—independence alike of

Turkish suzerainty and of Austro-Russian patronage—the widespread discontent among the subject populations of European Turkey, the ambitions of the Balkan princes, and the sincere and fervent national spirit of their subjects—all these factors contributed to the precipitation of an issue on the question as to whether the anomaly of Turkish rule should be continued in South-Eastern Europe.

The internal condition of the Ottoman Empire in 1875 was worse than it had been since the accession of Mahmud II., nearly seventy years before. The irresponsibility and favouritism of Abdul Aziz permeated every department of the administration; offices were openly sold; ministers and provincial governors gained their positions by intrigues in the Harem; ignorance, fanaticism, persecution, and injustice were rampant; anarchy and brigandage were rife in the provinces; the army was starving and unpaid; soldiers, gendarmes, Khurds, and Circassians resorted to unashamed robbery and violence upon the Christian peasantry; the public funds were devoted to the Sultan's personal pleasures; marble palaces on the Bosphorus were built with the money which should have been devoted to the Danubian and Armenian fortresses; the Sultan purchased his jewels and costly Paris furniture and paid for his farcically extravagant court functions with the revenues which should have gone to construct railways, bridges, and roads. The Grand Vizier was Mahmud Nedim Pasha, an incompetent nonentity, who was as subordinated to General Ignatiev, the able and scheming Russian Ambassador, as Reshid had been to Stratford de Redcliffe.

The result of this civil chaos was the formation of a party, who thought to reform the Empire by the renewal of the policy of Mahmud II. Their leader was Midhat Pasha, a man who had distinguished himself by his energy as Vali of Baghdad and of Bulgaria, and they numbered also Hussein Avni Pasha, an illiterate but capable soldier, who had been engaged in the reorganisation of the army, the Sheik-ul-Islam, Hassein Hairullah Effendi, Kaisseli Ahmed Pasha, a bluff old sailor, Mahommed Rushdi Pasha, a mild old man who was greatly under the influence of Midhat, and a number of unprincipled adventurers, such as Suleiman Pasha, head of the military school at Constantinople, Mahmud Djelal-ed-din Pasha, and Redif Pasha, commander of the Constantinople Army Corps. These men were the original members of a clique, which was the germ of the Young Turk party. They planned to overthrow Abdul Aziz, to appoint his imbecile nephew Murad Sultan, and with Midhat as Grand Vizier, to carry out a series of drastic reforms, with the objects of conciliating or repressing the subject races, of confirming the Turkish power, and of creating a unified Ottoman State.

Although Midhat "always advocated the equality of Mussulmans and Christians,"[1] his policy was essentially that of Turkification and centralisation—the *réforme à la turc* of Mahmud, not the *réforme à l'européen* of Stratford de Redcliffe and Abdul Medjid. Thus, as Vali of the Danubian vilayet, he had made every effort to ameliorate the lot of the Christians, and to effect material

[1] Sir Henry Eliot.

improvements. Yet he had ruthlessly suppressed the nationalist agitations of the Bulgarians and the rising of Panejot Hitov and Totov.

But before Midhat and his followers could carry their schemes into effect, an obscure revolt in the Herzegovina had precipitated a general rising of the Turkish Slavs, a rising which once more made the Balkans the storm-centre of European politics, and which threatened to bring about the end of Turkish rule on the European side of the Hellespont. In the summer of 1875 a local rising at Nevesinje, due to the exactions of the tax-collectors, had grown through the negligence of the authorities, and through the encouragement given by the attempted intervention of a Consular Commission, into a formidable movement which quickly spread to the neighbouring districts. All Bosnia rose in arms, and the insurgents received enthusiastic support from their compatriots in Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Montenegro. Bands of Croatians, Serbians, Montenegrins, and Crivoscians from the Bocché di Cattaro frequently made raids into Turkish territory, while the Bosnian insurgents, when pursued by Turkish troops, did not hesitate to take refuge in Serbian or Montenegrin territory. Pan-Slav committees were formed at Trieste, Spalato, and Sebenico, who made it their business to smuggle arms and ammunition across the Dalmatian frontiers. As early as September 1875 the Omladina advocated a Serbian declaration of war against the Turks, and in October the Bulgarian Committee organised an abortive rising at Eski Zagra.

In December, the understanding between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia took shape in the equivocal Andrassy Note, which stated that "the three courts" had "united for the purpose of employing in common their efforts for pacification." The Note suggested a programme of reforms, which the Porte declared itself willing to adopt. But the insurgent leaders, who in September had told the consuls that they did not desire "an impossible autonomy," now demanded "liberty independent and securely guaranteed by the Powers of Europe," and they called upon Serbia and Montenegro and "the powerful, strong, and glorious Russia" to deliver them from the "barbarous savages from Asia." In this changed attitude can be marked the influence of the Pan-Slav committees on the leaders of this movement, which had already developed from an agrarian revolt into a wide-spread Nationalist rising. On the other hand, the Turks were in December willing to make concessions, for they feared Austro-Russian intervention; but four months later Disraeli's opposition to the Berlin Memorandum and the arrival of a British squadron at Besika Bay caused them to assume a firmer attitude. The fluctuating policies of the insurgents and the Porte were determined by the support which they believed they could secure respectively from Russia and from Britain.

At the beginning of May 1876, when the Porte was sending considerable reinforcements to the Herzegovina in order to completely crush the insurrection, the "three cabinets" of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia proposed, in the

document known to the world as the Berlin Memorandum, to enforce an armistice on the Porte, and in the event of a failure to come to terms with the insurgents, to "supplement their diplomatic action" by "such efficacious measures as might be demanded in the interest of general peace, to check the evil and prevent its development."

But Disraeli refused to sanction a note which seemed to threaten armed intervention, and consequently it was never presented to the Porte. However, a series of events now occurred which made it impossible for Disraeli to maintain his firm attitude with regard to non-intervention in Turkey, based on the Treaty of Paris.

The "Bulgarian Atrocities" were a clever and unscrupulous piece of diplomacy on the part of the Russian Foreign Office and of the Pan-Slavist committees. In May 1876 the Bulgarian committees at Bukharest and Odessa organised an insurrection, which broke out simultaneously in many of the large towns of Bulgaria, accompanied by abominable atrocities on Moslems, "designedly committed by the insurgents as being the means best calculated to bring on a general revolution in Bulgaria, by rendering the position of the Christians, however peaceably inclined, so intolerable under the indiscriminate retaliation which the governing race were sure to attempt, as to force them in self-defence to rise."[1]

The valis telegraphed to the capital for regular troops; but General Ignatiev dissuaded Mahmud Nedim from sending them, on the grounds that

[1] Mr Consul Calvert.

"the presence of regular troops would have the effect of still further increasing the excitement." Consequently the authorities were forced to call upon the Circassian immigrants and Bashi-Bazuks, or armed bands of Mussulman peasants, to repress the insurrection. Terrible massacres ensued, the most notorious of which took place at Batak, a town in the foot-hills of the Rhodopé, and it is estimated that 20,000 Christian men, women, and children were slain.

When the details of these massacres became known, the outcry in the European, and especially in the English press, was tremendous, and a great revulsion of feeling took place against the Turks. Mr Gladstone proceeded to attack the Eastern policy of his rival, and expressed the hope in his famous pamphlet on the "Bulgarian Horrors," that "our Government, which has been working in one direction shall work in the other, and shall apply all its vigour, in common with the other states of Europe, in obtaining the extinction of the Turkish executive power in Bulgaria."

Such was the wide-spread indignation in the country, that Disraeli (now Earl of Beaconsfield) was forced to modify his attitude to the extent that Lord Derby, his Foreign Secretary, wrote to Sir H. Eliot at Constantinople, that "feeling is universal and so strong that, even if Russia were to declare war against the Porte, His Majesty's Government would find it practically impossible to interfere."

At Constantinople the effect of this wave of sentimental indignation in England was to bring about the fall of Mahmud Nedim, and a few days

later of Abdul Aziz, who committed suicide, or was murdered four days after his abdication. His imbecile nephew Murad became Sultan, and Midhat and the "reformers" came into power. But although Sir H. Eliot sent to London glowing appreciations of the new Grand Vizier, the change in no way modified the political situation. The provincial governors appointed by Mahmud Nedim retained their posts, and internal disorders continued.

VI

The Porte now began to mass troops at Skutari and Nish, in order to overawe the two Slav Principalities, and to compel them to refrain from assisting the Bosnian insurgents. But at the end of June Milan and Nicholas simultaneously declared war, and Michael Chernaiev, a Russian general who had distinguished himself in Central Asia, arrived in Belgrad to take command of the Serbian armies. He was joined by many Russian and German officers, and confident of victory the Serbians advanced on Vidin, Sofia, and Novi Bazaar.

On 8th July the Austrian and Russian emperors met at Reichstadt in Bohemia, and came to an understanding whereby Francis Joseph promised his neutrality in the event of a Russo-Turkish war, conditional on the consent of Russia to the occupation by the Austrians of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a guarantee that Russia would not annex any Turkish territories in Europe.

But the Serbian armies met with crushing

defeats. While Osman Nuri Pasha, the commandant of Vidin, defeated Leschjanin near Zaichar, Suleiman and Blühm Pasha, a German, defeated Chernaiev north of Pirot, and advancing up the valley of the Timok, captured Kniazevacz. At the same time, Mahommed Ali Pasha, a German renegade,[1] drove the Serbians out of the Sanjak of Novi Bazaar. On 1st September Chernaiev was again defeated at Alexinacz, in spite of the fact that over 300 Russian and German officers were serving in the Serbian army, and "native officers are now a comparatively insignificant minority."[2]

In the Herzegovina, Prince Nicholas inflicted a severe defeat on Ahmed Mukhtar Pasha at Vuchidol, and shut him up in Trebinje; but the arrival of Turkish reinforcements, by way of the Sanjak, forced the Prince to raise the siege and withdraw across his own frontier.

On 24th September the Guaranteeing Powers intervened to save the Serbians from further defeats, but the injudicious proclamation of Milan as King at Deligrad caused a renewal of hostilities. The Serbians were defeated in a series of engagements at Djunis, and on 2nd November they evacuated Deligrad and Alexinacz. The valley of the Morava lay open to the Turks who might have entered Belgrad in a month. But the Tsar now massed six Army Corps in Bessarabia, and General Ignatiev delivered an ultimatum to the Porte, demanding a cessation of hostilities within forty-

[1] His name was Georges Détroit, and he was the son of a poor musician of Magdeburg, of French extraction.

[2] Consul General White.

eight hours. The Porte was forced to yield, and an armistice was concluded with the two Slav Principalities for a period of six weeks.

As early as the beginning of October, Lord Derby had suggested a conference of the Powers as a counter to Prince Gorchakov's proposal of armed intervention, and upon the imposition of the Turko-Serbian armistice, he renewed the negotiations. The new Sultan, Abdul Hamid II., whose confidence in British support had been increased by two bellicose speeches made by Lord Beaconsfield at Aylesbury and the Guildhall, was not inclined to assent to a step which seemed to contravene the terms of the Treaty of Paris. Beaconsfield and Derby, however, regarded a conference as the only means of preventing a Russo-Turkish war, and succeeded in persuading the Sultan. Accordingly, on 11th December 1876, the delegates of the Powers met at Constantinople. But Abdul Hamid already exhibited all the characteristics of a subtle obstructionist. He relied on eventual British support in a war with Russia, and trusted that differences with Austria would force the Tsar to modify his attitude. He refused to grant autonomy to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria, and claimed that the proclamation of a constitution (23rd December) was sufficient guarantee of his intentions to introduce reforms.

In vain Lord Salisbury reminded Midhat of the fatal obduracy of Mahmud II. under similar circumstances. In the middle of January 1877 the delegates quitted Constantinople, having achieved nothing; and Salisbury remarked that he had done his best to save Turkey, but she would

not allow herself to be saved. A few days later Midhat fell, and Edhem and Redif, creatures of Abdul Hamid, became respectively Grand Vizier and Seraskier. The stifling régime of the "Great Assassin" had commenced.

VII

On 24th April Russia declared war on Turkey, a declaration which was welcomed by Mr Gladstone as the "knell of Turkish tyranny." Beaconsfield, in deference to public opinion, was forced to remain neutral; but in a note to Prince Gorchakov, Lord Derby reserved the right to intervene if British interests in Egypt or at Constantinople were threatened. Prince Charles of Rumania, with a Russian army on the Pruth, was unable to maintain his neutrality and concluded a military convention, whereby Russian troops were to be permitted to pass through his territories, although, as he wrote, "this will not be to the liking of most of the great Powers—but as they neither can, nor will, offer us anything, we cannot do otherwise. . . ."

Abdul Kerim Pasha, the Turkish commander-in-chief, proved utterly incompetent. If he had pursued the strategy of Omar in 1853 he might have prevented a Russian passage of the Danube, but he distributed his troops in small detachments on a wide front, and remained inactive while the enemy deployed into Wallachia.

At the beginning of July the Russians made a bridgehead between Nikopol and Sistovo, and while the Tsarevich Alexander held a large Turkish

army in the Quadrilateral, General Gourko captured Tirnovo by a lightning march, and crossing the Balkans, took the Shipka Pass by an attack in rear. But a fresh Turkish army under Suleiman Pasha landed at Enos from Montenegro, and advanced against the Russo-Bulgarian detachments south of the Balkans, while Osman Nuri Pasha marched from Vidin and occupied Plevna, on the flank of the Russian advance. Here he constructed a fortified camp and repulsed two Russian attacks on his positions. The Russians were forced to apply for the assistance of Rumanian troops, but when Prince Charles attacked the Plevna camp on 11th September he, too, suffered a disastrous repulse.

However, the baneful influence of Abdul Hamid proved the ruin of the Turks. A series of disgraceful intrigues allowed Osman to be isolated, and the machinations of Suleiman brought about the recall of Mahommed Ali, the capable German commander of the army of the Quadrilateral. The capitulation of Osman at Plevna on 10th December was the turning-point of the war. Gourko, recrossing the Balkans, took Sofia, routed Suleiman at Philippopolis, and drove the remnants of his army into the Rhodopé. The last Turkish army was surrounded at Shenovo, south of the Shipka, and laid down its arms. The fortresses of the Quadrilateral still held out, but on 20th January 1878 the Russians entered Adrianople.

The Serbians had again commenced hostilities, and while a detachment went to aid the Rumanians at the siege of Vidin, General Belimarkovich captured Pirot, Vranja, and Nish,

and reached the edge of the historic plain of Kossovo. The Montenegrins, who at the beginning of the campaign had resisted an invasion of the Zeta valley by Suleiman and Mahommed Ali, had, after the bulk of the Turkish armies were withdrawn to Bulgaria, captured Niksich, blockaded since 1875. When the Austrian Military Attaché forbade an advance on Mostar, Prince Nicholas turned towards the sea, and captured Spizza, Antivari, and Dulcigno.

In Armenia Count Louis Loris Melikov[1] had opened the campaign by the investment of Kars,

ERRATA.

Page 173.—Note at foot of page, *for* "Loris Melikor" *read* "Loris Melikov"; and *for* "Torquhassor" *read* "Torgukassov."

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carried Kars by assault. Mukhtar, defeated again at Deve Boyun, took refuge in Erzerum.

In Greece the Russian victories aroused universal enthusiasm, and there was a general desire that Greek troops should invade the neighbouring Turkish territories, then defended by only a few scattered battalions, augmented by Albanian irregulars. But the British Government obtained neutrality from the Greek Cabinet by the promise that the unredeemed Hellenes should receive equal "administrative reforms

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In Armenia Count Louis Loris Melikov[1] had opened the campaign by the investment of Kars, and the capture of Ardahan and Bayazid. But when the Russian reserves became exhausted, the Turks assumed the offensive and gained a series of small successes in the neighbourhoods of Batum and Bayazid, while a Russian defeat at Sevin was followed by the relief of Kars. But during September Russian reinforcements arrived and Loris Melikov, reassuming the defensive, defeated Ahmed Mukhtar at Aladja Dagh, and carried Kars by assault. Mukhtar, defeated again at Deve Boyun, took refuge in Erzerum.

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or advantages" with the other nationalities of Turkey. For two years there had been a desultory revolt in Crete, and now risings broke out in Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia. When the news of the Russian advance on Adrianople reached Athens, popular ardour could be restrained no longer, and on 2nd February 1878 the Greek Government announced that it had decided "to occupy provisionally with its army the Greek provinces of Turkey." But two days before (31st January) a Russo-Turkish armistice had been signed at Adrianople.

In England, public opinion had forgotten its horror of the "Bulgarian Atrocities" in admiration of the heroism of Osman at Plevna, and later, in apprehension of the Russian advance towards Constantinople. A chauvinistic wave swept across the country: the protests of Mr Gladstone and the hysterics of Professor Freeman fell on deaf ears. The Cabinet was divided, but Beaconsfield was in favour of armed intervention. In the first weeks of 1878 the British fleet moved to Besika Bay, and Parliament voted a war-credit of six millions. But when the British fleet entered the Dardanelles the Russians occupied San Stefano, a suburb of Constantinople.

VIII

In the meantime the Russian and Turkish plenipotentiaries were negotiating the terms of peace, and on 3rd March the Treaty of San Stefano was signed. It was of such a nature

that it is certain that Abdul Hamid would not have assented to it, had he not been convinced that the other Powers would never allow its terms to be carried into effect. Its chief feature was the creation of an autonomous principality of Bulgaria, with frontiers corresponding to those of the mediæval Tsardom, that is including Macedonia with the Ægean coast except Khalkidice and Uskub, Monastir, and the Lakes of Okhrida and Presba. Serbia and Montenegro were considerably enlarged, and Bosnia-Herzegovina became autonomous. Constantinople was thus separated from Salonika and from the remaining Turkish territories in Europe, Albania and Thessaly. In fact, the instrument had the triple effect of establishing a dominant Slav state in the Balkans, which it was intended should be a mere Russian dependency — "a second Finland"—of virtually destroying Turkish political and military power in Europe, and of blocking the Habsburg road to Salonika.

But the Tsar soon found himself confronted with the prospect of a coalition of those Powers with whose interests the Treaty of Stefano was most at variance. In the British Cabinet Lords Derby and Carnarvon, the two ministers opposed to war, resigned, and Beaconsfield brought Indian troops to Malta. Austria mobilised, and with Rumania, whose hostility had been aroused by a Russian demand for the retrocession of Southern Bessarabia, threatened the rear of the Russian armies in Bulgaria. The Tsar was accordingly forced to submit the peace-settlement to a congress of the Powers, which met at Berlin on 13th June,

under the presidency of Prince Bismarck. At the conference there were three contrary policies: that of Bismarck and Andrassy who designed, in accordance with the agreement made at Reichstadt, to secure for Austria the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and by able diplomacy to gain the predominating influence in Rumania and Serbia; that of Gorchakov who wished to maintain, as far as possible, the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano, especially in regard to the future status of the Bulgarian provinces; and that of Beaconsfield who endeavoured to check Russian influence in the Balkans, and to restore the position of Turkey as a European state.

Thus Beaconsfield worked to restrict the extension of Serbia and Montenegro and to limit the independence of Bulgaria, and failed to realise that in permitting the aggrandisement of Austria he was ignoring a far more potent menace to the maintenance of the Balance of Power in the Near East. Gorchakov proved sufficiently short-sighted to persist in demanding, apparently as a matter of political *amour-propre*, the retrocession of Southern Bessarabia, ceded to Moldavia by the Treaty of Paris. In return he offered Prince Charles the barren Dobrudja, inhabited by a majority of Bulgarians and Tatars. When the Rumanian delegation protested that Russia had guaranteed Rumania's integrity, Gorchakov retorted that it had been guaranteed against Turkey but not against Russia. And when the Rumanians appealed to Lord Salisbury, they received the answer[1] "that there were questions of more

[1] *The Balkans, a History*, D. Mitrany, p. 298.

concern to England, and should she succeed in coming to an understanding with Russia regarding them, she would not wage war for the sake of Rumania." Bismarck also supported the Russian demands, for he saw that an estrangement with Russia would compel Charles to seek an Austro-German alliance. And so Bessarabia was lost to Rumania—a qualification of the cynical observation that there is no gratitude in international politics.

The two Southern Slav states were ill-requited for two campaigns: Montenegro by Niksich in the Herzegovina, and districts in Albania; Serbia, by the recognition of her independence, and by the cession of Nish, Pirot, and Vranja. Austria received the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and undertook with Turkey the joint occupation of the Sanjak of Novi Bazaar—arrangements which were supported by Beaconsfield, who saw in this check to South Slav unity, a guarantee against future Pan-Slavist schemes.

With regard to Bulgaria, Britain, Germany, and Austria, supported by France, secured a settlement which involved that national disunion and political weakness, which had proved so pregnant of future complications, in the case of Moldo-Wallachia and Greece. Instead of the Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stefano, there was constituted a small "autonomous and tributary principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan," comprising the territory between the Danube and the Balkan range, with a capital at Sofia, and a port at Varna on the Black Sea. The districts inhabited by Bulgarians to the south of the Balkans were formed into the administrative

province of Eastern Rumelia, to be governed by a Christian vali, nominated by the Sultan, with the assent of the Powers, but it remained under the direct political and military control of the Sultan.

The fear of Russian influence had been the key-note of British obstruction to the formation of new states in South-Eastern Europe, but as in Greece, Serbia, and Rumania, so in Bulgaria the newly emancipated nation proved only anxious to be rid of all foreign tutelage.

Greece received no territorial extension, but the Powers promised to use their good offices with the Porte to obtain the cession of Epirus and Thessaly.

In Asia Minor, Russia obtained Kars and Batum, in lieu of part of the war indemnity. But on 4th June Sir H. Layard had signed the Cyprus Convention with Abdul Hamid, whereby Britain guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Sultan's Asiatic possessions, in return for which the Sultan promised to "introduce necessary reforms" with regard to the administration of the Armenian vilayets, and assigned to Britain the Island of Cyprus "to be occupied and administered by her."

Thus Beaconsfield achieved a decided triumph, for he had safeguarded what he regarded to be the vital requirements of Britain's Eastern policy, without recourse to armed force. In Cyprus he had secured an island which might serve as a naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean, and as a military *place d'armes* for the defence of Asia Minor or Egypt. But History might suggest that he was hardly justified when he called the Treaty of Berlin a "peace with honour." The Treaty was the last great reconstructive settlement of the

ancien régime. It was concluded in a spirit of shameless bargain, with a sublime disregard of elementary ethics, and in open contempt of the right of civilised peoples to determine their own future. It was essentially a temporary arrangement concluded between rival Imperialist states. And it sowed the seed of the crop of "Nationalist" wars and risings, in which the Balkan peoples were to be embroiled for the next half century.

IX

Of all the politicians assembled at Berlin in the summer of 1878, Bismarck alone showed the qualities of a far-seeing statesman. While Gorchakov was failing to create a Bulgaria which should make Russian influence predominant south of the Danube, and Beaconsfield to re-establish a Turkey whose existence he considered to be vital to British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, Bismarck achieved a settlement which tended to further Austro-German political influence in all the Near Eastern countries. Indeed, at Berlin, he may be said to have laid the foundations of that Triple Alliance, the sinister edifice of which was soon to overshadow all the states of Europe. By obtaining Bosnia-Herzegovina for Austria-Hungary, he increased the already large "subject" Slav element in the Dual Monarchy, and caused the Vienna dynasts and the Magyar land-owners to become still more dependent on the greater German State. By advocating the creation of a Bulgaria, he placed Rumania between two Slav

states, the lesser of which was separated from the greater by the Rumanian Dobrudja—essentially a "Bulgaria Irredenta." Hence, King Charles was obliged to seek the closer alliance of Austria, and to discourage Rumanian nationalist claims on Transylvania. Similarly the creation of a Bulgaria seemed to threaten Serbia, and inclined Prince Milan (King, 1880), always personally an Austrophile, towards an understanding with Vienna.

Finally, the suggestion by Bismarck that France should occupy Tunisia, estranged the relations of that country with Italy, and prepared public opinion in Italy for her entry into the Triple Alliance.

This clever policy was soon developed in the Treaty of Alliance signed between Bismarck and Andrassy at Gastein in September 1879. In May 1882 Italy became the third partner, and, while indignant patriots branded King Humbert as "the Austrian Colonel," Mancini virtually repudiated Italian Irredentism by consenting to guarantee the territorial integrity of Austria. A year later Bratianu interviewed Bismarck, and although Rumania never joined the Triple Alliance, Prince Charles pursued a foreign policy which was consistently friendly towards the Central Empires, a foreign policy supported by the aristocratic and capitalist parties, owing to Germany's large financial interests in their country, but opposed by the more extreme politicians, who deprecated the abandonment of Rumanian Irredentism in Transylvania. And in 1881 Chedomil Mijatovich, King Milan's foreign minister, signed a secret convention with Austria, agreeing to discourage

Slav propaganda in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in return for Austrian support to Serbian claims "in the direction of the Vardar valley."

Bismarck's cautious Imperialism[1] differed essentially from the hectic uncompromising Pan-Germanism of the Emperor William II. The Iron Chancellor had fought three aggressive wars, but to achieve German racial unity and economic solidarity, not to force on Europe the ruthless doctrine of "Deutschland über Alles." After 1871 he maintained that Germany was "satiated" (saturiet) with conquest, and required a long period of peace in which to consolidate her position in the world State-system.

His alliance with Russia and Austria, the first manifestation of which was the Andrassy Note of 1875, was designed to maintain the European *status quo*, to safeguard Germany from a sudden *revanche* by France, and to satisfy Russian Imperialism by a war in the Near East. He always wished to avoid war with Russia, and although he betrayed Gorchakov at the Congress of Berlin, he did not discontinue his good understanding with the Russian court.

He desired to create a powerful politico-economic Central European *bloc*, and saw that the maintenance and extension of Austria must be a vital part of the world-policy of Germany. He argued that the continuance of Habsburg domination over Hungarians, Slavs, and Rumanians was more advantageous to Germany than the incorporation of German-Austria in the new German

[1] R. W. Seton Watson, "Pan-German Aspirations in the Near East," *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, March 1878.

Empire. "He was glad to see," he once said to a deputation of German-Austrian students, "that the German-Austrians were such good Germans, but they could not prove this better than by making Austria strong. Germany needed them, and reckoned on them, but inside Austria." And so at the Congress of Berlin he effected a settlement, which both made Austria more dependent on Germany, and strengthened Austrian political influence in the south-eastern countries of Europe.

X

In strange contrast to the dominating spirit of the great Bismarck, was the sinister personality of Abdul Hamid. Physically a coward and contemptible in his private life, his superstition, his treachery, and his fanaticism, this stooping, tremulous "Shadow of God" proved sometimes an astute diplomatist, and always a consummate obstructionist. To make use of a colloquialism, it may be said that Abdul Hamid knew his Europe. He comprehended better than any statesman of his time the complications involved in the maintenance of the Balance of Power. He fully understood that only by that system did the Ottoman Empire continue to exist. He failed at the Constantinople Conference to precipitate a second Crimean War; but at San Stefano he gained a signal victory over Russian diplomacy. In the Rumelian question he succeeded again in frustrating Russian designs, and was sufficiently wise to permit the establishment of a strong

Bulgaria between the Pruth and Constantinople. In the Egyptian question he designed to set France against Britain, and he carried out his ruthless policy in Armenia, because he knew he could rely on the rivalries of Germany, Russia, and Britain. Finally, in Macedonia, he sought to involve Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece by patronising and persecuting, in turn, the nationals of either country. But always in the face of a united Concert of Europe he yielded, as over the Cretan question and the acceptance of the Mürsteg Programme.

His domestic policy reflected his personal cowardice. Raised to the throne after a series of palace-tragedies, he lived in perpetual fear of assassination or deposition. At first a puppet of Midhat, he soon disposed of that unfortunate king-maker, and set himself to regain the former absolute power of a Sultan, by causing the death or exile of all the more advanced Turks. During every year of his reign hundreds of intelligent Ottomans —Turks, Greeks, and Armenians—fled the country, and an army of spies was employed to hunt down those who showed any desire to adopt European habits or methods of government. Creatures of the Sultan filled all the administrative posts, both at Constantinople and in the provinces. Abdul Hamid himself lived isolated with his harem, and strictly guarded in his palace of Yildiz, and spent a considerable part of his day in perusing the detailed reports of his spies.

His Imperial policy was, broadly, concessions in Europe, except where the Mahommedan element predominated, and consolidation and exten-

sion in Asia. Thus after the War of 1877-78 he was willing to cede Thessaly to Greece, and to permit the union of Bulgaria and Rumelia, confining his demands to the retrocession of certain Mahommedan districts in the Rhodopé, although under the Treaty of Berlin he was entitled to intervene. But when the "Albanian League" was formed to prevent the cession of Gusinje and Plava to Montenegro (under the Treaty of Berlin), he gave the League his tacit support, and a demonstration by the fleets of the Powers became necessary to enforce the surrender of Dulcigno to Prince Nicholas in compensation for the two recalcitrant districts.

During the Nineteenth Century a process of consolidation in Asia had corresponded to that of disintegration in Europe. Mahmud had crushed the independent pashas and dereh beys of Anatolia and Armenia, and after the Syrian wars the Ottoman Government had subdued many of the Khurdish and Arab tribes, and restored a semblance of order even in the most distant provinces. A chronic state of brigandage on the Russian and Persian frontiers, and constant revolts in Mesopotamia, Khurdistan, and the Hedjaz did not prevent the Sultan's authority being effective in Erzerum, Baghdad, and Mecca.

Abdul Hamid with a vague consistency continued this process, calculated to eliminate the European and Christian, and to accentuate the Turkish and Mahommedan character of the Ottoman State. By massacre, sequestration, and proselytism, he sought to repress the large Armenian element in Asiatic Turkey—a prelude

to the ruthless Pan-Turanianism of the Young Turks. And by obstructing and intriguing against the British in Egypt, by sending preachers into the neighbouring Moslem countries, and by the construction of a "pilgrims" railway to the Holy Lands of Islam, he endeavoured to enhance the reputation of the Sultan of Turkey as Khalif. But all his efforts were spasmodic and lacking in energy. Even the construction of this Hedjaz Railway, to the expenses of which Moslems throughout the world subscribed (although its objects were rather military than pious), failed to conciliate the Arabs. The tribes of the Hedjaz and the Yemen remained for years in a state of revolt against the Turkish Government, another fact which tends to prove that the causes of the troubles between the Turks and their "subject" races were not religious but racial and political.

In the years following the Treaty of Berlin, the mutual interests of Britain and Turkey, which had caused Beaconsfield and Abdul Hamid to conclude the Cyprus Convention, ceased to be coincident. To Britain, established in Egypt, the maintenance of "the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire" was no longer of paramount importance, while Abdul Hamid's Mahommedan intrigues and his treatment of the Armenians were calculated to prejudice the Anglo-Turkish understanding.

At the same time considerations, political, military, and economic, suggested a rapprochement between Turkey and Austria and Germany. To Austria as to Turkey the repression of Balkan Nationalism was vital, while the interests of the

three empires were equally opposed to the future expansion of Russia.

After the disasters of 1877-78, the Sultan had secured the services of Von der Goltz Pasha and a German Military Mission to reorganise the Turkish army, while large numbers of the coming generation of officers were sent to military colleges in Germany. And the cumulative effect was to inculcate into the Turkish officer class a profound regard for German thought and German institutions.

Further, the completion of the railway between Constantinople and Belgrad (1888), which facilitated the transit to Central Europe of the raw materials of the Balkan countries, opened up the vast unexploited areas of Asia Minor to German enterprise.

The idea, originally propounded by von Moltke, the soldier, and Lizt and Rosher, the publicists, in the first half of the Nineteenth Century, that Germany should find in Asiatic Turkey "an economic substitute for the lack of a German Canada or Australia,"[1] was now enthusiastically propagated by Pan-German writers.

In 1886 Sprenger, the Orientalist, published his *Babylonia: the Richest Land of the Past, and the most Remunerative Field of Colonisation in the Present*, and in the following year Kaerger published a work which emphasised the suitability of Asia Minor as a field for colonisation. These works were followed during the next decade by Kannenburg's *Asia Minor's Natural Riches*, and by the profuse writings of Von der Goltz Pasha, Paul Rohrbach, Hugo Grothe, and others.

Official sanction was given to this movement,

[1] R. W. Seton Watson.

when in 1889 and 1898 the new German Emperor, William II., visited *le sultan massacreur* at Constantinople, and at Damascus proclaimed himself protector "for ever" of the Moslem world—an act of blatant effrontery aimed directly at Britain. Bismarck had fallen, and his shrewd if ruthless Imperialism had given place to an insensate Pan-Germanism, of which the Emperor William constituted himself the mouthpiece. For the wary diplomacy of the Iron Chancellor was substituted the puerile braggadocio which sent the Krüger telegram, and talked[1] hysterically of "shining armour" and "the Emperor of the Atlantic."

But the theatrical pilgrimages and oratorical indiscretions of the Hohenzollern, deserving of the pen of a Carlyle, corresponded to a crude though effective policy towards Turkey, the object of which was to gain the confidence of Abdul Hamid. A most astute and very able ambassador, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein achieved the position which Stratford de Redcliffe had held during the reign of Abdul Medjid, and General Ignatiev during that of Abdul Aziz. The first indication of the changed German attitude at Constantinople was given after the Armenian Massacres of 1896, when Berlin refused to countenance the intervention of the Powers. And German prestige was still further increased at Yildiz by the withdrawal of Germany and Austria from the Concert of Europe over the Cretan Question, and by the victory of the German-trained battalions in the Thessalian campaign of 1897.

[1] R. W. Seton Watson.

An energetic commercial programme, supported by the German Embassy at Constantinople, was the corollary to the military and academic propaganda and to the wanderings of the "Imperial commercial traveller." This "peaceful penetration" took the form principally of railway construction.

In 1883 the Porte violated the lease granted to a British company of the short line from Ismidt to Haidar Pasha, and disposed of it to a German group, which in 1889 formed itself into the Anatolian Railway Company. In 1893 this Company received a concession to extend their line to Konieh.

Five years later, when the German Emperor paid his second visit to the Sultan, definite propositions were brought forward to extend the Haidar Pasha-Konieh line to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf, and in the House of Commons Mr Balfour supported the enterprise. In 1903 operations were commenced, and the construction of the railway has continued until the present date (1919), the chief difficulty having been experienced in the tunnelling of the Taurus and Amanus ranges. It cannot be denied that the railway must have benefited the inhabitants of the districts through which it passed, but, even under these circumstances, it was not a remunerative financial undertaking. The object of the German railway penetration of Asia Minor was primarily military, and this was perceived at an early date by the Russian Government, who vetoed a proposed extension of the Haidar Pasha-Angora Railway towards the Russo-Turkish frontier.

XI

The thirty years which followed the Treaty of Berlin were years of social and economic reconstruction in the Balkan countries. In the Fifteenth Century the Balkan races had sunk, drugged beneath the "Turkish Night," and they awoke in the Nineteenth Century to the task of doing all that four hundred years of barbarian rule had left undone. But the Turkish Night had but dawned on the Austrian Day. "Economic boycott" could prove as deadly as the arms of Bayazid, European diplomacy more inexorable than Mahommed the Conqueror.

Although it would be absurd to assert that the lot of the populations of the Balkan countries was not alleviated by the departure of the Turks from the lands they had "desolated and profaned," their condition continued to be none of the happiest. German kings sat enthroned at Bukharest, Sofia, and Athens, and an Austrian puppet at Belgrad. The ignorance of the masses fostered the growth of a class of parasitical politicians who, whatever their professed opinions, had but one object—the acquisition of a lucrative post in the government. The constitutional history of the Balkans in the Nineteenth Century is one long chronicle of swiftly changing ministries, composed of men of swiftly changing opinions. There were exceptions, men of real ability and of genuine patriotism—such as Trikoupis in Greece, Stambulov in Bulgaria, Ristich in Serbia, Bratianu in Rumania—who proved of invaluable service to their country. But too often

it was a charlatan who manipulated the ballot-boxes, distributed the government appointments, and sold the concessions. And meanwhile, the foreign kings plotted at Constantinople and in the capitals of the Powers. However, the gradual spread of education and the flooding of the country with foreign capital—German in Rumania, Austrian in Serbia, Italian in Montenegro, and German and Italian in Greece — brought many material benefits to the people. It is interesting to note the effects which so-called self-government produced in the newly emancipated races. In Greece and Rumania the proverbial hysteria in the Latin character was shown in constant riots, political crises, and *coups d'état*: in Serbia, political activity was confined largely to the officer and bourgeois classes: and in Bulgaria, the strong Tatar strain in his blood caused the Bulgarian peasant to evince an apathy towards local politics, only equalled by that of the Anatolian Turk. The nationalist idea alone held the imagination of the average peasant — Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek — perhaps because it appealed to their primitive predatory instincts. The political agitator who raised the carking cry of Irredentism, the village priest who preached a Holy War, or the brigand who wished to raid a frontier village, were alike assured of an enthusiastic following.

The wars of 1875-78 were but a stage in the century-old Eastern question; the Treaty of Berlin was but the most temporary of settlements. The same elements of disorder continued to contribute to the atmosphere of general unrest—an unrest which was to culminate in the disastrous events of

1912-18. The devious machinations of the semi-official underworlds of Vienna and St Petersburg, the cynical obstructionism and calculating apathy of Abdul Hamid, the fanaticism, the inefficiency, or the ignorance of his pashas, the ambitions and rivalries of the Balkan kings, the multitudinous plottings and *coups d'état* of the adventurer-politicians, the nefarious activities of patriot brigands, the grim slaughterings of Bulgar by Turk, of Albanian by Serb, of Greek by Albanian, and Bulgar by Greek—ignorant peasants killing indiscriminately for Padishah or Exarch or Patriarch, uncouth savages cutting each other's throats in the name of Mahommed or Jesus—these were the elements of disorder.

"The grim raw races springing and rushing forward in all directions frighten one a good deal," once wrote a diplomat. But the spectacle of the heads of the civilised world, in their palaces in the capitals of Europe, setting these same "grim raw races" to kill and kill, was matter to frighten thinking men "a good deal" more. Abdul, called "the Great Assassin," "the Red Sultan," and other opprobrious terms, plotter of Armenian massacres and various infamies, was not worse than these. "Throughout the Turkish Empire, Austria was the Power which had the largest number of *cafés chantants* and registered brothels. In the neighbourhoods of Uskub and Kossovo, which were largely inhabited by Albanians, the Albanian chiefs were greatly displeased with an Austrian consul who sheltered under his flag gambling houses, brothels, and other disorderly houses. The chiefs declared that their young men were robbed and

demoralised by the debauchery protected under the Austrian flag"[1]—a passage to cause the future satirist to smile, when he studies the history of our age.

The first "springing and rushing forward" after the Treaty of Berlin took place in Bulgaria, when in September 1885 certain officers seized Philippopolis by a *coup d'état*, and declared the union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria. The Russian Government, reversing their policy at San Stefano and Berlin, requested the Sultan to intervene; but Abdul Hamid, as has been noted, refrained from doing so, and Lord Salisbury supported the union. A series of discreditable Russian intrigues followed, and King Milan of Serbia, prompted by dynastic requirements, undertook an adventurous advance on Sofia, at the moment when all the Russian officers had resigned from the Bulgarian army. Nevertheless he was signally defeated at Slivnitza and Pirot, and only the intervention of Vienna saved Belgrad. The Tsar finally compelled Alexander of Battenberg, the spirited young Prince of Bulgaria, to abdicate, but his triumph was ineffectual. The Union had been achieved and Stambulov, who became Regent, proved the saviour of his country. The son of an innkeeper of Tirnovo, Stephen Stambulov has been compared to the great Bismarck. A ruthless and unscrupulous politician, and an audacious statesman, he was the only man who could have secured the moral and political independence of his country, alike of Turkey and Russia. Like the elder Bratianu, he perceived the importance of a foreign

[1] Pears, *Life of Abdul Hamid*, p. 287.

prince to establish the diplomatic status of a young country. In December 1886 Prince Ferdinand of Coburg received at Vienna a Bulgarian deputation, headed by the Rumelian deputy Kaltchev, who came to offer him the princely crown, "his name first having been suggested to M. Kaltchev at the marble-topped table of a Viennese circus." In the following July Ferdinand was proclaimed Prince of Bulgaria at Tirnovo. With his devotion to botany and etiquette, this grandson of Louis Philippe was a singularly uncongenial character to the rough Bulgarian peasants who had adored their soldier Battenberg. In his theatricalism and verbosity he resembled the Emperor William as Stambulov resembled Bismarck. But, although his policy was always personal, he proved himself a clever diplomatist, if not a far-seeing statesman, and throughout his reign he succeeded at home in making the royal authority supreme, and abroad in placating and deceiving Russia and Turkey.

In Greece the acquisition of Thessaly had not satisfied the nationalist demagogues, and when an insurrection broke out in Crete, a delirious public called for war with Turkey. King George was compelled to declare war to save his throne; but while orators at Athens recalled the heroics of the War of Independence, Edhem Pasha unexpectedly overran Thessaly (1897), and the Powers intervened to secure the return of that province to Greece, and also the pacification of Crete.

In Serbia, Milan the Austrophile had fallen, but Alexander his son, by a series of autocratic measures and an unfortunate marriage, had made himself exceedingly unpopular. In the summer of

1903 a plot to assassinate him was conceived by a band of disgruntled politicians and ambitious officers, and one night the last of the Obrenovichi and his childless queen were done to death with a savagery peculiar to human beings, yet called inhuman—an omen and a portent for the unhappy Autocrat over whom Black Sunday already loomed, and for certain Teutonic princelings of the "sabre-rattling" species. From atmosphere of Parisian cafés, came wizened little Peter Karageorgevich, veteran of two wars, and able translator of Stuart Mill, to be a "a true constitutional King of Serbia."

XII

The restoration of the Karageorgevich dynasty coincided with a revival of the spirited anti-Turkish foreign policy, which had been pursued by the predecessors of Milan.

The "nationalist" ambitions of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece were centred on the ancient territory of Macedonia, comprising the three Turkish administrative vilayets of Kossovo, Uskub, and Salonika. Macedonia was inhabited by a considerable population of Albanians, Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks, by a few thousand Circassians, Turks, and Tatars, and by scattered shepherd-tribes of Latin extraction, the Kutzo-Wallachs, claimed by the Rumanians to be of Rumanian, and by Greeks to be of Greek origin, while the town of Salonika contained a population of 80,000 Spanish Jews, of strong Turcophile sympathies. By means of schools, churches, and intimidation

by armed bands, the Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks endeavoured to forward their own claims in these disputed lands. For in the event of the expulsion of the Turk, the Serbian Government designed to acquire the Vardar valley and an outlet to the Ægean at Salonika; the Bulgarian, the boundaries of the Treaty of San Stefano, which included Uskub, Monastir, and a sea-board on the Ægean; and the Greek, Salonika and its hinterland, which would give them effective control of the Vardar and the Struma valleys. The Rumanian Government exploited the Kutzo-Wallachs with the view of obtaining eventual compensation elsewhere.

Abdul Hamid pursued the time-honoured Imperial policy of *divide et impera*, for he considered that to increase the confusion among the heterogeneous population of Macedonia, was the means best calculated to maintain the Ottoman authority. Following that policy which in 1871 had created the Bulgarian Exarchate as a counter-force to the Greek Patriarchate, he alternately conceded to and withdrew privileges from the Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek "nationalist" clergy in Macedonia.

Of the three rival races, the Bulgarians carried on the most active propaganda. Many Macedonians had risen to high positions in the Bulgarian Government and army, and thousands of refugees from the affected regions formed a restless element in the south-western districts of Bulgaria. In 1894 the fall of Stambulov gave fresh impetus to promiscuous chauvinism. A Macedonian Committee was formed, with a programme

advocating "Macedonia for the Macedonians," that is the creation of an autonomous Macedonia under a governor-general "belonging to the predominant nationality." It was presumed that this nationality would be Bulgarian, and that the execution of such a project would be but preliminary to the incorporation of the whole of Macedonia in Bulgaria. But in 1900 the murder of a Rumanian professor, who was a protagonist of the claims of the Kutzo-Wallachs, almost precipitated a Rumano-Bulgarian war, and resulted in the arrest and trial of the leaders of the Committee.

During the same period fierce encounters were of daily occurrence between Albanian and Serbian bands in Old Serbia, and between Greek and Bulgarian comitadji and Turkish irregulars in Southern Macedonia.

The situation became so threatening during the winter of 1902-3 that the Sultan was constrained to appoint Hilmi Pasha, a man universally esteemed and a favourite of the ambassadors, Inspector-General of Macedonia. But although Hilmi put forward many excellent proposals of reform, they were all negatived at the Palace.

At last, in February 1903, the Austrian and Russian governments attempted a limited intervention, and drew up a scheme of reform, suggesting the appointment of an Inspector-General for a fixed number of years, the reorganisation of the gendarmerie under the superintendence of foreign officers, and certain financial arrangements. The Sultan appeared to accept this scheme, but its sole result was a revolt of the Albanians of Kossovo, possibly inspired from Yildiz, and the

murder of the Russian consuls at Mitrovitza and Monastir. The disorders continued. During the summer King Edward visited Vienna, and the Emperors Nicholas and Francis Joseph met at Mürsteg.

The result was the submission to the Sultan of the Mürsteg Programme, which provided for the attachment of Austrian and Russian civil agents to Hilmi Pasha, for the reorganisation of the gendarmerie under military officers of the Powers, and for administrative and judicial reforms. Abdul Hamid refused to consent to these proposals (March 1904) but eventually accepted a compromise.

Nevertheless, his calculating obstructionism succeeded in making the reforms ineffectual, and in frustrating the efforts of the European officers. "We are helpless, we can do no more than look on," said Colonel Verand, one of the gendarmerie officers. The Russian Government was involved in the Manchurian War and the subsequent internal troubles, and it was evident that Austria was insincere and unwilling to press the Porte to carry out reforms, because "she was afraid that disorder in Macedonia might be too completely suppressed. . . . She and Germany now acted together, and it soon became the popular and not unfounded opinion that the districts for which they had the appointment of gendarmerie officers saw little of the keen activity which those under British and French officers witnessed in the desire of the officers placed in charge to secure effective police . . . the supineness of the Austrian consuls and other officials in Macedonia was generally put

down to the desire of the Ballplatz to let things go from bad to worse, when possibly all Europe would agree to invite Austria to enter the province for the preservation of order. . . . The belief in her double dealing is not without evidence. That the Turks themselves suspected it, is well known."[1]

Between 1904 and 1908 the situation became steadily worse. "Greek and Bulgarian bands waged civil war against each other. Murders, thefts, attacks upon villages by men of a hostile race; sometimes upon no pretext whatever, except if, by Greeks, that the village was Bulgarian, or *vice versa;* at other times on the pretext that the villagers had given aid to rival bands; Turkish troops now joining one side, now another. Farms were deserted; mines were abandoned. . . . Every year saw a larger amount of emigration to America and other foreign countries. . . . People of all races were seeking the means of getting out of the country. . . . Macedonia had become a pandemonium."[2]

XIII

The political condition of European Turkey in 1908 was not dissimilar to that previous to the crisis of 1875-78. The same causes—anarchy, administrative incompetence, and threatened intervention on the part of Great Powers—produced the same effect, a revolution, essentially Turkish and Mahommedan in character and programme,

[1] Sir Edwin Pears' *Life of Abdul Hamid*, pp. 278-281.
[2] *Ibid.*, 279-280.

having as its object administrative reform in order to forestall foreign intervention and a consequent weakening of Turkish power.

Abdul Hamid's suicidal policy had alienated the majority of intelligent Turks. The prospect of a foreign occupation of Macedonia finally roused them to action. A movement was directed against Abdul Hamid, similar to that which, thirty-two years before, under similar circumstances, had brought about the fall of Abdul Aziz.

During the last years of the Nineteenth Century, small bodies of discontented Moslems had been formed both in Macedonia and the Asiatic provinces, who openly voiced disgust with the Sultan's régime. These men came into communication with the emissaries of the Turkish exiles in Paris and Geneva, who had begun to undertake a serious propaganda against the government of Yildiz. In 1891 a "Committee of Union and Progress" had been formed at Geneva, which occupied itself in organising small committees of from five to seven members in different parts of Albania, Macedonia, and Anatolia. At Paris, Ahmed Riza, "in the dingy little flat in the somewhat dreary Place Monge," edited his paper *Mechveret*,[1] which was smuggled into every garrison town of the Empire. For the Young Turks found their most ready converts among the officers.

Ahmed Riza, the philosopher, the disciple of Auguste Comte, was the brain of the Young Turk movement. His formula "Oh! non-Moslem Ottomans, Oh! Moslem Ottomans," expressed his programme. He desired to create an Ottoman

[1] Macdonald, *Turkey and the Eastern Question*, p. 55.

and not a Turkish state, to fuse Turk and Arab, Armenian and Khurd, Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian into one nation, the Ottoman nation. "We shall as statesmen," he said, "place the Koran and the Bible on an equal footing. But in our reconstitution of the Ottoman Empire, administrative conformity must be absolute. Autonomy is treason; it means separation. Our Christian compatriots shall be Ottomanised citizens. We shall no longer be conquerors and slaves, but a new nation of free men."[1] His practical programme comprised a constitutional monarchy, the revival of Midhat's Constitution, and the convocation of an Ottoman Parliament. The Committee was at first composed almost entirely of Moslems, but later it admitted a few Christian Ottomans and Salonika Jews.

It numbered several members of the Royal House, including Prince Sabah-ed-din, an accomplished young man, "master of Parisian French, tumultuously fluent of speech, lively in gesture," and that subtle politician, former follower of Midhat, Damad[2] Mahmud Djelal-ed-din Pasha, who had fled with his two sons to Paris. But many of the principal figures were not Turks, such as Hussein Djavid and Carasso, who were Salonika Jews; Talaat, a Pomak; Riza, whose mother was a German; and Enver, who was half a Pole.

In 1906 a "Central Committee," composed of the most active members of the C.U.P., was constituted at Salonika, and in the following

[1] Macdonald, *Turkey and the Eastern Question*, p. 55.
[2] Damad means "brother-in-law of the Sultan."

year Ahmed Riza formed another branch at Paris. The agents of the C.U.P. were now at work everywhere throughout the Empire, and it is incredible that Abdul Hamid, with his army of spies, was unaware of their organisation. But he continued to underestimate their strength.

The C.U.P. acted with startling suddenness. In the summer of 1908 Signor Tittoni, the Italian Premier, had spoken in favour of provincial autonomy for Macedonia, and this fact considered in conjunction with the meeting of King Edward and the Emperor Nicholas at Reval caused the Young Turks to think that intervention was impending. At the beginning of July Niazi Bey, head of the Monastir C.U.P., took to the hills with a few hundred men, and Shemshi Pasha, sent to capture his band, was shot in the streets of Monastir. Abdul Hamid took fright, and on 22nd July appointed the Liberal Kutchuk Said Pasha, Grand Vizier, in succession to his creature, Ferid. But the concession came too late. The very next day Enver Bey proclaimed the Constitution at Salonika, and the Second and Third Army Corps prepared to march on the capital. Abdul Hamid found that he could not trust his Albanian troops; telegrams continued to reach him demanding the proclamation of the Constitution; on 29th July he yielded. The restoration of the Constitution was proclaimed, together with the freedom of the Press and the abolition of the spy system.

The triumph of the Committee was complete; the exiles began to pour into Constantinople. The equality of Moslem and Christian was enthusiastically acclaimed; the comitadji bands laid down

their arms; Greek fraternised with Bulgar, and Albanian with Serb; a Turk was imprisoned for insulting a Christian; and Moslems joined in a memorial service for the victims of the Armenian massacres. In the universal goodwill, the iniquities of Abdul Hamid were forgotten and cheers for the Sultan were mingled with cheers for the Constitution. "Henceforth," cried Riza, "we are all brothers; under the same blue sky we are all equal, we glory in being Ottomans."

The credit of Britain rose as that of Germany, the supporter of the Hamidian régime, declined, and Sir Gerard Lowther, the new ambassador, was received with an enthusiastic ovation when he arrived at Constantinople. For a few weeks it seemed as though Riza's millennium were indeed a reality. But the impossible had not been achieved. The Committee could not trust Abdul Hamid, and it soon became evident that he was plotting a counter-revolution. A multitude of discharged officials and unemployed spies formed a discontented element in the capital, while many of the more fanatical Turks regarded the revolution as a "Macedonian Victory." And Abdul's money circulated freely among the men of his favourite Albanian regiments. There was dissension among the Young Turks themselves: the followers of Ahmed Riza were irreconcilable fusionists; they persisted that "autonomy is treason," and refused to entertain any scheme which comprehended it. On the other hand, the party of Sabah-ed-din and Ismail Kiamil Bey, the "Liberal Entente," advocated decentralisation and provincial but not ethnical autonomy. But both parties were

ardent Imperialist-Unionists, both adhered to the doctrine of Turkification.

The principles and the ideals of the Young Turks were incompatible. They proclaimed the equality of all races and creeds, yet they desired to create this "new Ottoman nation." The other races must be welded into Ottomans round the nucleus of the Turkish minority. And there could be no equality of treatment in that. By a logical sequence of facts, the Young Turks were from the first compelled to a policy of Turkification. "Give us," said Nazim Pasha, "thirty years of universal education, and we shall create our new Ottoman People." But five hundred years of Ottoman rule had failed to fuse the Slav and the Greek, the Armenian and the Arab, with the Turk. The General Election for the Ottoman Parliament was the first great test of the sincerity of the Young Turks. If the elections had been fairly conducted the Turkish vote would have been swamped. The alternatives lay before them either of allowing the non-Turkish majority to exercise its due weight at the polls, and subsequently in the Parliament and the Government, or of manipulating the voting in favour of the "Turkish" candidates. They not unnaturally adopted the second alternative, and consequently an overwhelming and absolutely unrepresentative Turkish majority was returned. The Young Turks then proceeded to suppress the Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek "Constitutional Clubs," social and educational organisations formed in European Turkey immediately after the revolution, on the pretext that they were "nationalist" societies. Further, the privileges, religious and

judicial, which the Christians had enjoyed before the revolution, were withdrawn on the grounds that they were incompatible with the principle of equality.

XIV

The attitude of the neighbouring states also tended to increase the difficulties of the new administration.

The revolution, welcomed so ingenuously and so whole-heartedly by Western Liberals, was regarded with disfavour and apprehension by the diplomats of Berlin, Vienna, and Buda-Pesth, and by the Balkan "nationalist" politicians. Germany, aware of the ebullient enthusiasm for British institutions at Constantinople, feared the establishment of a strong Anglophile government, and a revival of the Turko-British entente of the days of Palmerston and Beaconsfield; Austria feared that the Turkish administration in Macedonia might be reformed from within, strengthened, and confirmed, and that the necessity for an Austrian occupation might vanish; and the Balkan Imperialists saw that such a restoration of order in the "Macedonian cockpit" would invalidate their expansionist-Irredentist propaganda.

Accordingly, while von Bieberstein at Constantinople intrigued with the more adventurous spirits of the Committee of Union and Progress, the Austrian and Balkan statesmen concerted a surprising series of *coups d'état*. At Buda-Pesth, Prince Ferdinand met the Emperor Francis Joseph, and they agreed on joint action should Turkey or

Serbia attempt to resist the intended measures. On 5th October at Tirnovo, the ancient capital, Ferdinand was proclaimed Tsar of an Independent Bulgaria. Two days later Austria-Hungary formally annexed the occupied provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and the Cretans proclaimed their union with Greece. For several weeks a dangerous crisis threatened. The Turks ordered a boycott of Austrian goods, which caused serious harm to the trade of the Dual Monarchy; the military party in Serbia, headed by the wild and irresponsible Crown Prince George, called for war with Austria, and the Serbian Foreign Minister, M. Milovanovich, and Prince Nicholas demanded territorial compensation in Bosnia which should unite the two Slav kingdoms. But although Great Britain protested against the infraction of the Treaty of Berlin, it was well known that the German Government was prepared to support Vienna, while Signor Tittoni stigmatised the former anomalous position of Austria in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a "diplomatic fiction." The Russian Government, exhausted by the Manchurian War and internal disorders, was not in a position to object; in fact M. Isvolski, the Russian Foreign Minister, professed that his Government had "not the right to protest alone."

Finally, both the Bosnian and Bulgarian questions were settled by the payment of considerable indemnities to the Turkish Government. But the Cretan question was not terminated until the following summer, when the Young Turks, feeling themselves strong enough to resist Greek nationalism, instituted a boycott of Greek goods,

and threatened the kingdom with war. Consequently, the Greek Government was forced to repudiate the Cretan Unionists, a step which created widespread discontent, and led to the establishment of the dictatorship of the Military League (29th August 1909).

XV

Meanwhile, Abdul Hamid had fallen.

The months which followed the Proclamation of the Constitution had been months of disillusionment. There was discontent in the capital; no abatement of disorder in the provinces; the troops became undisciplined; the Law Courts remained unreformed; the finances were chaotic; the Christians were disappointed and the mass of the Mussulmans angry; Albanians, Macedonians, and Arabs alike objected to the C.U.P.'s measures of Turkification; and revolts and mutinies had broken out in the Hedjaz.

The Parliament was opened on 15th December, but it proved as farcical and as ineffectual as "Midhat's Parliament" in 1876: it was absolutely controlled by the C.U.P., and was eventually discredited by voting the removal of the conscientious and honest old Vizier, Kiamil, who happened to offend the "wire-pullers."

Under these circumstances the reactionaries began to raise their heads. A "Mahommedan Association" was formed whose object was to oppose the Committee. It claimed to be working to prevent the Government from falling into the

hands of the non-Moslem elements, and to be ambitious for the restoration of the rule of the Sacred Law.

Finally, on 13th April, a mutiny broke out among the regiments in the capital. The Mahommedan soldiery paraded the streets with cries of "Down with the Constitution," "Down with the Committee," "Long live the Sacred Law"; two Young Turk ministers were shot; the offices of *Tanin*, the organ of the Committee, were wrecked; Ahmed Riza, Mahmud Mukhtar, and other prominent Young Turks and many deputies took flight; Hilmi, the new Vizier, a nominee of the Committee, gave place to Tewfik, and Abdul Hamid published a pardon to the mutinous troops. Had he immediately put himself at the head of the reaction, and openly pronounced against the Committee, it is possible that the movement might have been successful. But Abdul Hamid hesitated; he contented himself with intriguing and inciting the disorderly Mahommedan elements, through his agents and spies. And while he hesitated, the Committee acted. Mahmud Shevket Pasha, the Commandant of Salonika, marched on Constantinople; he interviewed the fugitive deputies at San Stefano; and on 25th April, in face of a half-hearted resistance, entered the capital. The miserable Abdul, "a broken-down man, went in fear of his life." On the 27th the Parliament voted his deposition, after obtaining the sanction of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and proclaimed his younger brother Rechid, Sultan, under the title of Mahommed V. The same afternoon, a deputa-

tion, including a Jew and a Christian, read the Fetva of Deposition to Abdul Hamid, the Khalif—a spectacle to outrage orthodox Islam. But the "Lieutenant of God upon Earth," the Khunkiar or Bloody One, asked only for his life. "The last three or four days," says Pears, "had told heavily upon him. His beard had lost its dye and the hair showed grey." When the officers arrived in the evening to remove him, "he appeared very much agitated, with his hands in his pockets, doubtless clutching two revolvers, apparently convinced that the troops intended to kill him." An evil man was Abdul, an accomplished trickster, a wholesale butcher, but a pathetic human figure now, a poor little old man "with bent figure and ashy face," whose "beard had lost its dye," who "shuffled rather than walked," and wore a fez and overcoat "much too large for him." And so he departed for the Villa Allatini, Salonika, with melancholy cortège of women and "a favourite Angora cat"—tragic phantom of the savage splendour that was Turkey.

The new Sultan proved little more than a figure-head, and the Young Turks were at liberty to pursue their policy of unification. The results of this policy had been disappointing before the fall of Abdul Hamid: they were now deplorable. The abolition of the Macedonian Constitutional Clubs: the attempts to force the Turkish language on the Greeks, Albanians, and Arabs: the encouragement given to the immigration of Bosnian Moslems into Macedonia: and the enforcement of the census and conscription in Albania, produced a state of anarchy, as wide-

spread as in the worst days of the late Sultan. The comitadji bands reappeared in Macedonia, and the former disorders recommenced in that unhappy province; a formidable rebellion broke out among the Albanian Mussulmans; the Druses of the Hauran revolted; a new Mahdi, Said Idris, arose in the Yemen; the islanders of the Dodekanese complained of the withdrawal of their privileges, and the Cretans protested against the presence of Moslem judges.

Throughout the years 1909-11 the Turks were engaged in a costly campaign in the Albanian hills, where the Khurdish Hamidieh troops committed appalling atrocities. A consistent policy of repression in Macedonia, Armenia, Syria, and Arabia, combined with an uncompromising attitude during the settlement of the Cretan Question, and the resolution passed by the Congress of the C.U.P. in 1910, to exclude all non-Turks from the Central Committee, were signs that the futile reactionism of Abdul Hamid had but given place to the stark anti-Christian illiberalism of a chauvinistic military clique, imbued with all the old ideas of the superiority of the Turk over the Arab, the Slav, the Armenian, and the Greek. Ahmed Riza's vision of a "new Ottoman nation" had vanished. And it was but a vision. There could be no "new Ottoman nation." The Young Turkish movement was essentially Pan-Turkish. From the first, the strength of the Committee rested on the Turkish spirit of dominance—of the right of conquest. There could be no reconciliation, no fusion of the conquering soldier clan and the indigent "subject races." Even had the "subject races" been willing

to be fused into the "new Ottoman nation," the Turkish Mahommedan would never have permitted equal rights to the despised Christian. To the last, in spite of five hundred years of interbreeding, the Turk remained the dominant clan, the alien administrative caste—the "army of occupation."

The military programme of the Young Turks was consistent with their policy of Pan-Turkish Imperialism. Their greatest energies and the major part of their revenues were devoted to the reformation and reorganisation of the army and navy. The navy, the third strongest in Europe, on the death of Abdul Aziz, had been allowed by Abdul Hamid to sink into a condition of deplorable decrepitude. For thirty years his ironclads had rusted in the Golden Horn. Now, a British Naval Mission, under Admiral Gamble, and subsequently under Admirals Williams and Sir A. Limpus, undertook the reconstitution of the Turkish navy, while two dreadnoughts were ordered to be built in English yards—developments which tended to augment British influence at Constantinople. But concurrently Marshal von der Goltz and his colleagues were reorganising the Turkish army, while the active von Bieberstein was engaged in cultivating the friendship of the leaders of the C.U.P. and in restoring German prestige to the height it had attained under Abdul Hamid.

XVI

But the crude reconstruction of the Young Turks was interrupted by perhaps the most unashamed act of aggression of an age in which European and American public opinion has condoned, on the grounds of economic necessity, unprovoked attacks by the strong on the weak, in almost every part of the globe. In Tripoli there was not that misgovernment or that interference in the rights of nationals, which has formed the recognised pretext for intervention by the Great Powers in the affairs of their smaller neighbours—of Britain in South Africa, Egypt, and Persia, of Russia in Turkey and China, of France in North Africa and Cochin China, of Japan in Korea, of Italy in Abyssinia, and of America in the Philippines and Cuba. The population of the Tripoli vilayet was almost entirely Mahommedan and contented enough under the somewhat lax rule of the Ottoman authorities, while the grievances of a few Italian subjects were not of a nature to form a pretext for war. But Italian politicians have never been over-scrupulous as regards the ethics of their actions, and the Italian people is subject to that unfortunate failing, peculiar to the whole Latin race, that unreasoning chauvinism of which d'Annunzio is the voice, that hysterical sensationalism which seems to require a war or a revolution every thirty years.

But it would be unjust to blame one nation or one group of politicians for a policy which was the outcome of the philosophy of centuries—of the

acceptance of the fact that "might is right," that life is a "struggle for existence." In international politics it has been proved that a strong man may rob a weak man, so long as the robbery does not affect the interests of another strong man. Well might Pierre Loti cry, a Voice in the Wilderness, "*Quelle dérision que tous ces grands mots vides: progrès, pacifisme, conférences, et arbitrages.*"

The average Italian nationalist could justify the invasion of Tripoli, as a measure to maintain the Balance of Power in the Mediterranean. The Italians, we are told, regarded Tripoli "as their share of the Turkish Empire," and to them it seemed just that they should occupy it to compensate for the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the establishment of the French Protectorate over Morocco. As late as June 1911 Signor Tittoni declared that his foreign policy had as basis "the maintenance of the *status quo* and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire"; but less than three months later war was declared on Turkey, to the joyous enthusiasm of a public who had already forgotten the tragedy and the shame of Adowa. "*Pauvre, belle et pimpante Italie!*" philosophises Loti, "*Est-ce que sincèrement elle s'imagine marcher à la gloire.*"

The superiority of the Italian fleet prevented the despatch of Turkish reinforcements to Tripoli, although Enver, always an audacious soldier, managed to make his way thither from his Berlin Embassy to organise the resistance. The few thousand Turkish troops and their Arab auxiliaries maintained a stubborn defensive, and it was only after much costly fighting that the Italians were

able to consolidate their occupation of the coast towns, preliminary to the conquest of the oases of the interior.

Meanwhile, the Italian fleet bombarded Prevesa and San Giovanni di Medua, but was recalled from the Adriatic on the remonstrances of the Austrian Government. However, squadrons visited the Red Sea and the Syrian coast, and bombarded the Turkish barracks at Samos and the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles, while Italian troops occupied Rhodes, Kos, and the ten smaller islands of the Dodekanese.

On 18th October 1912 the Young Turkish Government, confronted with the prospect of a Balkan war, concluded the Treaty of Lausanne, by which the Turkish vilayets of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, designated by the Italians as Libya, were ceded to the kingdom of Italy. The Italians were to evacuate the Dodekanese immediately after the evacuation of Libya by Ottoman troops, a proceeding which they have never carried out, under pretext of the non-fulfilment of the Treaty by the Turks, whose Arab auxiliaries continued to carry on a protracted resistance in the interior of Tripoli.

XVII

Before the signature had been affixed to the Treaty of Lausanne the Young Turks found themselves engaged in another and far more serious war.

It has been observed that the events of 1908 reacted on all the states bordering on Turkey,

and not least on Serbia and Greece. The aggrandisement of Bulgaria, and the final annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria, combined with the apparent understanding between the rulers of the two aggressing countries, gave rise to grave misgivings in Serbia. These events were believed to constitute part of a definite conspiracy directed against the independence of the South Slavonic kingdom.

The revival, on the restoration of the Karageorgevichi, of the Pan-Slavist agitation in the Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary had caused the Viennese dynasts to adopt an even more oppressive anti-nationalist policy in those provinces, partitioned for administrative purposes into the three historical divisions of Dalmatia, Croatia-Slavonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Dalmatia was a province of Austria and sent deputies to the Austrian Reichsrath, Croatia-Slavonia was the property of the Hungarian Crown, and sent representatives to the Diet at Buda-Pesth, while Bosnia-Herzegovina, until 1908, was deprived of all popular representation as being technically a province of the Ottoman Empire. Thus the Southern Slavs were hopelessly divided, and the Habsburg administration made every effort to accentuate this division, by preventing the construction of railway communications between the three provinces, by obstructing commercial intercourse, by promoting and exploiting the differences between Roman Catholic and Orthodox, and by encouraging Slav emigration and the immigration of German and Hungarian colonists. Nevertheless, during the period 1903-8, the Pan-Slavist

propaganda made considerable progress not only among the solid Slav ethnographical *bloc* of the Adriatic hinterland, but also among the scattered Serb settlements of the Hungarian provinces of Bacska and the Banat—a development which illustrated the intense national consciousness of the South Slavonic race. In 1906 a Serbo-Croat parliamentary coalition party was formed, which advocated the administrative union of all the Slav provinces of the Dual Monarchy, as a preliminary step to the closer union of the entire South Slavonic race. And they came into sharp conflict with the ultramontane clericals of Agram, who desired the fusion of all the South Slavs, including the independent Serbs, into one state, to form a third kingdom with Austria and Hungary, under the Habsburg sceptre.

The entire Pan-Slavist programme roused apprehension in both Vienna and Buda-Pesth, and the result was the pronounced anti-nationalist policy, directed not only to the repression of nationalism in the Habsburg provinces, but against the independent kingdom.

In October 1906 Baron Aerenthal became Austrian Foreign Minister, and he immediately undertook an anti-Slav foreign policy, which was developed in the proposal to continue the Austrian railway at Uvatz through the Sanjak of Novi Bazaar, and in the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And in the following year he attempted to precipitate a crisis with Serbia, in regard to the notorious Agram Treason Trial (March) and the no less discreditable Friedjung Case (December).

In Serbia, chauvinistic nationalism was perhaps

more justifiable than in any neighbouring country, for the axiom of the Omladina that for Serbia the alternative was "expansion or death" was tragically true. Land-locked Serbia was economically subject to Hungary, which was her largest market and controlled the Danube route for exports to Central Europe. The proposal to construct a Danube-Adriatic railway, a financially impractical scheme, was the despairing resort of a government which realised this economic servitude. In addition, the decline of Russian and the rise of Austro-German influence at Constantinople, suggested the possibility of an Austrian protectorate over Macedonia. Hence immediate expansion and the acquisition of a port, at the expense of Turkey, became a matter of vital necessity to Serbia.

In Greece the events of 1908-9 had precipitated a dangerous internal crisis, and the country had only been saved from anarchy by the vigorous personality of Eleutheros Venizelos, who had become Greek Premier in October 1910, after an adventurous career in the difficult field of Cretan politics. To this brilliant empire-builder, it seemed that a successful "nationalist" war could alone restore the morale of the Greek nation, while he, too, could not but have viewed with apprehension the evident designs of Austria on Macedonia.

It is not generally known who was the author of this league of the Balkan states against Turkey, but it is believed to have been Eleutheros Venizelos. An attack on Turkey was a necessity for Serbia, and, in a lesser degree, for Greece; it

appealed to the ambition and to the opportunism of Nicholas of Montenegro and Ferdinand of Bulgaria, and to the fervent nationalism and innate militarism of their subjects. The whole scheme was secretly supported by the Russian Government, who had now commenced to revive their interest in the Balkan question, a revival which had been marked by an unsuccessful attempt during the Italian war to obtain from the Porte a modification of the Straits regulations in favour of the Russian military flag.

In March 1912 secret agreements were concluded between Bulgaria and Serbia, and Greece and Bulgaria, for the partition of Macedonia, subject to the arbitration of the Tsar in any disputed questions.

During the summer of 1912 the situation was critical. Hostile incidents took place on the Montenegrin frontiers; there were massacres of Serbs at Berané and Kotchana, and of Bulgarians at Ishtip; there was friction between the Ottoman and Balkan governments, and Turkish troops were being concentrated in Thrace, ostensibly for manœuvres. Finally, the publication of a note in which Count Berchtold, the new Austrian Foreign Minister, proposed "progressive decentralisation" for Macedonia, caused the Balkan statesmen to fear the imminence of European intervention.

On 8th October the Montenegrins commenced hostilities and gained a number of easy initial successes, and on the 15th Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia delivered a joint note to the Porte, demanding ethnical autonomy for the European provinces of the Turkish Empire, together with certain

administrative reforms to be carried out under the supervision not only of the ambassadors of the Great Powers but also of the ministers of the Balkan States; and the demobilisation of the Ottoman army. The Turkish Government replied by declaring war on Bulgaria and Serbia, in the hope of intimidating Greece, but on 18th October Greece commenced hostilities.

These sudden developments called forth a storm of diplomatic protest from the Great Powers, but we may imagine that Berlin, Vienna, and Buda-Pesth regarded the situation with equanimity. The Turks could only oppose 400,000 men in Europe to the 700,000 of the Balkan League, but military critics judged the Serbian and Greek armies by the standards of Slivnitza and Domokos, and declared Bulgaria to be a "negligible quantity."

Their prophecies were confuted with startling rapidity. Montenegrin and Serbian troops overran the Sanjak of Novi Bazaar, and the main Montenegrin army, after entering Gusinje and Plava, the disputed districts during the impasse of 1879, and Ipek, the seat of the ancient Serbian Patriarchate, laid siege to Skutari.

The Serbian Crown Prince Alexander defeated Zekki Pasha in a two-days' battle at Kumanovo, and on 31st October King Peter entered Uskub (Skoplje), the former capital of Stephen Dushan. The remnants of the Turkish Northern Army were scattered at Prilep (5th November) and Monastir (19th November).

Meanwhile a Serbian detachment, penetrating the Albanian mountains, occupied Durazzo, thus securing a port on the Adriatic.

The Greek Crown Prince Constantine engaged Hassan Pasha at Sarandoporos, and compelled him to retreat northwards. On 28th October Hassan was again defeated at Veria, and on 8th November capitulated with 25,000 men at Salonika, "not without suspicion of treachery."[1] On the following day a Bulgarian division appeared before the town, with the object of sharing in its capture; and on the subject of its occupation, the first friction arose among the allies.

Another Greek army invaded Epirus, and after capturing Prevesa and other towns, laid siege to Janina. Meanwhile the Greek navy had rendered considerable service to the allied cause, by preventing the transport by sea of Turkish reinforcements from Asia Minor. Nine Greek-speaking islands had been occupied, and Crete had again proclaimed the Union with Greece. On the Bulgarians fell the main brunt of the Turkish resistance. The Turks had concentrated 180,000 men, or almost half their available force in Thrace, and von der Goltz had declared that the frontier-fortress of Kirk-Kilissé could withstand a Prussian siege for three months.[2]

But immediately on the declaration of war the Bulgarians, under such brilliant leaders as Popov, Savov, and Radko Dmitriev, crossed the frontier, and occupied the railway junction at Mustafa Pasha. In a two-days' battle Abdullah Pasha was defeated, and on 24th October the Bulgarians occupied Kirk-Kilissé. On the 28th they encountered the main Turkish army, under Nazim Pasha, on a line from Lulé Burgas to Visa.

[1] Eversley, p. 361. [2] Miller, p. 500.

After an obstinate resistance, the Turkish troops fled in incontinent rout; a rout which was only checked behind the lines of Chataldja.

These lines had been constructed along a ridge of hills which stretch from the Marmara to the Black Sea at a distance of nineteen miles from Constantinople. On 17th November the Bulgarian army attacked, but the Turks fought with their traditional obstinacy behind earthworks, and the assault proved a failure.

Nevertheless, this month of battles had been one of the most disastrous suffered by any nation in the annals of military history. The Turkish power in Europe had been extinguished. A few detachments of Zekki's army had taken refuge in the Albanian hills, and the garrisons of Skutari, Janina, and Adrianople still held out. But "Turkey in Europe" had virtually ceased to exist. "It is almost incomprehensible," wrote Mr Crawford Price, an eye-witness of the debacle in Thrace, "that this warlike nation, the stories of whose valour fill the most thrilling pages of the military history of the world, could have degenerated into a beaten rabble, flying before the onslaught of despised Serbians and Greeks. . . . The Greeks . . . showed themselves the superior of the Turk in organisation, strategy, and even in personal courage. . . . Words fail to describe the utter demoralisation I found in the ranks of the Turkish troops after their defeat."[1]

But the cause of Turkish failure lay not in the lack of courage in, possibly, the hardiest race in the world, but in the total incapacity of the

[1] J. M. Crawford Price, *The Balkan Cockpit*.

Turkish officers to adapt themselves to modern conditions of war. The commissariat was almost non-existent, for the Ottoman commanders adopted the mediæval policy of expecting the troops to live on the country in which they were campaigning. The men often went for three or four days without food. At Lulé Burgas Abdullah Pasha begged Mr Ashmead Bartlett for a crust of bread.

In addition, every department of the organisation was in an execrable condition. Some companies were without rifles, others without cartridges, others without bayonets. Groups of officers wandered about the battlefield looking for their companies, and companies marched and fought for days without officers. In every technical arm, Turkish officers proved themselves inferior to those of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia.

The peculiar mentality of the Turkish Moslem must be taken into consideration. That same fatalism which makes him face death with equanimity and resist odds before which the troops of other nations would quail, causes the Turkish soldier to become a panic-stricken sheep, an atom in a general *sauve qui peut*, if once his line is broken. He accepts defeat with the resignation with which he accepted the prospect of annihilation, and it is almost impossible to organise him and impel him to make another stand. It has also been suggested that the large number of Christians lately pressed into the Turkish army, formed an element of disintegration. Their sympathies were not with the cause for which they fought, and they were inclined to desert to the enemy or to their homes.

XVIII

On 3rd December, at the instance of the Powers, an armistice was concluded between Turkey and Bulgaria and Serbia, but hostilities were continued with Montenegro and Greece. On 16th December a conference of the delegates of the five belligerents met at St James's Palace, London, and at the same time Sir Edward Grey presided over a conference of the ambassadors of the Great Powers. But the negotiations proved abortive, and the attitude of the members of the Triple Alliance promised future troubles. The victories of the League had been welcomed with enthusiasm in England, and Mr Asquith had declared that "the victors are not to be robbed of the fruits which cost them so dear." But they were a serious set-back to the plans of the protagonists of the "Drang nach Osten," and it soon became evident that Vienna was not prepared to accept the new situation. Austrian troops were concentrated on the western and northern frontiers of Serbia and Montenegro, and Serbian claims to a port on the Adriatic and Montenegrin claims to Scutari were answered by the recognition of the Independence of Albania which had been proclaimed at Valona by Ismail Kiamil Bey.

On 17th January 1913 the Powers sent a note to the Porte recommending the surrender of Adrianople to the League, and the submission of the future of the Ægean Islands to a conference of the Powers. The Grand Divan at Constantinople accepted the note in principle, but on the 23rd a

military *émeute* took place at Constantinople. Enver Bey, lately returned from Cyrenaica, shot Nazim Pasha, the Seraskier; and Kiamil Pasha, the Grand Vizier, was forced to resign. Mahmud Shevket, an honest man but a pronounced militarist, succeeded him, and the fiery Enver took the post of Seraskier. Thus a violently chauvinistic clique came into power, whose avowed object was to continue the war. It is generally suspected that the coup was inspired from the German and Austrian embassies.

On 3rd February hostilities recommenced, but Turkish arms met with no better success. On 4th February the Bulgarians, supported by a Serbian army of 50,000 men, initiated an attack on Adrianople, and on the same day another Bulgarian army defeated the Turks at Bulair, threatening the occupation of the Gallipoli Peninsula. On 6th March Janina capitulated to the Greeks; on 10th March Greek troops occupied Samos; on 28th March Shukri Pasha, with 17,000 men, surrendered Adrianople; and on 21st April King Nicholas entered Skutari. Of all their possessions in Europe Constantinople alone remained to the Turks, and the C.U.P. was now willing to make peace, even at the cost of Adrianople and Thrace. Accordingly they requested the mediation of the Powers, and at the beginning of May a second conference met in London.

At the London Conference a most dangerous situation soon developed. The agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria, reached in March of the previous year, had been concluded on the assumption that the territory to be disposed of would be confined to Macedonia. Northern Macedonia or

Old Serbia had been allotted to Serbia, Central Macedonia, including Monastir and Okhrida, to Bulgaria, while the region of Uskub had been constituted a neutral zone, upon whose future possession the Emperor of Russia was to arbitrate.

M. Venizelos had put forward no specific claims, but it was assumed that Greece would acquire, in addition to Crete, Southern Macedonia and possibly Salonika.

The situation was now embarrassed, firstly, by the erection of an independent Albanian principality under the patronage of Austria and Italy, which had the effect of precluding Serbia from an outlet to the Adriatic; and secondly, by the Bulgarian occupation of Adrianople and the major part of Thrace, an eventuality which had not been foreseen.

Serbia found herself menaced by the establishment of an independent Albania, which it was designed should become an Austrian protectorate, and whose south-eastern frontier would be coterminous with that of an enlarged Bulgaria.

Bulgaria demanded the rich tobacco-growing district of Kavalla, and Salonika, the economic centre of all the Balkan countries, to both of which Greece could lay claim on historical and ethnographical grounds.

M. Venizelos acted with admirable moderation. He was willing to waive the well-substantiated claims of Greece to Southern Thrace and the Ægean coast, where the population was mainly Greek, but expected Bulgaria to compromise her claims to Salonika and its Bulgar-populated hinterland. Similarly it was suggested that

Bulgaria should accept Adrianople in settlement of her claims on Uskub, which in turn should constitute compensation to Serbia for her exclusion from the Adriatic.

But the attitude of the Bulgarian delegates was unconciliatory and threatening. They persisted in demanding not only Thrace and Adrianople, but Kavalla and the major part of Macedonia. M. Gueshov, the able and moderate Premier, who had been one of the men responsible for the formation of the League, resigned, and King Ferdinand, supported by the chauvinists, became increasingly bellicose.

The situation was further complicated by the demand of Rumania for the rectification of her difficult Dobrudja frontier by the cession of Silistria.

The question of the responsibility of Austrian diplomacy in provoking the war between Bulgaria and the other members of the League has been much discussed. The semi-official Vienna *Reichspost* boasted that the rupture was the deliberate work of the Ballplatz. "From the beginning," it wrote, "we knew of the formation of the Balkan Alliance, and we set ourselves to break it."[1] M. Mishev, a distinguished Bulgarian publicist, writing in the summer of 1915, declared that "It can no longer be denied that Austria drew Bulgaria into the war with the Balkan Allies." That "war was a vital question for Austria, and in order to provoke an armed conflict, Austria-Hungary had in all likelihood promised that she would support Bulgaria not only diplomatically but also by other and

[1] *Quarterly Review*, April 1915, p. 430.

more efficacious means—by war. By such a promise the rear of Bulgaria on the Rumanian and Turkish frontiers would be guaranteed. . . . That our High Command must have received such a guarantee is to be inferred from the negligent and light-hearted manner in which our High Commanders declared war. They were absolutely convinced that neither Rumania nor Turkey would cross our open frontiers."[1]

Further, M. Take Jonescu affirmed that during May 1913 Prince Fürstenburg, the Austrian Minister at Bukharest, informed him that he had received instructions to assure the Rumanian Government that Austria was prepared to give military assistance to Bulgaria. This evidence is further corroborated by H. von Bulow's statement[2] in his book, *Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Balkan States*, that "Previously to the Serbo-Bulgarian War, Prince Fürstenburg negotiated with Maiorescu, and offered, in exchange for the Bulgarian territory demanded by Rumania, a portion of Serbian territory, in the certain case of a Bulgarian victory;" and also by Signor Giolitti's statement in the Italian Chamber, that in August 1913 Count Berchtold had negotiated at Rome with regard to a proposed attack on Serbia.

Thus it must be concluded that in the summer of 1914 King Ferdinand felt confident of the success of an aggressive policy towards, and, if necessary, a military attack on Serbia and Greece.

It was evident that he was prepared to persist

[1] Logio, "Bulgarian Problems and Politics," page 96.
[2] D. Mitrany, Rumania, p. 304.

in his unyielding attitude, in spite of the pressing advice of the Russian Government. Accordingly, Greece and Serbia concluded a defensive military convention. The Balkan League was broken.

On 29th June at midnight, the Bulgarian troops suddenly attacked the Serbian outposts along the line of the Bregalnica. At first the Serbians were forced back. But on 1st July they were reinforced, and in a two-days' battle completely defeated the Bulgarians. Meanwhile, the new Greek King Constantine had advanced from Salonika and inflicted a severe defeat on a Bulgarian army between the Struma and the Vardar. Further successes followed at Doiran and Strumnitza; the Rumanians crossed the Danube, occupied Silistria and advanced to Plevna. The Turks also resumed hostilities; Enver Pasha captured Adrianople by a night attack, and later occupied Demotika and Kirk-Kilissé. The condition of Bulgaria was hopeless; on all sides the country lay open to hostile armies; famine broke out at Sofia. A month after the treacherous attack on the Bregnalica, King Ferdinand sued for peace.

On 10th August his humiliation was crowned by the Treaty of Bukharest, and the Balkan Wars were terminated by the two subsidiary Treaties of Constantinople (between Bulgaria and Turkey), and Athens (between Greece and Turkey).

Rumania obtained from Bulgaria the two districts of Silistria and Dobrich, the greater part of which had originally been assigned to Rumania by the Treaty of San Stefano.

Bulgaria obtained part of Thrace, a strip of

the Ægean Coast with a port at Dédé Agatch, and a small part of Eastern Macedonia.

Serbia divided the Sanjak of Novi Bazaar with Montenegro, and received Northern and Central Macedonia, including Uskub, Monastir, and Okhrida; Montenegro also received districts of Northern Albania.

Greece gained most; her territory and population was doubled; she received Crete and other islands, Southern Macedonia, Salonika, and the districts of Kavalla and Serres.

Turkey was confirmed in the restoration of Adrianople and part of Thrace.

XIX

The cause of Nationalism had secured a decided triumph. It seemed that the ideal of "the Balkans for the Balkan Peoples," which thirty years ago had been but a dream, had become a reality. The kingdom of Greece now included within its boundaries almost all the Greek-speaking communities of the continent; Salonika, the chief port of the Peninsula, was a Greek town; the rich region of Kavalla was Greek; the Greek flag waved over the greater islands of the Ægean; of all the Greek lands, the coast of Western Asia Minor alone remained in the hands of the Turk.

The ideal of Greater Serbia seemed nearer of attainment. Half a million Serbs in Old Serbia had been united to the kingdom, and the ancient capital of Stephen Dushan had been regained.

And although Serbia had not obtained a seaport, a commercial treaty with Greece allowed her the use of Salonika, and her frontiers were now coterminous with those of Montenegro.

At least, the Treaty of Bukharest was an improvement on that of Berlin. But human nature is such that man is spoiled by victory. The Nationalist proves himself to have been an Imperialist in adversity, and the Patriot develops into the Annexationist.

To Serbians and Greeks the Second Balkan War appeared to be "the crowning mercy"; but six years of history have sufficed to show that it was not only for Bulgarians, but for Serbians, Greeks, and Rumanians, an unmitigated catastrophe.

If, after the war with Turkey, an amicable settlement had been achieved, the formation of a permanent Balkan League of the two Latin and three Slavonic countries of South-Eastern Europe, would have been an ideal possible of attainment. Such a political alliance would have been a security for the peace and stability of the Near East, while the united military power of the five allies would have been a formidable and potent factor in European politics. To the Habsburg Empire the League would have been a grave menace, and to Russia an ally of the greatest importance. The satisfaction of Serbian and Rumanian "nationalist" claims on Austria-Hungary, and of Greek on Turkey in Asia, might have been obtained within the following quarter of a century. But the Ballplatz realised the danger. The victories of the Serbians in Macedonia had been acclaimed with

ominous enthusiasm throughout the Southern Slavonic provinces. "We knew of the formation of the Balkan Alliance, and we set ourselves to break it"—that sinister sentence should ring through the centuries, the battle-cry of the heartless, political philosophy which we call Imperialism.

And so the settlement of the Turkish Question only sowed the seeds of a crop of other questions—the Dobrudja Question, the Kavalla Question, a new Macedonian Question, and the Epirus Question.

At Bukharest, Venizelos, the only statesman there, had vainly advocated moderation to Bulgaria. But purblind chauvinism triumphed. Rumania insisted on her strategic frontier, and added a quarter of a million Bulgars to her population; Serbia, excluded from the Adriatic sea-board by Austro-Italian diplomacy, annexed whole districts of Bulgarian Macedonia; and Constantine, "flushed with the victory of Kilkish," could scarcely be restrained from depriving Bulgaria of Dédé Agatch and Porto Lagos.

The independent shepherd-state of Albania, erected by the London Conference in December, had proved a field where the diplomacy of the Triple Alliance might find full scope. A German princeling, William of Wied, was installed at Durazzo who proved but an Austrian puppet. And in October 1913 the Austrian Government found occasion to address an ultimatum to Serbia, demanding the evacuation of certain frontier villages.

Now Bulgaria, weak and broken by two wars, her people ruined and disappointed, defiant and sullen, her exchequer bankrupt, her administration

chaotic, was reduced to that condition of hopelessness which is the opportunity of the hostile diplomat, the foreign-paid agitator, and the grinding concessionaire.

King Ferdinand, whose creatures were badly defeated in the General Election held during the winter of 1913, was forced to dissolve Parliament and to hold another election in which he obtained the majority for the Government, only by gross "jerrymandering" at the polls, and by seeking the support of the Turkish representatives from the newly acquired territories.[1] Many of these were members of the C.U.P. and continued to take their orders from Constantinople. As a result the Porte was able to exercise considerable influence on the course of events in the neighbouring country. Further, the Bulgarian Government, being unable to obtain credit at London or Paris, was constrained to grant concessions to German and Austrian financiers, which virtually placed the control of the railways, coal supply, and chief industries of the country in the hands of Berlin and Vienna.

XX

With the Treaty of Bukharest, the history of the Turks in Europe is at an end. It is at present impossible to write a measured and impartial account of the history of the Turkish Empire during the period of 1914-19. Until German generals and Turkish pashas, all the leading actors in the great drama as it was played on the Bosphorus,

[1] Logio, Bulgaria.

give their memoirs to the world, it will be impossible to gauge accurately the course of events at Constantinople. The chief figures loom as intangible shadows in the mist of secrecy and rumour and false report which effectively obscures all that has passed there. The hideous results of that which passed we know, the sinister causes we can as yet but vaguely discern.

Massacre and famine of a nature unprecedented since the days of Timur Leng are rife from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. The ghastly struggle for Gallipoli, the thirst-mad agony of Kut, the horrors of those blizzard battles at Sari-Kamish and Erzerum are tragedies, the reality of which must stun the imagination of a contemporary generation and paralyse the descriptive pen of the chronicler. But of the unhappy individuals who are held responsible for these great culminations of the savagery and ignorance of man, and whom the world calls leaders, we know little. Mr Morgenthau has attempted to reveal them to us. We can descry them indistinctly—Mahommed the Sultan, the Khalif, a weak, dyspeptic, flaccid man, dazed by his own impotence; Izzet-ed-din, impulsive, honest, obscurely murdered; Enver, "hero of the Revolution," brave, conceited, unscrupulous by circumstance; Talaat, the Pomak peasant, rough, "self-made," unscrupulous by instinct; the three typical Germans, von Wangenheim, the devious, callous diplomat; old von der Goltz, the scientific strategist; Liman von Sanders, the keen, ruthless soldier; and a host of others, Germans, Turks, Greeks, Jews, all brave or vain or grasping or sincere or venal or anxious or incapable, like

other mortals, who are born, and struggle, and die.

But a chronicle of the events of the Great War as they affected the Turkish Empire should be styled, not a "A History of the Turks in Europe" but a "A History of the Germans in Turkey." During the winter of 1913-14, German influence at Constantinople rose to its zenith. The defeat of Lulé Burgas had made possible the success of the clique of which Enver Pasha was the leading figure, and the re-capture of Adrianople strengthened their power. Moslem opinion regarded the easy successes over the Bulgarians as a result of the patriotic policy of the chauvinists.

Enver, the popular hero of Stambul, favoured the Germans. But it would be unjust to assume that he accepted bribes from Berlin. In thought he was a simple mediocrity. He had the mentality of the soldier-adventurer. He was an Imperialist-Idealist. He was very young and his limited brain was intoxicated by the meteoric brilliancy of his career.

And Baron Marschall played his cards well. He flattered the ingenuous military ambitions of these Young Turks. He spoke of the Baghdad Railway, and of the potential riches of the Mesopotamian Basin and the Iranian Plateau, the development of which would make possible "the renaissance of a great Caliphate as prosperous as that of the Abbasides . . . strong with the solidity and courage of the Turks rendered effective by German Kultur." He flashed before their amazed imaginations the possibility of a great Turanian Empire, the frontiers of which would

press back the Russians to the Kuban, include all the Moslem tribes of the Caucasus and the Azerbaijani Tatars, and extend east of the Caspian to the Chinese frontier. He suggested a Pan-Islamic scheme which should aim at suzerainty over all Islamic lands — over Hindustan and Persia, Egypt and North Africa—a fantastic Pan-Turanianism, a wild Pan-Islamism, but dreams calculated to inflame the brains of young officers unbalanced by success.

Meanwhile, German officers were reorganising the demoralised Turkish army, German bankers were negotiating a loan, the consideration of which had been refused at London and Paris, and German diplomacy was encouraging Constantinople to refuse to adopt M. Charikov's project for Armenian Reform.

But in those first months of 1914 the whole of Europe was drifting towards catastrophe. The Balkan Wars were but a prelude to the World War; the Peace of Bukharest, hailed as the settlement of the Near Eastern question, was but an armistice. Already the peasants of the Volga were arming to kill the clerks and shopkeepers of Vienna, and the miners of Westphalia were being drilled to slaughter the cotton-spinners of Manchester.

War was coming, glorious War, with its "victorious advances" of Crown Princes and Grand Dukes, with its "marvellous strokes" of national heroes, with its "strategic retirements" and "successful evacuations." But such a war as might even have caused to pause those poor feckless robbers called Imperialists, who think

that a dynasty is worth so many million lives, and a captured coalfield cheap at cost of a hundred thousand broken hearts.

War, "when a man who never knows it, kills a man he's never seen," which, stripped of its declarations and proclamations and bulletins and communiqués and treaties, of its victory-parades and processions, and victorious occupations and thanksgiving services, is but a ghastly hell of wholesale murder, of broken bodies and stricken hearts, of famine and disease, of "cruel necessity" and wicked terror, of massacre and persecution, of the senseless destruction of that which sober Man has laboured years to build, of the satisfaction of the lowest instincts, pride, animosity, cruelty, and lust!

"Political necessity," "the struggle for existence," "the healthy expansion of the strong," "as long as there are brave men in the world they will fight," protests the apologist; but War must ever be the negation of Christ, of those principles which men called civilised profess to have made their own.

In this great death-crash of a political system, the fate of the Turkish Empire was but an incident. At first the War took the form of a contest between two rival groups of states, but as it lengthened, and particularly after the fall of the Romanovs, it developed into a struggle of abstract principles. Although the attitude of the leaders of some of the Allied nations at the Peace Conference may cause sceptics to demur, it is undeniable that Austro-Germany stood for Reaction and a paternal system of government as opposed to Progress and the principle of the Government of

the People by the People, for Imperialism and Colonial exploitation as opposed to Nationalism and the principle that a backward country should be governed for the benefit of the indigent people, for individualistic Industrialism as opposed to the principle that the wealth of the world is for the people. The ecstatic Pan-Turanians of Constantinople glibly closed the Dardanelles for their German allies, and sent their war-weary peasantry to fight in Caucasia, Mesopotamia, and Egypt. But alike in victory or defeat the Ottoman Empire could not continue to exist as an independent Imperial State. If Germany were victorious, Turkey, however aggrandised, was destined to become an Austro-German Protectorate; if the Reactionary Alliance were broken, the fate of Turkey was indissolubly bound up with that of Austria-Hungary and Romanov Russia, the other "Gaoler-States."

Indeed, the great historical anomaly is, that the Ottoman Empire should have continued to exist into the Twentieth Century.

And at last the day has come, when those strange barbarians who followed

> ". . . the simple plan,
> That they should take who have the power,
> And they should keep who can,"

have been driven for ever from their tortured provinces.

The army of occupation has evacuated the country!

At the beginning of this book we asked "How was it possible for an obscure tribe of nomad

shepherds from the depths of Central Asia to impose its dominion upon a dozen nations of Europe?"

A study of the history of the Balkans for the last five hundred years sufficiently answers that question.

The eternal vultures gather round the eternal corpse, from Carlovicz to Versailles. The table of History is littered with "scraps of paper." Julius Cæsarini was not more plausible than Gorchakov, Andrassy, Ærenthal.

Intolerance, savagery, callousness, exploitation, down through all centuries to the Twentieth Century!

Armies march—men, mailed and turbaned, sashed and wigged, helmeted and moustached, masked and drugged, through the Ages. And still men slaughter men because they make different noises with their mouths; villages go up in flame and smoke; women mourn and children starve; plague carries off the strong; men lie parched and mutilated; horses strain in dumb agony, in millions they strain eternally.

How stupid is Man, not wicked but stupid, always stupid!

Dimly, in the chaos of the Ages, we discern the pigmy figures of the great, sometimes heroic, more often pathetic, helpless, meaningless. Proud, cruel Bayazid, caged like a broken bird, sees Despina's naked beauty prostrate before the leering eyes of that lame old grizzled Tatar. Constantine, last of the Cæsars, sobs out his prayers in the gorgeous gloom of Sancta Sophia. Grey old Suleiman lies stark in his litter before the walls of

Sziget. Peter, the empire-builder, in his fœtid camp at Husshi, pens to Moscow his letter of despair. Milosh, son of Obren, gathers his peasants beneath Takovo's oak tree. Osman, type of all that was brave and sincere in Old Turkey, lies maimed and despairing in that broken cottage, and hears the Russians marching in to Plevna.

And what of the Conquerors, the Imperial Race, the Dominant Caste, the everlasting Army of Occupation?

"More than any the Turks suffer," wrote that most charming of essayists, Léon Ostrorog. "From the Indian Ocean to the Balkans, from the Persian frontier to the Ionian Sea, whosoever digs the soil will find everywhere the bones of Anatolian peasants. They have fought all the campaigns, the most desperate and the most stupid. . . . In the autumn of 1912, when the Balkan War becoming inevitable, general mobilisation was decreed, we saw them coming into Constantinople, in interminable files, two by two, holding one another's hands like children, beardless youths, men in middle life, and in hoary old age.

". . . With horror in our hospitals, we saw soldiers die, not of wounds but of hunger. So long it was since they had eaten that their throats had grown incapable of swallowing. . . . Now, as I write, in the cottages throughout Anatolia there must be a great lamentation, women weeping the dead of Gallipoli after the dead of the Balkans."



RISE AND DECLINE OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE (1343-1812)

Figures indicate date or approximate date of Acquisition by the Turks, e.g., Constantinople, 1453

Hyphened figures indicate date of acquisition and loss by the Turks, e.g., Crimea, 1475-1774

Turkish Frontiers at their greatest extent, circum 1683

Turkish Vassal States lost or independent by 1812

Turkish Territory lost to 1812

Site of Battle

The Frontiers of States, as they existed previous to the Turkish conquest, are not indicated for the sake of clearness, but the following were the States in existence, circum 1360

1. *—The Hungarian Empire of Louis the Great, including part of Bosnia, Wallachia, Bukovina, and Red Russia*
2. *—The already disintegrating Serbian Empire, of Stephen Nejaki, son of Stephen Dushan, which included parts of Albania, Thessaly and Macedonia*
3. *—The Bulgarian Kingdom of Tsar Alexander, soon to be divided, under his three sons, into the Principalities of Dobrudja, Tirnovo and Vidin*
4. *—The Latin Principalities in Albania and Greece*
5. *—The lands and islands of the Greek Empire*
6. *—The possessions of the Venetian and Genoese Republics*
7. *—The possessions of the Knights of St. John and the Duke of Naxos*

CHIEF EVENTS OF OTTOMAN HISTORY, 1288-1914.

End of 13th Century .	Irruption of Chingiz Khan. Er-Togrhul settles at Eski Shehr.
1288 . .	Osman chief or amir of the Osmanli.
1326 . .	Capture of Brusa.
1326-39 .	Orkhan forms a standing army.
1343 . .	Turkish mercenaries assist John Cantacuzene.
1349 . .	„ „ „ in relief of Salonika.
1353 . .	Turks occupy Gallipoli: later, Demotika and Chorlu.
c. 1359 .	Murad I. forms the Janissary Corps.
1361 . .	Capture of Adrianople.
1363 . .	Hungarians, Bulgars, and Serbs defeated at Harmanli on the Maritza.
1365 . .	Ragusan Republic makes Treaty of Commerce with Murad.
1371 . .	Bulgars and Serbs defeated at Samakov. Conquest of Macedonia.
1387 . .	Genoese commercial Treaty with Murad.
1388 . .	Venetian „ „ „
1389 . .	Battle of Kossovo. Serbia reduced to vassalage.
1393 . .	Fall of Tirnovo. End of the Bulgarian kingdom.
1396 . .	Sigismund's Franco-German Crusaders routed at Nikopol.
1400-2 .	Timur the Tatar invades Armenia. Battle of Angora.
1402-13 .	Civil war in Turkish dominions. Mahommed I. becomes Sultan. Venice and Genoa renew their treaties.
1430 . .	Capture of Salonika by Murad II.

1436 . .	War with Hungary. Bosnia and Wallachia vassals of the Sultan.
1443 . .	Murad defeated at Belgrad. Hunyadi's victories at Hermanstadt and Varsag. Invasion of Serbia.
1444 . .	Treaty of Szegeddin. Vladislas of Hungary defeated at Varna.
1448 . .	Hunyadi defeated at Kossovo. Wars with the Albanians.
1451 . .	Accession of Mahommed the Conqueror.
1453 . .	Fall of Constantinople.
1453-81 .	Conquest of Trebizond. Venetians driven from Eubœa. Conquest of the Crimea. Subjugation of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Wallachia. Friuli devastated. Capture of Otranto. But Mahommed defeated at Belgrad, Semendria, and Rhodes.
1481-1512 .	Peaceful reign of Bayazid II. Construction of the Turkish fleet.
1512-20 .	Reign of Selim I. Religious massacres. War against Persia. Conquest of Syria, Egypt, and Arabia Felix. Turkish Sultans assume title of Khalif (1516).
1520 . .	Suleiman I. the Magnificent. Capture of Belgrad.
1521 . .	Knights of St John lose Rhodes.
1526 . .	Battle of Mohacs and capture of Buda-Pesth.
1529 . .	Siege of Vienna.
1535 . .	Alliance with France. First capitulations.
1533-65 .	Successes of Kheir-ed-din Barbarossa, Dragut, and Piale. Conquest of North Africa. Battle of Prevesa. Siege of Malta.
1566 . .	Siege of Sziget and death of Suleiman. Accession of Selim the Sot. Rule of Grand Vizier Mahommed Sokolovich. Proposition to construct Suez and Volga-Don canals.
1568 . .	Russians defeat Tatar-Turkish army at Astrakhan.
1571 . .	Battle of Lepanto.
1573 . .	Venice cedes Cyprus to the Porte.
1578 . .	Death of Mahommed Sokolovich. Decay sets in.

1582 . .	William Harebone in Constantinople.
1593 . .	War with Austria. Michael attempts to form a United Rumania.
1596 . .	Austrians defeated at Cerestes.
1604 . .	Capitulations to Henry IV.
1606 . .	Treaty of Sitvatorok.
1622 . .	Sir Thomas Roe in Turkey. Accession of Murad IV. Drastic reforms.
1655 . .	Blake visits Tunis and Algiers.
1656 . .	Reforms of Mahommed Köprili.
1663 . .	Agreement between Britain and Turkey respecting Barbary corsairs. War breaks out with Austria. Campaign in Hungary. Battle of St Gotthard. Treaty of Vascar.
1669 . .	Capitulation of Candia.
1672-76 .	War with Poland. Treaty of Zurawnow. Podolia ceded to the Turks. French fleet in the Dardanelles. Capitulations of 1673. Death of Ahmed Köprili.
1683-96 .	War with Austria. Siege of Vienna. Relief by Sobieski. Coalition of Austria, Poland, Russia, and Venice against Turkey. Loss of Buda-Pesth, Belgrad, the Morea, and Azov. Defeats at Zlankamen and Zenta. Peace of Carlovicz.
1711 . .	Affair of the Pruth. Treaty of Falksen.
1715 . .	Reconquest of the Morea.
1716 . .	War with Austria. Battle of Pietervaradin. Fall of Belgrad.
1718 . .	Treaty of Passarovicz.
1735-38 .	Russo - Austrian coalition against Turkey. Münnich captures Ochakov. Austrians defeated at Krotzka. Peace of Belgrad.
1738-68 .	Continued internal decay.
1768-74 .	Russo-Turkish war. Crimea ravaged. Battle of Chesmè. Treaty of Kutchuk Kainadji.
1784 . .	Meeting of Catherine and Joseph at Kherson.
1787-91 .	Russo-Austrian coalition against Turkey. Austria withdraws. Treaty of Sistova. Russian victories. Treaty of Jassy. 1789. Accession of Selim III. Outbreak of the French

		Revolution. Anarchy in the provinces. Age of the independent pashas.
1798	. .	Napoleon lands in Egypt. Nelson sinks the French fleet in Aboukir Bay.
1799	. .	Failure of the Siege of Acre. Turkish army defeated at Aboukir. Napoleon returns to France.
1801	. .	Abercrombie occupies Egypt.
1802	. .	Peace of Amiens. Turkey and Russia joint-Protectors of Septinsular Republic.
1804	. .	Serbian peasant rising against the Janissaries.
1805	. .	Treaty of Pressburg. Marmont in Dalmatia. Sebastiani and Italinski at Constantinople. Meeting of the first Serbian Skupshtina.
1807	. .	Russians invade Rumania. Duckworth in the Dardanelles. Palace revolutions at Constantinople. Accession of Mahmud II. Mahommed Ali defeats the British in Egypt. Napoleon and Alexander meet at Tilsit "to form an Imperial Duumvirate of the world."
1809	. .	Peace of the Dardanelles. Russians capture Rustchuk and Sistovo.
1812	. .	Stratford Canning negotiates the Treaty of Bukharest between Russia and Turkey. Subsequent reduction of Serbia.
1812-14	.	Last Campaigns of Napoleon. The Turks refrain from attacking Russia. Philiké Hetairia formed at Odessa.
1815	. .	Congress of Vienna. Rising of Milosh Obrenovich.
1817	. .	Autonomy for Serbia. Obrenovich Prince.
1821	. .	Unsuccessful rising of Greeks in Rumania. Outbreak of the Revolution in the Morea. The "Peloponnesian Senate." Fall of Tripolitza. Massacres of Moslems and Jews.
1822	. .	"Constitution of Epidauros." Massacres of Greeks at Constantinople and elsewhere. Failure of Turkish attempt to pacify the Morea.
1823	. .	National Assembly at Argos. Arrival of Byron. Hostilities between Kolokotrones and the primates. Congress of Verona.

1824-25 . Ibrahim lands at Modon and lays siege to Navarino. Complete defeat of the Greeks. Ibrahim and Reshid Kioutages reduce the Morea. Greek Government removes to Poros. *Accession of the Emperor Nicholas I.*

1826 . . Wellington at St Petersburg. Massacres of the Janissaries. Mahmud training a New Army. Nicholas imposes the Convention of Akkerman.

1827 . . Treaty of London provides for intervention in Greece by Britain, Russia, and France. Battle of Navarino. Ibrahim evacuates the Morea.

1828-29 . Arrival of John Capo d'Istria, first "President," in Greece. Mahmud denounces the Convention of Akkerman. The Russians invade Bulgaria and Armenia. Fall of Varna. Battle of Kulevcha. Diebich crosses the Balkans. The last Turks expelled from the Morea by a Franco-Greek force. Mahmud accepts Peace of Adrianople.

1830 . . *Revolutions in France and Poland.*

1831 . . Pan-Mahommedan risings in Bosnia and Albania. Assassination of Capo d'Istria. Ibrahim overruns Syria.

1832 . . Grand Vizier Reshid defeated at Konieh.

1833 . . Russian fleet in the Bosphorus. Convention of Kutayeh and Treaty of Khunkiar-Iskelessi. Nesselrode and Metternich conclude Convention of Münchengrätz. Uneasiness in England. Otho of Bavaria, King of Greece.

1835 . . Movement in Serbia against Obrenovich. "Constitution of Sretenje."

1839 . . Turks defeated at Nisibin. Death of Mahmud II. Accession of Abdul Medjid. Hatti-Humayun of Gul-Khaneh. Turkish fleet surrenders at Alexandria. European crisis. In Serbia, Milosh abdicates, and is succeeded by his son Michael Obrenovich.

1840 . . Treaty of London stipulates for coercion of Mahommed Ali.

1841 . . Straits Convention. Stratford Canning Ambassador at Constantinople.

1842 . . Alexander Karageorgevich Prince of Serbia.

1843 . . Constitution in Greece. Expulsion of Otho's Bavarian ministers.

1848 . . *"The Year of Revolutions."* The Russians in Rumania. Convention of Balta Liman. Russo-Turkish crisis with regard to the extradition of the Hungarian refugees.

1851 . . Rising in Bosnia headed by Ali Pasha Risvan-begovich.

1852 . . "The sick man is dying." *Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of the French.*

1853 . . The Question of the Holy Places. Menshikov at Constantinople. The Russians in Rumania. Nationalist movement in Greece. Turkish defensive victories at Kalafat and Oltenitza. Sea-fight at Sinope.

1854 . . Britain and France declare war. Paskievich evacuates the Principalities, and they are occupied by the Austrians.

1854-55 . The Crimean and Kars campaigns. Sardinian troops co-operate. The Allies reduce Sevastopol but the Russians capture Kars. Operations in the Baltic and Pacific. Allies at the Piræus.

1856 . . *The Congress of Paris.* The Hatti-Humayun.

1857 . . *Unsuccessful Nationalist Movement in India.*

1858 . . Stratford de Redcliffe leaves Constantinople. Death of Reshid. Riza Grand Vizier. Turks defeated at Grahovo.

1859 . . Col. Alexander Cusa, elected Prince of Moldavia and Wallachia.

1861-62 . Accession of Abdul Aziz. Military revolt in Greece. Deposition of Otho. Nationalist movement threatens among the South Slavs: repressed by Omar.

1863 . . *Polish insurrection. European crisis.*

1864 . . *Danish War. Another crisis.* Cession of Ionian Islands to Greece. Midhat vali of Bulgaria. George I., King of Greece.

1866 . . Porte consents to evacuation of the Serbian fortresses. Palace-revolution in Bukharest.

Nomination of Prince Charles. Cretan insurrection. *Prusso-Austrian War.* Gen. Manteuffel visits St Petersburg.

1867 . . Michael Obrenovich contemplates Balkan confederation against Turkey.

1868-69 . He is murdered. Accession of Milan. Turko-Greek crisis. Intervention of the Powers. Establishment of an autocephalous Bulgarian Church. Inauguration of the Suez Canal.

1870 . . *"L'année terrible."* Russia repudiates the Treaty of Paris, and is supported by Germany.

1875 . . Insurrection in Herzegovina; spreads to Bosnia; unrest among all the Southern Slavs. The Andrassy Note.

1876 . . "The Bulgarian Atrocities." Indignation in England. Fall of Abdul Aziz. Midhat in power. Campaigns against the Serbians and Montenegrins. The Powers impose an armistice at request of Prince Milan; terminated by the Serbians. Continued Turkish successes. Russian ultimatum. Bellicose speeches of Beaconsfield at Aylesbury and the Guildhall, and of the Emperor Alexander at Moscow. Conference of the Powers at Constantinople. "Midhat's Constitution."

1877 . . Failure of the Conference. Fall of Midhat. Treaty of Peace with Serbia. Russia declares war. Turkish campaign in Montenegro. Russian invasion of Bulgaria and Armenia. Collapse of Turkish resistance. Renewal of war with Serbia. Insurrections in Crete, Thessaly, and Epirus.

1878 . . Armistice of Adrianople. British fleet in the Sea of Marmora. Treaty of San Stefano. European crisis. Emperor Alexander consents to Congress of Berlin. TREATY OF BERLIN. Cyprus Convention.

1879 . . *Austro-German Treaty of Alliance signed at Gastein.*

1879-80 . The Albanians resist concessions to Montenegro. Mahommed Ali Pasha murdered at Ipek. Allied fleet compels cession of Dulcigno to

Montenegro. German Military Mission sent to Turkey.

1881 . . French Acquisition of Tunis. Austro-Serbian Treaty. Persecution and exile of Midhat Pasha and others.

1882 . . Thessaly ceded to Greece. Rising of Ahmed Pasha Arabi in Egypt. Crisis with regard to Egyptian affairs. *Italy joins the Austro-German Alliance.*

1883 . . Bratianu interviews Bismarck. Germans secure lease of Ismidt-Haidar Pasha Railway. Serious revolts in the Yemen.

1885 . . Rumelian Crisis. Serbo-Bulgarian War.

1886 . . Enforced abdication of Prince Alexander. Russian intrigues.

1887 . . Collapse of Russian interference in Bulgaria. Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha elected Prince. Stambulov Premier.

1888 . . Completion of Belgrad-Constantinople Railway.

1889 . . German Emperor visits Abdul Hamid at Constantinople. Anatolian Railway Company obtains concession to construct extension to Konieh.

1890 . . *Fall of Bismarck.*

1891 . . Troubles in Old Serbia between Moslem Albanians and Serbs. Committee of Union and Progress formed at Geneva.

1892 . . Renewed insurrection in the Red Sea vilayets: there is serious unrest among the Arab tribes during the next twenty years.

1893 . . Massacres of Armenians in different parts of Asiatic Turkey begin: result of Abdul Hamid's policy of Turkification and of agitation of Armenian nationalists: these massacres continue intermittently during the next twenty years.

1894 . . Fall and persecution of Stambulov.

1895 . . He is murdered.

1896 . . Cretan insurrection. Turko-Greek crisis.

1897 . . Edhem Pasha overruns Thessaly. Treaty signed at Constantinople.

1898 . . Second visit of the German Emperor to Constantinople. Anatolian Railway Company receives concession to undertake extension from Konieh to the Persian Gulf: Mr Balfour in the House of Commons applauds this enterprise. Disorders in Greece as a result of the unsuccessful war. Prince George of Greece "High Commissioner of Crete." Much Moslem emigration from the island.

1899 . . Flight of Damad Mahmud Djelal-ed-din Pasha to Paris.

1900 . . Death of Ghazi Mushir Osman Nuri Pasha, defender of Plevna.

1902 . . Disgrace and disappearance of Mushir Fuad Pasha.

1903 . . Austro-Russian scheme of reform for Macedonia. Continued disorders in Macedonia. King Edward visits Vienna, and the Emperors Francis Joseph and Nicholas meet at Mürsteg. King Alexander Obrenovich murdered in Belgrad. Prince Peter Karageorgevich becomes King: under influence of the regicides.

1904 . . Mürsteg Programme submitted to the Porte: its failure. Anglo-French Agreement recognises Britain's special position in Egypt. *Agreements between Britain, France, and Spain with regard to Morocco. Franco-German estrangement on the Moroccan question. Manchurian War and revolutionary movement in Russia.*

1905 . . Continued disorders in Macedonia.

1906 . . Central Committee of C.U.P. at Salonika.

1907 . . Anglo-Russian Partition of Persia into "spheres of influence."

1908 . . Signs of approaching European intervention precipitate action by the Young Turks. Abdul Hamid restores the Constitution. Young Turks in power. Austria annexes Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ferdinand proclaimed Tsar of Bulgaria at Tirnovo. Crete demands union with Greece.

1909-10 . Reactionary movement at Constantinople re-

pressed. Abdul Hamid deposed. Young Turk extremists in power. Methods of repression throughout the Empire during the three following years. Greece overawed: the Military League and the advent of Venizelos. The Agram Treason Trial and the Friedjung Case.

1911 . . Turko-Italian campaign in Tripoli and Cyrenaica.

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